Xi Jinping is the top leader in the Communist Party of China and the President of the People’s Republic of China.

xi jinping photo via getty images

Who Is Xi Jinping?

Born in 1953 to a Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leader, Xi Jinping worked his way up the party ranks to become a major player in the Chinese Politburo. By 2013, Xi was elected General Secretary of the Communist Party, Chair of the Military Commission and President of the People’s Republic of China. Although he earned criticism for human rights violations and disruptive economic regulations, Xi also continued the country's rise as a global superpower. His name and philosophy was added to the party constitution in 2017, and the following year he successfully pushed for the abolition of presidential term limits.

In 1966, Mao launched the Cultural Revolution, a sociopolitical movement intended to preserve “true” Communist ideology and purge remnants of capitalist society. All formal education was halted, and Xi, at that time in high school, was sent down to work in a remote farming village for seven years, doing manual chores and subsisting on rice gruel. It was there that Xi grew up both physically and mentally. Considered a weakling when he first arrived, he grew strong and compassionate and developed good relations working alongside the villagers. Though the Cultural Revolution was a failure, Xi emerged with a sense of idealism and pragmatism.

Rise in the Communist Party

After numerous unsuccessful attempts, in 1974 Xi was accepted into the Communist Party. The following year he began to study chemical engineering at Beijing’s Tsinghua University, earning a degree in 1979. From that point forward, he steadily rose through the ranks of the Communist Party. Between 1979 and 1982, Xi served in the Central Military Command as vice premier, gaining valuable military experience. It was around this time that he married his first wife, Ke Lingling, the daughter of the Chinese ambassador to Great Britain. The marriage ended in divorce within a few years.

From 1983 to 2007, Xi served in leadership positions in four provinces, beginning with Hebei. During his tenure in Hebei, Xi traveled to the United States and spent time in Iowa with an American family, learning the finer points of agriculture and tourism. After his return, he served as vice mayor of Xiamen in Fujian, wherein 1987 he married folk singer Peng Liyuan, who also holds the rank of army general in the People’s Liberation Army. The couple has a daughter, Xi Mingze, who studied at Harvard University under a pseudonym.

National Prominence

Xi would make a steady ascent in the ensuing decades, with postings as governor of the Fujian and Zhejiang provinces and as party secretary. In 2007, his career got a further boost when a pension-fund scandal rocked the leadership of Shanghai and he was named as its party secretary. He spent his tenure promoting stability and restoring the city’s financial image, and that same year was chosen for the Politburo Standing Committee. In early 2008, Xi’s visibility became even greater when he was elected vice president of the People’s Republic of China and placed in charge of preparations for the 2008 summer Olympics in Beijing.

Elected Leader of the People's Republic of China

In early 2012, Xi traveled to the United States to meet with President Barack Obama and members of his cabinet. He also made a nostalgic trip back to Iowa and then visited Los Angeles. During his visit, he spoke of increasing trust and reducing suspicions between the two countries while respecting each other’s interests in the Pacific-Asian region.

Later that year, on November 15, Xi was elected general secretary of the Communist Party and chairman of the Central Military Commission. In his first speech as general secretary, Xi broke from tradition and sounded more like a Western politician, speaking about the aspirations of the average person and calling for better education, stable jobs, higher income, a more reliable safety net of retirement and health care, better living conditions and a better environment. He also vowed to take on corruption within the government at the highest levels. He referred to his vision for the nation as the "Chinese Dream."

On March 14, 2013, Xi completed his ascent when he was elected president of the People’s Republic of China, a ceremonial position as head of state. In his first speech as president he vowed to fight for a great renaissance of the Chinese nation and a more prominent international standing.

Achievements and Controversies

Fulfilling one of his early promises, Xi almost immediately embarked on a campaign to deal with government corruption. He arrested some of the country's most powerful figures, including former security chief Zhou Yongkang, and by the end of 2014 the CCP had disciplined more than 100,000 officials.

Xi also set about stimulating a slowing economy. In 2014, China introduced the "One Belt, One Road" initiative to bolster trade routes and launched the ambitious Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Domestically, his party expanded the power of private banks and allowed international investors to trade shares directly on the Shanghai stock market.

Xi has also changed some of the laws enacted by predecessors, formally ending China's one-child policy in 2015. His elimination of the "reeducation through labor" system, which punished individuals charged with petty crimes, was viewed favorably.

However, the Chinese leader has drawn scrutiny for his methods. Critics have noted that his crackdown on government corruption mainly targeted political opponents, and the CCP has come under fire by human rights groups for jailing journalists, lawyers and other private citizens. Under Xi's reach, censors have sought to eliminate Western influence in school curriculums and limited the public's internet access.

Xi has also overseen economic regulations that have reverberated beyond his country's borders. The government stepped in to prop up a sagging housing market in 2014, and suddenly devalued the yuan in the summer of 2015. Despite promising during a trip to the United States in September that China would never manipulate currency to increase exports, Xi has been accused of that very approach.

Global Standing

As part of his goal to establish China as a 21st-century global superpower, Xi has pushed for military reform to upgrade naval and air forces. Already chairman of the Central Military Commission, in 2016 he added the title of commander in chief of its joint battle command center.

In recent years, Xi has asserted China's naval capacities through the construction of artificial islands within disputed territories of the South China Sea. Despite his claims to the contrary, satellite photographs indicated that the islands were being used to house military developments. In July 2016, an international tribunal in The Hague ruled that China had illegally claimed those territories, although China refused to accept the authority of that ruling.

While often at odds with the U.S. over trade issues, Xi has publicly acknowledged the need for China to cooperate with its Western counterpart on the issue of climate change. In September 2016, Xi and U.S. President Barack Obama announced they were formally adopting the international climate-change agreement reached in Paris the previous December to reduce emissions from the world’s two largest economies.

Relations and Trade War with U.S. President Trump

In November 2017, Xi met with U.S. President Donald Trump for a two-day summit in Beijing. Despite earlier accusing China of being a currency manipulator, Trump offered praise this time around for the country taking advantage of financial opportunities. For his part, Xi spoke about a “win-win” cooperation between the two economic superpowers, announcing memorandums of understanding to increase trade by $253 billion.

However, the two leaders then contrasted one another during their subsequent appearances at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Vietnam. In his speech, Trump criticized the development of globalization for harming American workers and companies, declaring, "we are not going to let the United States be taken advantage of anymore." Taking the stage immediately afterward, Xi painted a glowing picture of the collective benefits of globalization, saying, "let more countries ride the fast train of Chinese development."

Tensions between the two sides mounted after Trump ordered stiff tariffs on aluminum and steel imports in March 2018, as part of U.S. efforts to level the "out of control" trade deficit with its Asian counterpart. China responded by slapping tariffs on a range of American goods, including fruits, nuts and pork products, prompting Trump to threaten to escalate the matter further.

Xi sounded a conciliatory note during his speech at the Boao Economic Forum in April, in which he pledged to "significantly broaden market access" for foreign companies by easing restrictions in the financial and auto sectors and lowering import tariffs for vehicles. Additionally, he promised greater protection for intellectual property. "China does not seek a trade surplus," the president said. "We have a genuine desire to increase imports and achieve greater balance of international payments under the current account."

Amid the escalating tensions of a potential trade war, the yuan fell to a six-month low against the dollar in late June, sparking speculation that China would let that course continue and make their goods cheaper on the world market.

Following the announcement that China and the U.S. had agreed to the broad outlines of "phase one" of a trade deal in October 2019, the two sides signed the deal into place in mid-January 2020. Xi hailed the agreement, which included commitments to purchase an additional $200 billion in American goods but did not address his government's subsidies of local industries, as "beneficial to both China, the U.S. and the world."

Expansion of Power

In October 2017, during a meeting of the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party, delegates voted to add the words "Xi Jinping Thought for the New Era of Socialism with Chinese Special Characteristics" to the party constitution. The addition was meant to serve as a guiding principle for the party moving forward, with Xi's vision paving the way for global leadership in the years to come.

Furthermore, the constitutional change boosted Xi's status to match those of exalted former Communist Party heads Mao Tse-tung and Deng Xiaoping . It was believed that, as one of the country's strongest leaders in decades, Xi possessed the ability to hold on to power as long as he desired.

In late February 2018, the Communist Party's Central Committee proposed scrapping term limits for China's president and vice president, potentially setting the table for Xi to govern indefinitely. The National People's Congress formally voted to make the constitutional change the following month, shortly before Xi was confirmed for a second five-year term.

In a speech to close the 16-day legislative session, Xi spoke of forging unification with Taiwan, promoting "high-quality" development that values innovation and expanding his signature Belt and Road foreign policy initiative. "The new era belongs to everyone, and everyone is a witness, pioneer and builder of the new era," he said. "As long as we are united and struggle together, there will be no power to stop the Chinese people from realizing their dreams."

Coronavirus

Xi faced a new challenge in the final days of 2019 with the outbreak of a pneumonia-like illness in the city of Wuhan. Chinese authorities attempted to close off Wuhan on January 23, 2020, but the new coronavirus had already escaped the country's borders; by February 10, it was reported that more than 900 people had died from the virus in China alone, surpassing the total from the SARS epidemic of 2002-3.

Xi and the Communist Party drew criticism for their initial response to the crisis — including a reported attempt to silence the doctor who first raised the alarm about the illness — and for the crackdown on travel and personal liberties that followed. However, the government's efforts appeared to be paying off with the rate of new infections finally slowing in March, prompting the president to make his first visit to Wuhan since the outbreak began.

QUICK FACTS

  • Birth Year: 1953
  • Birth date: June 15, 1953
  • Birth City: Beijing
  • Birth Country: China
  • Gender: Male
  • Best Known For: Xi Jinping is the top leader in the Communist Party of China and the President of the People’s Republic of China.
  • Astrological Sign: Gemini
  • Tsinghua University
  • Nacionalities

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CITATION INFORMATION

  • Article Title: Xi Jinping Biography
  • Author: Biography.com Editors
  • Website Name: The Biography.com website
  • Url: https://www.biography.com/political-figures/xi-jinping
  • Access Date:
  • Publisher: A&E; Television Networks
  • Last Updated: July 9, 2020
  • Original Published Date: March 14, 2016
  • During the civilization and development process of more than 5,000 years, the Chinese nation as made an indelible contribution to the civilization and advancement of mankind.
  • Some foreigners with full bellies and nothing better to do engage in finger-pointing at us. First, China does not export revolution; second it does not export famine and poverty; and third, it does not mess with you. So what else is there to say?

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Xi Jinping’s Radical Secrecy

This is not just a challenge for biographers. It makes China harder to predict and the world more dangerous.

A black-and-white photo of Xi Jinping appearing on a huge screen at a rally in China.

Xi Jinping has never given a press conference. He is the head of China’s ruling Communist Party—a colossal, sprawling political machine with 96.7 million members—yet he does not have a press secretary. His office does not preannounce his domestic travel or visitor log. He does not tweet.

What are billed by the official media as important speeches are typically not released until months after Xi has delivered them in closed forums. Even then, the published versions can be pallid reworkings of the documents that have been circulated internally and, very occasionally, leaked.

The secretiveness of Beijing’s ruling party might once have been dismissed as a mere eccentricity, fodder for an industry of intelligence analysts and academic Pekingologists to sort through for clues about top-level machinations. But with Xi now often described, without hyperbole, as the “ world’s most powerful man ,” and on the verge of winning a norm-breaking third term later this year at the party congress, Beijing’s radical opacity has real-world consequences.

How would Xi, for example, make any decision to invade Taiwan ? What would happen if the military pushed back? Could the politburo vote to overrule Xi? Does Xi feel pressure from the public to take the island? Almost anything China does has global fallout these days, but its internal debates and its decision-making processes are almost entirely hidden.

The challenge of finding out much at all about Xi is certainly evident in a raft of recent biographies (by, variously, the Canadian academic Alfred L. Chan ; the British Sinologist Kerry Brown ; and two German journalists, Stefan Aust and Adrian Geiges ). The manner in which anyone writing about Xi and his government is forced to sniff around the perimeters of the party-state in search of scraps of information reminded me of a recurring conversation I had in China when I lived there as a journalist, on and off for about 15 years from the mid-1990s, and then during multiple visits since. I often heard the refrain from Chinese officials “You don’t understand China!” when they complained about this or that article of mine. My stock reply was: “You don’t want me to understand China!”

Read: How Xi Jinping blew it

China’s official media awards draw the red lines very clearly for local journalists, who are, inevitably, far better informed than foreigners in an unapologetically closed system . To be considered for a reporting prize, according to the independent China Media Project, journalists must “love the Party, protect the Party and serve the Party” and adhere to the principle of “public opinion guidance.”

Heaven help any Chinese journalist who might manage to publish a real-time account of Xi’s decision making. At best, they would be out of a job. More likely, they would end up behind bars. Foreigners can simply be banned from entering the country ever again.

Putting aside the political dangers that secrecy engenders, Xi Jinping’s personal story alone makes him a gripping subject. His father, Xi Zhongxun, was a revolutionary hero and a senior official in Mao Zedong’s post-1949 government who was purged in 1962 and later sent into internal exile. Xi Zhongxun was then denounced in struggle sessions and imprisoned during the Cultural Revolution, a radical mobilization that Mao Zedong unleashed in 1965 to destroy his enemies.

During that turmoil, Xi himself, after starting life in an elite academy in Beijing, was exiled to an impoverished village in central China as a teenager. A so-called sent-down youth, he toiled in the fields and dug ditches.

Even then, after Mao died in 1976 and China began to embrace the market, Xi did not have an entirely easy ride. Thanks to his father’s rehabilitation, Xi did enjoy some advantages as the offspring of “red nobility,” gaining entry into a prestigious university before the education system had fully reopened. But after a stint as an aide to China’s defense minister during his military service, he was forced to build his career by doing the same hard slog as other Chinese officials.

Xi went to work in coastal Fujian, across from Taiwan, starting in a small, relatively poor city. During his 18-year stint in the province, he managed to avoid becoming embroiled in any of the local corruption scandals, and ended up as Fujian’s governor. Once he left there, for nearby Zhejiang province, he rose rapidly, transferring to Shanghai, the up escalator of Chinese politics. He rode it to Beijing to become the leader-in-waiting, eventually taking over as party secretary and head of the military in 2012, and state president the following year.

In Xi’s case, we know more about him than we do about previous Chinese leaders, in part because, before rising to the party’s top ranks, he talked about his upbringing. The party itself has published a series of reverent oral histories on his years as a sent-down youth and as an official in the provinces.

All of that can be illuminating as far as it goes—like shining a flashlight into the corner of a dark room and no farther. But the real business of Chinese politics, together with the rest of Xi’s story, remains securely locked down. These glimpses from his past encase his life in an official mythology and largely obscure, or avoid altogether, crucial questions about how he came to power and survived at turning points in his career.

None of the local or foreign books about him can explain with clarity how the party chose Xi as the nominated successor to Hu Jintao in 2007. Was it because Xi was considered independent of the party’s main competing factions? Did his revolutionary family roots swing the vote in his favor? Did a council of party elders support him? Who makes up the council of elders, anyway? Do they ever meet, in fact?

Read: The world according to Xi Jinping

Formally, the head of the Communist Party in China is chosen by the Central Committee, the roughly 370-member body that acts as kind of the expanded board of directors of China, Inc. But there is no recorded instance of the committee ever exercising any genuine scrutiny of the party, let alone tussling over who should be leader.

Nor do any writings about Xi illuminate whatever mandate he was given when he assumed leadership of the party in late 2012, amid evident political turmoil. That mystery is a live issue to this day. China’s official press, quoting senior officials, has accused a Xi rival, Bo Xilai , and his associates of attempting to stage an intraparty coup around this time. Bo was the charismatic party secretary of the megacity of Chongqing, in western China, and like Xi, the son of a revolutionary hero. He is now in jail.

Xi’s first 100 days or so in office were a whirlwind, perhaps partly as a response to Bo’s attempted putsch. Xi inaugurated an anti-corruption campaign, began locking up liberals, set anti-poverty targets, and announced the Belt and Road Initiative, a multibillion-dollar project to invest—and build influence—in Central Asia, Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and beyond.

In late 2017, after five years in power, he dispensed with the convention of naming a successor. The following year, Xi abolished term limits on the presidency, effectively making himself leader in perpetuity.

Xi’s harshness shocked many in the system, and still does. What deals did he have to cut to get his way? The Communist Party, after all, is a political machine before anything else. If he went way past what his patrons had wanted him to do, we are, again, none the wiser.

Writing contemporaneous history in China is hard enough. Even telling its recent history is a struggle. Take, for example, the way that China-literate Westerners routinely credit Deng Xiaoping with opening the country up to market reforms in the late 1970s. As moments in history go, they don’t come much bigger than this: The economic powerhouse that China is today dates from the point when the party-state decided to kick-start growth in the aftermath of Mao’s death. Deng gets all the credit for these market-led measures, which is what we might call the “ Time Man of the Year” version of history (Deng won the award twice, in 1978 and 1985). But this doesn’t square with the facts.

Read: When Biden went to China

The historians Warren Sun of Monash University and Frederick Teiwes of the University of Sydney make a persuasive case that the important reforms were under way before Deng took over in 1978. According to their research, published in 2011 yet sometimes overlooked, Deng’s predecessor, Hua Guofeng, set in motion just about all of the policies that Deng is now credited with. Deng was important, of course, but he possessed the indispensable quality of strong Chinese leaders. He made sure that the history was written in his favor, reducing Hua to a hapless leader who had obstructed change—the reverse of the truth.

Under Xi, the battle over history has gone to another level, both in service of his own career and to ensure that the party can dictate whatever version of events it needs to align with current policy.

Glenn Tiffert, a historian of modern China at the Hoover Institution, made a remarkable discovery about a decade ago when researching the legal debates in China in the 1950s over issues such as judicial independence and the ascendancy of the law over politics and class. By comparing the original journals in his possession that aired these usually savage debates with their digital editions, Tiffert noticed that scores of articles had been excised from the online records. Any historian fresh to the issue and without access to the scarce hard copies could never have known that China had conducted such debates at all.

The doctoring of the records was designed to buttress the party’s vehement opposition to Western legal concepts. “The more faithful scholars are to this adulterated source base and the sanitized reality it projects, the more they may unwittingly promote the agendas of the censors,” Tiffert wrote .

Formal restrictions on research are also getting tighter. Over the past decade or so, China has been restricting access to its archives. In 2013, the foreign ministry placed about 90 percent of its collection out of reach. Those archives are now closed to the public altogether.

The tightening of access to sources, official and otherwise, has run in parallel with the introduction of a new criminal offense of “ historical nihilism ,” which can be wheeled out to suppress any version of the past that the party doesn’t like. In 2021, China’s internet regulator, doubtless trying to curry favor with Xi ahead of the party’s 100th anniversary later that year, announced that it had deleted 2 million posts containing “harmful” discussion of history on social-media sites such as Weibo (China’s equivalent of Twitter) and the ubiquitous messaging service WeChat.

With so many obstacles in their way, historians of modern China, foreign and local, are like detectives in a dangerous, suspicious neighborhood. One of the rising scholars of Chinese elite politics, Joseph Torigian of American University, teaches a course in fact called “Scholar as Detective.”

Decades may pass before the archives are accessible again or another time when the Chinese themselves, who are either unable or afraid to talk, start to publish memoirs and the like. Without that opening up, we will have little opportunity to gain deep insight into the inner workings of Xi’s rule. By then, our assessments will be academic: Xi’s grand ambitions for China will have played out—with wildly unpredictable results, for his country and for the rest of the world.

Xi Jinping's rise to power started when his father, Xi Zhongxun, fell from grace

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Xi Jinping saunters past a row of applauding Chinese delegates in masks

The chant of "down with Xi Jinping" is something the President of China first heard when he was a schoolboy.

Key points:

Xi Jinping's childhood changed when his father was purged from a senior role in the Chinese Communist Party

China's President often talks about how being sent to the countryside to live in a cave as a teenager made him tough

  • Former prime minister Kevin Rudd says early in his career Mr Xi seemed determined not just to lead, but to reshape China's future

The reason Mr Xi was denounced while he was still a teenager was because his father, Xi Zhongxun, who was the vice-premier of China, had fallen from grace.

Joseph Torigian, an expert in Chinese elite politics who is writing a biography of Xi Jinping's father, says the fall in status Xi Jinping suffered during this period shaped the future President of China.

Once a comrade of Chairman Mao and a member of the first generation of Chinese communist leaders, Mr Xi's father was sensationally cast down as a traitor of communist ideals in the early 1960s, when Mr Xi was just nine years old.

"Xi Zhongxun was removed from his position of vice-premier, and he was sent to a sort of confinement in the party school," Dr Torigian told the ABC podcast China, If You're Listening.

"He was told to write self-criticisms, reflect on what he had done wrong, and engage in manual labour to reform himself."

Chinese President Xi Jinping, left, younger brother Xi Yuanping, middle, and father Xi Zhongxun, right.

Eventually, he was given a small reprieve and given a job as a deputy manager of a tractor factory, before being kidnapped and sent to Xi'an during the Cultural Revolution.

He had once been one of the most powerful men in China, but Xi Zhongxun now found himself at the bottom of China's social hierarchy, as Chairman Mao empowered the youth of the country to weed out the old guard, of whom Mao had become suspicious.

For a young Xi Jinping, it was also a stunning turn in fortunes.

As a boy, Xi Jinping was denounced

Four years after Xi Zhongxun was purged, Chairman Mao triggered the terrifying Cultural Revolution.

Mao, who was in his 70s, had become wary of political rivals from his own generation, and to consolidate his power he unleashed a wave of discontent from the younger generation.

He empowered young dogmatic followers in China with what he described as "the right to rebel".

He called on the youth of China to rebel against the people who tried to control them — their teachers, the police, the landlords, the government.

Children spied on their parents. People were humiliated in the streets.

Professor Feng Chongyi from the University of Technology in Sydney grew up in China during the Cultural Revolution.

As a child, he and all his schoolmates would have to attend what were called "struggle sessions", where people were punished for their betrayal of Mao's communist ideals in public.

A black and white family portrait of President Xi Jinping's family in 1960.

The crowd would hurl abuse, objects and sometimes their fists.

"Many of them were beaten to death," Professor Feng said.

"One of my aunts was beaten to death during the night."

This was the atmosphere that surrounded Xi Jinping's family's fall from grace.

After his father was purged, the younger Xi was occasionally kidnapped and put in jail, and his mother was repeatedly humiliated in struggle sessions.

Kids stand in front of a poster during the Cultural Revolution.

Both of Xi Jinping's parents were physically harassed and his siblings were also tormented and humiliated.

During this time, his sister died and reports said she was "persecuted to death" — generally thought to be a euphemism for suicide.

Xi Jinping went to one struggle session with his mother Qi Xin, where he was the subject of the crowd's anger, said Dr Torigian.

"Ms Qi did attend one struggle session where her teenage son was criticised and the slogan 'down with Xi Jinping' was shouted," he said.

"Xi Jinping's mother was allegedly a participant in that shouting."

Chinese red guards

This was the kind of division that was sown between families and friends during the Cultural Revolution.

"A night around that same time, Xi Jinping left his confinement at the [Chinese Communist] Party school, when a guard was distracted, and went home and told his mother that he was hungry, but his mother didn't give him food, and in fact reported him," Dr Torigian said.

"Although interestingly, according to this friend of the family who tells the story, Xi Jinping understood his mother's behaviour, noting that if she was caught, she would be arrested and a brother and sister would have no-one to take care of them."

The young Mr Xi was arrested the next day and sent to a juvenile detention facility.

The experience that hardened him into a future leader

Mr Xi was eventually sent with other young people who'd fallen out of favour to work on farms in Shaanxi.

He claims he didn't cry on the train, filled with other children. He said he laughed.

"My family standing outside the car all said, 'how could you be laughing?'" Mr Xi has said.

"I said, 'if I was staying, I would be crying, if I did not go, I don't even know if I would live or die here.'"

A cave dwelling with back and white photos aligning the right hand side of the wall.

This is the beginning of the Xi Jinping myth, how the boy cast out to the countryside rebuilt himself through labour and force of will.

He lived in a cave house, carved into the rock face with a door and windows.

"We once didn't have meat to eat for several months. When I saw meat the next time, my classmate and I just cut it off and ate it raw," Mr Xi once said in an interview reflecting on that time.

About 70 young people who were sent to work on the farms in Shaanxi died there.

Mr Xi turned his punishment into a story, according to Dr Torigian, about being forged into a resilient man who understood the needs of poorer Chinese people.

"He talks about how witnessing this abject poverty helped him appreciate the needs for the party to address those extraordinary challenges," Dr Torigian said.

"Then, of course, he talks about how tough it made him."

A man wearing a mask holds a mobile phone in front of TV showing speech of middle-aged Chinese man.

Chairman Mao died in 1976, and by 1978 Xi Zhongxun was one of many in the old guard who were eventually swept back into power

The Xi family were reunited but Xi Jinping returned more devoted to the Chinese Communist Party than ever before.

The man of destiny

By the mid-1980s, Xi Jinping was forging through the ranks of the Chinese Communist Party and had been appointed vice-mayor of Xiamen, a city of about 550,000 people at the time.

This is where former prime minister Kevin Rudd met him for the first time, when Mr Rudd was working as a diplomat.

The two men bonded over discussing Bob Hawke, who they observed had some unfortunate luck with being translated.

"[For example] 'Well, we're not going to play silly buggers with you on this,' which, of course, the Chinese interpreter rendered as, 'we should not engage in games of happy homosexuals'." Mr Rudd said.

The two men crossed paths again when Xi Jinping had ascended to the vice presidency of China and was being feted to become the leader of the world's most populous country, and Mr Rudd was prime minister of Australia

"I remember sitting with him in front of the fire at the lodge, because it was June," Mr Rudd said.

Prime Minister Kevin Rudd (right) speaks to Chinese vice-president Xi Jinping in Canberra on June 21

Mr Rudd would be ousted by his own party just days later.

"I should have been attending more to the factions of the Australian Labor Party than the factions of the Chinese Communist Party at the time, but that's another story," he said.

They discussed the future of the two countries and of the Asia-Pacific, but Mr Rudd said that speaking about Mr Xi's father, the man who had been cast down during his childhood, is what brought out the biggest response.

"A lot of those conversations began with discussions about family," he said.

"I'd introduced him to our kids and he told me about his daughter.

"And then we began talking about his father; I think that's when he became really engaged in the conversation, because as a former embassy analyst, his father had been a Politburo member when I was back in the embassy in the mid-80s.

"So we had a long conversation about his dad."

Even then, Mr Rudd said it was obvious that being president of China was not the end of Mr Xi's ambition, and the true goal was what he could do with the presidency.

"In my early judgment of him, he saw himself very much as, quote, the man of destiny. That is, someone who could reshape China's future," he said.

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bio of xi jinping

By Evan Osnos

When Xi was fourteen Red Guards warned “We can execute you a hundred times.” He joined the Communist Party at twenty.

In anticipation of New Year’s Eve, 2014, Xi Jinping, the President of China and the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, permitted a camera crew to come into his office and record a message to the people. As a teen-ager, Xi had been sent to work on a farm; he was so delicate that other laborers rated him a six on a ten-point scale, “not even as high as the women,” he said later, with some embarrassment. Now, at sixty-one, Xi was five feet eleven, taller than any Chinese leader in nearly four decades, with a rich baritone and a confident heft. When he received a guest, he stood still, long arms slack, hair pomaded, a portrait of take-it-or-leave-it composure that induced his visitor to cross the room in pursuit of a handshake.

Xi’s predecessor, Hu Jintao, read his annual New Year’s greeting from a lectern in an antiseptic reception hall. Xi, who took office in November, 2012, has associated himself with an earthier generation of Communists, a military caste that emphasized “hard work and plain living.” He delivered his New Year’s message at his desk. Behind him, bookshelves held photographs that depicted him as Commander-in-Chief and family man. In one picture, he was wearing Army fatigues and a fur hat, visiting soldiers in a snowfield; in another, he was strolling with his wife and daughter, and escorting his father, Xi Zhongxun, a hallowed revolutionary, in a wheelchair. The shelves also held matching sets of books. Xi’s classroom education was interrupted for nearly a decade by the Cultural Revolution, and he has the autodidact’s habit of announcing his literary credentials. He often quotes from Chinese classics, and in an interview with the Russian press last year he volunteered that he had read Krylov, Pushkin, Gogol, Lermontov, Turgenev, Dostoyevsky, Nekrasov, Chernyshevsky, Tolstoy, Chekhov, and Sholokhov. When he visited France, he mentioned that he had read Montesquieu, Voltaire, Rousseau, Diderot, Saint-Simon, Fourier, Sartre, and twelve others. In his New Year’s remarks, Xi oscillated between socialist slogans (“Wave high the sword against corruption”) and catchphrases from Chinese social media (“I would like to click the thumbs-up button for our great people”). He vowed to fight poverty, improve the rule of law, and hold fast to history. When he listed the achievements of the past year, he praised the creation of a holiday dedicated to the Second World War: “Victory Day of the Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression.”

Xi is the sixth man to rule the People’s Republic of China, and the first who was born after the revolution, in 1949. He sits atop a pyramid of eighty-seven million members of the Communist Party, an organization larger than the population of Germany. The Party no longer reaches into every corner of Chinese life, as it did in the nineteen-seventies, but Xi nevertheless presides over an economy that, by one measure, recently surpassed the American economy in size; he holds ultimate authority over every general, judge, editor, and state-company C.E.O. As Lenin ordained, in 1902, “For the center . . . to actually direct the orchestra, it needs to know who plays violin and where, who plays a false note and why.”

Xi’s New Year’s message was broadcast on state television and radio channels at 6:30 p.m. , just before the evening news. A few hours later, the news veered sharply out of his control. In Shanghai, a large holiday crowd had gathered to celebrate on the Bund, the promenade beside the Huangpu River, with splendid views of the skyline. The crowd was growing faster than the space could handle. Around 11:30 p.m. , the police sent hundreds of extra officers to keep order, but it was too late; a stairway was jammed, and people shouted and pushed. A stampede ensued. In all, thirty-six people suffocated or were trampled to death.

The disaster occurred in one of China’s most modern and prosperous places, and the public was appalled. In the days that followed, the Shanghai government held a memorial for the victims, and encouraged people to move on; Internet censors struck down discussion of who was responsible; police interrogated Web users who posted criticisms of the state. When relatives of the victims visited the site of the stampede, police watched them closely, and then erected metal barriers to render it unreachable. Caixin, an investigative media organization, revealed that, during the stampede, local officials in charge of the neighborhood were enjoying a banquet of sushi and sake, at the government’s expense, in a private room at the Empty Cicada, a luxury restaurant nearby. This was awkward news, because one of the President’s first diktats had been “Eight Rules” for public servants, to eliminate extravagance and corruption. Among other things, the campaign called on officials to confine themselves to “four dishes and one soup.” (Eventually, eleven officials were punished for misusing funds and for failing to prevent a risk to the public.)

“Im sure shell be back soon. Shes just somewhere integrating awareness about something.”

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A few weeks after the incident in Shanghai, I paid a call on a longtime editor in Beijing, whose job gives him a view into the workings of the Party. When I arrived at his apartment, his kids were in raucous control of the living room, so we retreated to his bedroom to talk. When I asked him how President Xi was doing, he mentioned the banquet at the Empty Cicada. He thought it pointed to a problem that is much deeper than a few high-living bureaucrats. “The central government issued an order absolutely forbidding them to dine out on public funds. And they did it anyway!” he said. “What this tells you is that local officials are finding their ways of responding to change. There is a saying: ‘When a rule is imposed up high, there is a way to get around it below.’ ” The struggle between an emperor and his bureaucracy follows a classic pattern in Chinese politics, and it rarely ends well for the emperor. But the editor was betting on Xi. “He’s not afraid of Heaven or Earth. And he is, as we say, round on the outside and square on the inside; he looks flexible, but inside he is very hard.”

Before Xi took power, he was described, in China and abroad, as an unremarkable provincial administrator, a fan of American pop culture (“The Godfather,” “Saving Private Ryan”) who cared more about business than about politics, and was selected mainly because he had alienated fewer peers than his competitors. It was an incomplete portrait. He had spent more than three decades in public life, but Chinese politics had exposed him to limited scrutiny. At a press conference, a local reporter once asked Xi to rate his performance: “Would you give yourself a score of a hundred—or a score of ninety?” (Neither, Xi said; a high number would look “boastful,” and a low number would reflect “low self-esteem.”)

But, a quarter of the way through his ten-year term, he has emerged as the most authoritarian leader since Chairman Mao. In the name of protection and purity, he has investigated tens of thousands of his countrymen, on charges ranging from corruption to leaking state secrets and inciting the overthrow of the state. He has acquired or created ten titles for himself, including not only head of state and head of the military but also leader of the Party’s most powerful committees—on foreign policy, Taiwan, and the economy. He has installed himself as the head of new bodies overseeing the Internet, government restructuring, national security, and military reform, and he has effectively taken over the courts, the police, and the secret police. “He’s at the center of everything,” Gary Locke, the former American Ambassador to Beijing, told me.

In the Chinese Communist Party, you campaign after you get the job, not before, and in building public support and honing a message Xi has revealed a powerful desire for transformation. He calls on China to pursue the Chinese Dream: the “great rejuvenation of the nation,” a mixture of prosperity, unity, and strength. He has proposed at least sixty social and economic changes, ranging from relaxing the one-child policy to eliminating camps for “reëducation through labor” and curtailing state monopolies. He has sought prestige abroad; on his first foreign trip (to Moscow), he was accompanied by his wife, a celebrity soprano named Peng Liyuan, who inspired lavish coverage of China’s first modern Presidential couple. Peng soon appeared on Vanity Fair ’ s Best-Dressed List.

After Mao, China encouraged the image of a “collective Presidency” over the importance of individual leaders. Xi has revised that approach, and his government, using old and new tools, has enlarged his image. In the spirit of Mao’s Little Red Book, publishers have produced eight volumes of Xi’s speeches and writings; the most recent, titled “The Remarks of Xi Jinping,” dissects his utterances, ranks his favorite phrases, and explains his cultural references. A study of the People’s Daily found that, by his second anniversary in office, Xi was appearing in the paper more than twice as often as his predecessor at the same point. He stars in a series of cartoons aimed at young people, beginning with “How to Make a Leader,” which describes him, despite his family pedigree, as a symbol of meritocracy—“one of the secrets of the China miracle.” The state news agency has taken the unprecedented step of adopting a nickname for the General Secretary: Xi Dada—roughly, Big Uncle Xi. In January, the Ministry of Defense released oil paintings depicting him in heroic poses; thousands of art students applying to the Beijing University of Technology had been judged on their ability to sketch his likeness. The Beijing Evening News reported that one applicant admired the President so much that “she had to work hard to stop her hands from trembling.”

To outsiders, Xi has been a fitful subject. Bookstores in Hong Kong, which are insulated from mainland control, offer portraits of varying quality—the most reliable include “The New Biography of Xi Jinping,” by Liang Jian, and “China’s Future,” by Wu Ming—but most are written at a remove, under pseudonyms. The clearest account of Xi’s life and influences comes from his own words and decisions, scattered throughout a long climb to power.

Kevin Rudd, the former Prime Minister of Australia, a Mandarin speaker who has talked with Xi at length over the years, told me, “What he says is what he thinks. My experience of him is that there’s not a lot of artifice.”

In a leadership known for grooming colorless apparatchiks, Xi projects an image of manly vigor. He mocks “eggheads” and praises the “team spirit of a group of dogs eating a lion.” In a meeting in March, 2013, he told the Russian President, Vladimir Putin, “We are similar in character,” though Xi is less inclined toward bare-chested machismo. Xi admires Song Jiang, a fictional outlaw from “Water Margin,” a fourteenth-century Chinese classic, for his ability to “unite capable people.” Neither brilliant nor handsome, Song Jiang led a band of heroic rebels. In a famous passage, he speaks of the Xunyang River: “I shall have my revenge some day / And dye red with blood the Xunyang’s flow.”

“The first time we see the sun in months and it explodes.”

Xi describes his essential project as a rescue: he must save the People’s Republic and the Communist Party before they are swamped by corruption; environmental pollution; unrest in Hong Kong, Xinjiang, and other regions; and the pressures imposed by an economy that is growing more slowly than at any time since 1990 (though still at about seven per cent, the fastest pace of any major country). “The tasks our Party faces in reform, development, and stability are more onerous than ever, and the conflicts, dangers, and challenges are more numerous than ever,” Xi told the Politburo, in October. In 2014, the government arrested nearly a thousand members of civil society, more than in any year since the mid-nineteen-nineties, following the Tiananmen Square massacre, according to Chinese Human Rights Defenders, a Hong Kong-based advocacy group.

Xi unambiguously opposes American democratic notions. In 2011 and 2012, he spent several days with Vice-President Joe Biden, his official counterpart at the time, in China and the United States. Biden told me that Xi asked him why the U.S. put “so much emphasis on human rights.” Biden replied to Xi, “No President of the United States could represent the United States were he not committed to human rights,” and went on, “If you don’t understand this, you can’t deal with us. President Barack Obama would not be able to stay in power if he did not speak of it. So look at it as a political imperative. It doesn’t make us better or worse. It’s who we are. You make your decisions. We’ll make ours.”

In Xi’s early months, supporters in the West speculated that he wanted to silence hard-line critics, and would open up later, perhaps in his second term, which begins in 2017. That view has largely disappeared. Henry Paulson, the former Treasury Secretary, whose upcoming book, “Dealing with China,” describes a decade of contact with Xi, told me, “He has been very forthright and candid—privately and publicly—about the fact that the Chinese are rejecting Western values and multiparty democracy.” He added, “To Westerners, it seems very incongruous to be, on the one hand, so committed to fostering more competition and market-driven flexibility in the economy and, on the other hand, to be seeking more control in the political sphere, the media, and the Internet. But that’s the key: he sees a strong Party as essential to stability, and the only institution that’s strong enough to help him accomplish his other goals.”

In his determination to gain control and protect the Party, Xi may have generated a different kind of threat: he has pried apart internal fault lines and shaken the equilibrium that for a generation marked the nation’s rise. Before Xi took power, top officials presumed that they were protected. Yu Hua, the novelist, told me, “As China grew, what really came to matter were the ‘unwritten rules.’ When the real rules weren’t specific enough or clear enough, when policies and laws lagged behind reality, you always relied on the unwritten rules.” They dictated everything from how much to tip a surgeon to how far an N.G.O. could go before it was suppressed. “The unwritten rules have been broken,” Yu said. “This is how it should be, of course, but laws haven’t arrived yet.”

The Communist Party dedicated itself to a classless society but organized itself in a rigid hierarchy, and Xi started life near the top. He was born in Beijing in 1953, the third of four children. His father, Xi Zhongxun, China’s propaganda minister at the time, had been fomenting revolution since the age of fourteen, when he and his classmates tried to poison a teacher whom they considered a counterrevolutionary. He was sent to jail, where he joined the Communist Party, and eventually he became a high-ranking commander, which plunged him into the Party’s internal feuds. In 1935, a rival faction accused Xi of disloyalty and ordered him to be buried alive, but Mao defused the crisis. At a Party meeting in February, 1952, Mao stated that the “suppression of counterrevolutionaries” required, on average, the execution of one person for every one thousand to two thousand citizens. Xi Zhongxun endorsed “severe suppression and punishment,” but in his area “killing was relatively lower,” according to his official biography.

Xi Jinping grew up with his father’s stories. “He talked about how he joined the revolution, and he’d say, ‘You will certainly make revolution in the future,’ ” Xi recalled in a 2004 interview with the Xi’an Evening News , a state-run paper. “He’d explain what revolution is. We heard so much of this that our ears got calluses.” In six decades of politics, his father had seen or deployed every tactic. At dinner with the elder Xi in 1980, David Lampton, a China specialist at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins, marvelled that he could toast dozens of guests, over glasses of Maotai, with no visible effects. “It became apparent that he was drinking water,” Lampton said.

“Wait Maybe they arent just awesome bunk beds with cheese pillows”

When Xi Jinping was five, his father was promoted to Vice-Premier, and the son often visited him at Zhongnanhai, the secluded compound for top leaders. Xi was admitted to the exclusive August 1st School, named for the date of a famous Communist victory. The school, which occupied the former palace of a Qing Dynasty prince, was nicknamed the lingxiu yaolan —the “cradle of leaders.” The students formed a small, close-knit élite; they lived in the same compounds, summered at the same retreats, and shared a sense of noblesse oblige. For centuries before the People’s Republic, an evolving list of élite clans combined wealth and politics. Some sons handled business; others pursued high office. Winners changed over time, and, when Communist leaders prevailed, in 1949, they acquired the mantle. “The common language used to describe this was that they had ‘won over tianxia ’—‘all under Heaven,’ ” Yang Guobin, a sociologist at the University of Pennsylvania, told me. “They believed they had a natural claim to leadership. They owned it. And their children thought, naturally, they themselves would be, and should be, the future owners.” As the historian Mi Hedu observes in his 1993 book, “The Red Guard Generation,” students at the August 1st School “compared one another on the basis of whose father had a higher rank, whose father rode in a better car. Some would say, ‘Obey whoever’s father has the highest position.’ ” When the Cultural Revolution began, in 1966, Beijing students who were zilaihong (“born red”) promoted a slogan: “If the father is a hero, the son is also a hero; if the father is a reactionary, the son is a bastard.” Red Guards sought to cleanse the capital of opposition, to make it “as pure and clean as crystal,” they said. From late August to late September, 1966, nearly two thousand people were killed in Beijing, and at least forty-nine hundred historical sites were damaged or destroyed, according to Yiching Wu, the author of “The Cultural Revolution at the Margins.”

But Xi Jinping did not fit cleanly into the role of either aggressor or victim. In 1962, his father was accused of supporting a novel that Mao opposed, and was sent to work in a factory; his mother, Qi Xin, was assigned to hard labor on a farm. In January, 1967, after Mao encouraged students to target “class enemies,” a group of young people dragged Xi Zhongxun before a crowd. Among other charges, he was accused of having gazed at West Berlin through binoculars during a visit to East Germany years earlier. He was detained in a military garrison, where he passed the years by walking in circles, he said later—ten thousand laps, and then ten thousand walking backward. The son was too young to be an official Red Guard, and his father’s status made him undesirable. Moreover, being born red was becoming a liability. Élite academies were accused of being xiao baota —“little treasure pagodas”—and shut down. Xi and the sons of other targeted officials stayed together, getting into street fights and swiping books from shuttered libraries. Later, Xi described that period as a dystopian collapse of control. He was detained “three or four times” by groups of Red Guards, and forced to denounce his father. In 2000, he told the journalist Yang Xiaohuai about being captured by a group loyal to the wife of the head of China’s secret police:

I was only fourteen. The Red Guards asked, “How serious do you yourself think your crimes are?” “You can estimate it yourselves. Is it enough to execute me?” “We can execute you a hundred times.” To my mind there was no difference between being executed a hundred times or once, so why be afraid of a hundred times? The Red Guards wanted to scare me, saying that now I was to feel the democratic dictatorship of the people, and that I only had five minutes left. But in the end, they told me, instead, to read quotations from Chairman Mao every day until late at night.

In December, 1968, in a bid to regain control, Mao ordered the Red Guards and other students to the countryside, to be “reëducated by the poor and lower-middle-class peasants.” Élite families sent their children to regions that had allies or family, and Xi went to his father’s old stronghold in Shaanxi. He was assigned to Liangjiahe, a village flanked by yellow cliffs. “The intensity of the labor shocked me,” Xi recalled in a 2004 television interview. To avoid work, he took up smoking—nobody bothered a man smoking—and lingered in the bathroom. After three months, he fled to Beijing, but he was arrested and returned to the village. In what later became the centerpiece of his official narrative, Xi was reborn. A recent state-news-service article offers the mythology: “Xi lived in a cave dwelling with villagers, slept on a kang , a traditional Chinese bed made of bricks and clay, endured flea bites, carried manure, built dams and repaired roads.” It leaves out some brutal details. At one point, he received a letter informing him that his older half-sister Xi Heping had died. The Australian journalist John Garnaut, the author of an upcoming book on the rise of Xi and his cohort, said, “It was suicide. Close associates have said to me, on the record, that after a decade of persecution she hanged herself from a shower rail.”

Xi chose to join the Communist Party’s Youth League. Because of his father’s status, his application was rejected seven times, by his count. After Xi befriended a local official, he was accepted. In January, 1974, he gained full Party membership and became secretary of the village. His drive to join the Party baffled some of his peers. A longtime friend who became a professor later told an American diplomat that he felt “betrayed” by Xi’s ambition to “join the system.” According to a U.S. diplomatic cable recounting his views, many in Xi’s élite cohort were desperate to escape politics; they dated, drank, and read Western literature. They were “trying to catch up for lost years by having fun,” the professor said. He eventually concluded that Xi was “exceptionally ambitious,” and knew that he would “not be special” outside China, so he “chose to survive by becoming redder than the red.” After all, Yang Guobin told me, referring to the sons of the former leaders, “the sense of ownership did not die. A sense of pride and superiority persisted, and there was some confidence that their fathers’ adversity would be temporary and sooner or later they would make a comeback. That’s exactly what happened.”

The following year, Xi enrolled at Tsinghua University as a “worker-peasant-soldier” student (applicants who were admitted on the basis of political merit rather than test scores). That spring, Xi Zhongxun was rehabilitated, after sixteen years of persecution. When the family reunited, he could not recognize his grown sons. His faith never wavered. In November, 1976, he wrote to Hua Guofeng, the head of the Party, asking for reassignment, in order to “devote the rest of my life to the Party and strive to do more for the people.” He signed it, “Xi Zhongxun, a Follower of Chairman Mao and a Party Member Who Has Not Regained Admission to Regular Party Activities.”

Xi Jinping’s pedigree had exposed him to a brutal politics—purges, retribution, rehabilitation—and he drew blunt lessons from it. In a 2000 interview with the journalist Chen Peng, of the Beijing-based Chinese Times , Xi said, “People who have little experience with power, those who have been far away from it, tend to regard these things as mysterious and novel. But I look past the superficial things: the power and the flowers and the glory and the applause. I see the detention houses, the fickleness of human relationships. I understand politics on a deeper level.” The Cultural Revolution and his years in Yan’an, the region where he was sent as a teen-ager, had created him. “Yan’an is the starting point of my life,” he said in 2007. “Many of the fundamental ideas and qualities I have today were formed in Yan’an.” Rudd, the former Australian Prime Minister, told me, “The bottom line in any understanding of who Xi Jinping is must begin with his dedication to the Party as an institution—despite the fact that through his personal life, and his political life, he has experienced the best of the Party and the worst of the Party.”

Xi’s siblings scattered: his brother and a sister went into business in Hong Kong, the other sister reportedly settled in Canada. But Xi stayed and, year by year, invested more deeply in the Party. After graduating, in 1979, he took a coveted job as an aide to Geng Biao, a senior defense official whom Xi’s father called “my closest comrade-in-arms” from the revolution. Xi wore a military uniform and made valuable connections at Party headquarters. Not long after college, he married Ke Xiaoming, the cosmopolitan daughter of China’s Ambassador to Britain. But they fought “almost every day,” according to the professor, who lived across the hall. He told the diplomat that the couple divorced when Ke decided to move to England and Xi stayed behind.

China’s revolutionaries were aging, and the Party needed to groom new leaders. Xi told the professor that going to the provinces was the “only path to central power.” Staying at Party headquarters in Beijing would narrow his network and invite resentment from lesser-born peers. In 1982, shortly before Xi turned thirty, he asked to be sent back to the countryside, and was assigned to a horse-cart county in Hebei Province. He wanted to be the county secretary—the boss—but the provincial chief resented privileged offspring from Party headquarters and made Xi the No. 2. It was the Chinese equivalent of trading an executive suite at the Pentagon for a mid-level post in rural Virginia.

Within a year, though, Xi was promoted, and he honed his political skills. He gave perks to retired cadres who could shape his reputation; he arranged for them to receive priority at doctors’ offices; when he bought the county’s first imported car, he donated it to the “veteran-cadre office,” and used an old jeep for himself. He retained his green Army-issue trousers to convey humility, and he learned the value of political theatrics: at times, “if you don’t bang on the table, it’s not frightening enough, and people won’t take it seriously,” he told a Chinese interviewer in 2003. He experimented with market economics, by allowing farmers to use more land for raising animals instead of growing grain for the state, and he pushed splashy local projects, including the construction of a television studio based on the classic novel “A Dream of Red Mansions.”

In 1985, he spent two weeks in Iowa as part of an agricultural delegation. In the town of Muscatine, he stayed with Eleanor and Thomas Dvorchak. “The boys had gone off to college, so there were some spare bedrooms,” Eleanor told me. Xi slept in a room with football-themed wallpaper and “Star Trek” action figures. “He was looking out the window, and it seemed like he was saying, ‘Oh, my God,’ and I thought, What’s so unusual? It’s just a split-level,” she said. Xi did not introduce himself as a Communist Party secretary; his business card identified him as the head of the Shijiazhuang Feed Association. In 2012, on a trip to the U.S. before becoming top leader, he returned to Muscatine, to see Dvorchak and others, trailed by the world press. She said, “No one in their right mind would ever think that that guy who stayed in my house would become the President. I don’t care what country you’re talking about.”

By 1985, Xi was ready for another promotion, but the provincial Party head blocked him again, so he moved to the southern province of Fujian, where one of his father’s friends was the Party secretary, and could help him. Not long after he arrived, he met Liao Wanlong, a Taiwanese businessman, who recalled, “He was tall and stocky, and he looked a little dopey.” Liao, who has visited Xi repeatedly in the decades since, told me, “He appeared to be guileless, honest. He came from the north and he didn’t understand the south well.” Liao went on, “He would speak only if he really had something to say, and he didn’t make casual promises. He would think everything through before opening his mouth. He rarely talked about his family, because he had a difficult past and a disappointing marriage.” Xi didn’t have a questing mind, but he excelled at managing his image and his relationships; he was now meeting foreign investors, so he stopped wearing Army fatigues and adopted a wardrobe of Western suits. Liao said, “Not everyone could get an audience with him; he would screen those who wanted to meet him. He was a good judge of people.”

“In this scene imagine youre sentient and know what feelings are.”

The following year, when Xi was thirty-three, a friend introduced him to Peng Liyuan, who, at twenty-four, was already one of China’s most famous opera and folk singers. Xi told her that he didn’t watch television, she recalled in a 2007 interview. “What kind of songs do you sing?” he asked. Peng thought that he looked “uncultured and much older than his age,” but he asked her questions about singing technique, which she took as a sign of intelligence. Xi later said that he decided within forty minutes to ask her to marry him. They married the following year, and in 1989, after the crackdown on student demonstrators, Peng was among the military singers who were sent to Tiananmen Square to serenade the troops. (Images of that scene, along with information about Peng’s private life and her commercial dealings, have been largely expunged from the Web.) In 1992, they had a daughter. As it became clear that Xi would be a top leader, Peng gave up the diva gowns and elaborate hairdos in favor of pants suits and the occasional military uniform. Fans still mobbed her, while he stood patiently to the side, but for the most part she stopped performing and turned her attention to activism around H.I.V., tobacco control, and women’s education. For years, Xi and Peng spent most of their time apart. But, in the flurry of attention around Big Uncle Xi, the state-run media has promoted a pop song entitled “Xi Dada Loves Peng Mama,” which includes the line “Men should learn from Xi and women should learn from Peng.”

The posting to the south put Xi closer to his father. Since 1978, his father had served in neighboring Guangdong, home to China’s experiments with the free market, and the elder Xi had become a zealous believer in economic reform as the answer to poverty. It was a risky position: at a Politburo meeting in 1987, the Old Guard attacked the liberal standard-bearer, Hu Yaobang. Xi’s father was the only senior official who spoke in his defense. “What are you guys doing here? Don’t repeat what Mao did to us,” he said, according to Richard Baum’s 1994 chronicle of élite politics, “Burying Mao.” But Xi lost and was stripped of power for the last time. He was allowed to live in comfortable obscurity until his death, in 2002, and is remembered fondly as “a man of principle, not of strategy,” as the editor in Beijing put it to me.

His son avoided overly controversial reforms as he rose through the ranks. “My approach is to heat a pot with a small, continuous fire, pouring in cold water to keep it from boiling over,” he said. In 1989, a local propaganda official, Kang Yanping, submitted a proposal for a TV miniseries promoting political reform, but Xi replied with skepticism. According to “China’s Future,” he asked, “Is there a source for the opinion? Is it a reasonable point?” The show, which Xi predicted would leave people “discouraged,” was not produced. He also paid special attention to cultivating local military units; he upgraded equipment, raised subsidies for soldiers’ living expenses, and found jobs for retiring officers. He liked to say, “To meet the Army’s needs, nothing is excessive.”

Xi prosecuted corruption at some moments and ignored it at others. A Chinese executive told the U.S. Embassy in Beijing that Xi was considered “Mr. Clean” for turning down a bribe, and yet, for the many years that Xi worked in Fujian, the Yuanhua Group, one of China’s largest corrupt enterprises, continued smuggling billions of dollars’ worth of oil, cars, cigarettes, and appliances into China, with the help of the Fujian military and police. Xi also found a way to live with Chen Kai, a local tycoon who ran casinos and brothels in the center of town, protected by the police chief. Later, Chen was arrested, tried, and sentenced to death, and fifty government officials were prosecuted for accepting bribes from him. Xi was never linked to the cases, but they left a stain on his tenure. “Sometimes I have posted colleagues wrongly,” he said in 2000. “Some were posted wrongly because I thought they were better than they actually were, others because I thought they were worse than they actually were.”

Xi proved adept at navigating internal feuds and alliances. After he took over the economically vibrant province of Zhejiang, in 2002, he created policies intended to promote private businesses. He encouraged taxi services to buy from Geely, the car company that later bought Volvo. He soothed conservatives, in part by reciting socialist incantations. “The private economy has become an exotic flower in the garden of socialism with Chinese characteristics,” he declared. In 2007, he encountered a prime opportunity to show his political skills: a corruption scandal in Shanghai was implicating associates of Jiang Zemin, the powerful former President, who served from 1989 to 2002. Xi was sent to Shanghai to take over. He projected toughness to the public without alienating Jiang. He rejected the villa that had been arranged for him, announcing that it would be better used as a retirement home for veteran comrades.

His timing was fortunate: a few months later, senior Party officials were choosing the next generation of top leaders. Xi was expected to lose to Li Keqiang, a comrade who had no revolutionary family pedigree, and had postgraduate degrees in law and economics from Peking University. Since 2002, the highest ranks of Chinese politics had been dominated by men who elbowed their way in on the basis of academic or technocratic merit. President Hu’s father ran a tea shop, and the Premier, Wen Jiabao, was the son of a teacher, but Chen Yun, the late economic czar, had advised his peers that born reds, now known as “second-generation reds,” or princelings, would make more reliable stewards of the Party’s future. One princeling told a Western diplomat, “The feeling among us is: ‘Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao, your fathers were selling shoelaces while our fathers were dying for this revolution.’ ” In private, some princelings referred to the President and the Premier as huoji —“hired hands.” In October, 2007, Xi was unveiled as the likely heir apparent. It was not entirely a compliment. “Party leaders prefer weak successors, so they can rule behind the scenes,” Ho Pin, the founder of Mingjing News, an overseas Chinese site, said. Xi’s rise had been so abrupt, in the eyes of the general public, that people joked, “Who is Xi Jinping? He’s Peng Liyuan’s husband.”

“Kinda makes you feel insignificant and incredibly hot doesnt it”

Xi was tested by a pageant of dysfunction that erupted in the run-up to his début as General Secretary, in 2012. In February, Wang Lijun, a former police chief, tried to defect to the U.S. and accused the family of his former patron, Bo Xilai, the Party secretary of Chongqing, of murder and embezzlement. Party leaders feared that Bo might protect himself with the security services at his command, disrupt the transition of power, and tear the Party apart. In September, Ling Jihua, the chief of staff of the outgoing President, was abruptly demoted, and he was later accused of trying to cover up the death of his son, who had crashed a black Ferrari while accompanied by two women.

Beset by crises, Xi suddenly disappeared. On September 4, 2012, he cancelled a meeting with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and visits with other dignitaries. As the days passed, lurid rumors emerged, ranging from a grave illness to an assassination attempt. When he reappeared, on September 19th, he told American officials that he had injured his back. Analysts of Chinese politics still raise the subject of Xi’s disappearance in the belief that a fuller explanation of why he vanished might illuminate the depth, or fragility, of his support. In dozens of conversations this winter, scholars, officials, journalists, and executives told me that they suspect he did have a health problem, and also reasons to exploit it. They speculate that Xi, in effect, went on strike; he wanted to install key allies, and remove opponents, before taking power, but Party elders ordered him to wait. A former intelligence official told me, “Xi basically says, ‘O.K., fuck you, let’s see you find someone else for this job. I’m going to disappear for two weeks and miss the Secretary of State.’ And that’s what he did. It caused a stir, and they went running and said, ‘Whoa, whoa, whoa.’ ” The handoff went ahead as planned. On November 15, 2012, Xi became General Secretary.

Xi headed a Politburo Standing Committee of seven men: four were considered princelings by birth or marriage, a larger ratio than in any Politburo in the history of the People’s Republic. Western politicians often note that Xi has the habits of a retail pol: comfort on the rope line, gentle questions for every visitor, homey anecdotes. On a trip to Los Angeles, he told students that he likes to swim, read, and watch sports on television, but rarely has time. “To borrow a title from an American film, it’s like ‘Mission: Impossible,’ ” he said. But Chinese observers tend to mention something else: his guizuqi , or “air of nobility.” It can come off as a reassuring link to the past or, at times, as a distance from his peers. In a meeting at the Great Hall of the People last year, Party officials were chatting and glad-handing during a lengthy break, but Xi never budged. “It went on for hours, and he sat there, staring straight ahead,” a foreign attendee told me. “He never wandered down from the podium to say, ‘How’s it going in Ningxia?’ ”

Xi believed that there was a grave threat to China from within. According to U.S. diplomats, Xi’s friend the professor described Xi as “repulsed by the all-encompassing commercialization of Chinese society, with its attendant nouveaux riches, official corruption, loss of values, dignity, and self-respect, and such ‘moral evils’ as drugs and prostitution.” If he ever became China’s top leader, the professor had predicted, “he would likely aggressively attempt to address these evils, perhaps at the expense of the new moneyed class.” Though princelings and their siblings had profited comfortably from China’s rise (Xi’s sister Qi Qiaoqiao is reported to have large corporate and real-estate assets), the revolutionary families considered their gains appropriate, and they blamed the hired hands for allowing corruption and extravagance, which stirred up public rage and threatened the Party’s future.

The first step to a solution was to reëstablish control. The “collective Presidency,” which spread power across the Standing Committee, had constrained Hu Jintao so thoroughly that he was nicknamed the Woman with Bound Feet. Xi surrounded himself with a shadow cabinet that was defined less by a single ideology than by school ties and political reliability. Members included Liu He, a childhood playmate who had become a reform-minded economist, and Liu Yuan, a hawkish general and the son of former President Liu Shaoqi. The most important was Wang Qishan, a friend for decades, who was placed in charge of the Central Commission on Discipline and Inspection, the agency that launched the vast anticorruption campaign.

The Party had long cultivated an image of virtuous unanimity. But, during the next two years, Wang’s investigators, who were granted broad powers to detain and interrogate, attacked agencies that might counter Xi’s authority, accusing them of conspiracies and abuses. They brought corruption charges against officials at the state-planning and state-assets commissions, which protect the privileges of large government-run monopolies. They arrested China’s security chief, Zhou Yongkang, a former oil baron with the jowls of an Easter Island statue, who had built the police and military into a personal kingdom that received more funding each year for domestic spying and policing than it did for foreign defense. They reached into the ranks of the military, where flamboyant corruption was not only upsetting the public—pedestrians had learned to watch out for luxury sedans with military license plates, which careered around Beijing with impunity—but also undermining China’s national defense. When police searched homes belonging to the family of Lieutenant General Gu Junshan, a senior logistics chief, they removed four truckloads of wine, art, cash, and other luxuries. According to a diplomat in Beijing, Gu’s furnishings included a gold replica of China’s first aircraft carrier. “When questioned about it, he said it was a sign of patriotism,” the diplomat said.

“You give me permission to laugh.”

By the end of 2014, the Party had announced the punishment of more than a hundred thousand officials on corruption charges. Many foreign observers asked if Xi’s crusade was truly intended to stamp out corruption or if it was a tool to attack his enemies. It was not simply one or the other: corruption had become so threatening to the Party’s legitimacy that only the most isolated leader could have avoided forcing it back to a more manageable level, but railing against corruption was also a proven instrument for political consolidation, and at the highest levels Xi has deployed it largely against his opponents. Geremie Barme, the historian who heads the Australian Centre on China in the World, analyzed the forty-eight most high-profile arrests, and discovered that none of them were second-generation reds. “I don’t call it an anticorruption campaign,” a Western diplomat told me. “This is grinding trench warfare.”

Shortly after taking over, Xi asked, “Why did the Soviet Communist Party collapse?” and declared, “It’s a profound lesson for us.” Chinese scholars had studied that puzzle from dozens of angles, but Xi wanted more. “In 2009, he commissioned a long study of the Soviet Union from somebody who works in the policy-research office,” the diplomat in Beijing told me. “It concluded that the rot started under Brezhnev. In the paper, the guy cited a joke: Brezhnev brings his mother to Moscow. He proudly shows her the state apartments at the Kremlin, his Zil limousine, and the life of luxury he now lives. ‘Well, what do you think, Mama,’ says Brezhnev. ‘You’ll never have to worry about a thing, ever again.’ ‘I’m so proud of you, Leonid Ilyich,’ says Mama, ‘but what happens if the Communists find out?’ Xi loved the story.” Xi reserved special scorn for Gorbachev, for failing to defend the Party against its opponents, and told his colleagues, “Nobody was man enough to stand up and resist.”

The year after Xi took office, cadres were required to watch a six-part documentary on the Soviet Union’s collapse, which showed violent scenes of unrest and described an American conspiracy to topple Communism through “peaceful evolution”: the steady infiltration of subversive Western political ideas. Ever since the early aughts, when “color revolutions” erupted in the former Soviet bloc, Chinese Communists have cited the risk of contagion as a reason to constrict political life. That fear was heightened by a surge of unrest in Tibet in 2008, in Xinjiang in 2009, and across the Arab world in 2011. Last September, when pro-democracy protests erupted in Hong Kong, an opinion piece in the Global Times , a state-run daily, accused the National Endowment for Democracy and the C.I.A. of being “black hands” behind the unrest, intent on “stimulating Taiwanese independence, Xinjiang independence, and Tibetan independence.” (The U.S. denied involvement.)

Xi’s government has no place for loyal opposition. When he launched the anticorruption campaign, activists—such as the lawyer Xu Zhiyong, who had served as a local legislator in Beijing—joined in, calling on officials to disclose their incomes. But Xu and many others were arrested. (He was later sentenced to four years in prison for “gathering crowds to disrupt public order.”) One of Xu’s former colleagues, Teng Biao, told me, “For the government, ‘peaceful evolution’ was not just a slogan. It was real. The influence of Western states was becoming more obvious and more powerful.” Teng was at a conference in Germany soon after Xu and another colleague were arrested. “People advised me not to return to China, or I’d be arrested, too,” Teng said. He is now a visiting scholar at Harvard Law School.

A prominent editor in Beijing told me that Chinese philanthropists have been warned, “You can’t give money to this N.G.O. or that N.G.O.—basically all N.G.O.s.” In December, the Committee to Protect Journalists counted forty-four reporters in Chinese jails, more than in any other country. Well-known human-rights lawyers—Pu Zhiqiang, Ding Jiaxi, Xia Lin—have been jailed. Earlier this month, Human Rights Watch called this the harshest suppression of dissent in a decade.

Although Vladimir Putin has suffocated Russian civil society and neutered the press, Moscow stores still carry books that are critical of him, and a few long-suffering blogs still find ways to attack him. Xi is less tolerant. In February, 2014, Yiu Mantin, a seventy-nine-year-old editor at Hong Kong’s Morning Bell Press, who had planned to release a biography critical of Xi, by the exiled writer Yu Jie, was arrested during a visit to the mainland. He had received a phone call warning him not to proceed with publication. He was sentenced to ten years in prison, on charges of smuggling seven cans of paint.

For years, Chinese intellectuals distinguished between words and actions: Western political ideas could be discussed in China as long as nobody tried to enact them. In 2011, China’s education minister, Yuan Guiren, extolled the benefits of exchanges with foreign countries. “Whether they’re rich or poor, socialist or capitalist, as long as they’re beneficial to our development we can learn from all of them,” he told the Jinghua Times , a state newspaper. But in January Yuan told a conference, “Young teachers and students are key targets of infiltration by enemy forces.” He said, “We must, by no means, allow into our classrooms material that propagates Western values.” An article on the Web site of Seeking Truth , an official Party journal, warned against professors who “blacken China’s name,” and it singled out the law professor He Weifang by name. When I spoke to He, a few days later, he said, “I’ve always been unpopular with conservatives, but recently the situation has become more serious. The political standpoint of this new slate of leaders isn’t like that of the Hu or Jiang era. They’re more restraining. They’re not as willing to permit an active discussion.”

“Ill have what shes having when she decides what shes having.”

Sealing China off from Western ideas poses some practical problems. The Party has announced “rule of law” reforms intended to strengthen top-down control over the legal system and shield courts from local interference. The professor said, “Many colleagues working on civil law and that sort of thing have a large portion of their lectures about German law or French law. So, if you want to stop Western values from spreading in Chinese universities, one thing you’d have to do is close down the law schools and make sure they never exist again.” Xi, for his part, sees no contradiction, because preservation of the Party comes before preservation of the law. In January, he said that China must “nurture a legal corps loyal to the Party, loyal to the country, loyal to the people, and loyal to the law.” Echoing Mao, he added, “Insure that the handle of the knife is firmly in the hand of the Party and the people.”

Xi’s wariness of Western influence is reflected in his foreign policy. On a personal level, he expresses warm memories of Iowa, and he sent his daughter, Xi Mingze, to Harvard. (She graduated last year, under a pseudonym, and has returned to China.) But Xi has also expressed an essentialist view of national characteristics such that, in his telling, China’s history and social makeup render it unfit for multiparty democracy or a monarchy or any other non-Communist system. “We considered them, tried them, but none worked,” he told an audience at the College of Europe, in Bruges, last spring. Adopting an alternative, he said, “might even lead to catastrophic consequences.” On his watch, state-run media have accentuated the threat of “peaceful evolution,” and have accused American companies, including Microsoft, Cisco, and Intel, of being “warriors” for the U.S. government.

As for a broad diplomatic vision, Chinese leaders since Deng Xiaoping have adhered to a principle known as “Hide your strength, bide your time.” Xi has effectively replaced that concept with declarations of China’s arrival. In Paris last year, he invoked Napoleon’s remark that China was “a sleeping lion,” and said that the lion “has already awakened, but this is a peaceful, pleasant, and civilized lion.” He told the Politburo in December that he intends to “make China’s voice heard, and inject more Chinese elements into international rules.” As alternatives to the Washington-based World Bank and International Monetary Fund, Xi’s government has established the New Development Bank, the Silk Road infrastructure fund, and the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, which, together, intend to amass two hundred and forty billion dollars in capital. Xi has been far bolder than his predecessors in asserting Chinese control over airspace and land, sending an oil rig into contested waters, and erecting buildings, helipads, and other facilities on reefs that are claimed by multiple nations. He has also taken advantage of Putin’s growing economic isolation; Xi has met with Putin more than with any other foreign leader, and, last May, as Russia faced new sanctions over the annexation of Crimea, Xi and Putin agreed on a four-hundred-billion-dollar deal to supply gas to China at rates that favor Beijing. According to the prominent editor, Xi has told people that he was impressed by Putin’s seizure of Crimea—“He got a large piece of land and resources” and boosted his poll numbers at home. But, as war in Ukraine has dragged on, Xi has become less complimentary of Putin.

No diplomatic relationship matters more to China’s future than its dealings with the United States, and Xi has urged the U.S. to adopt a “new type of great-power relationship”—to regard China as an equal and to acknowledge its claims to contested islands and other interests. (The Obama Administration has declined to adopt the phrase.) Xi and Obama have met, at length, five times. American officials describe the relationship as occasionally candid but not close. They have “brutally frank exchanges on difficult issues, and it doesn’t upset the apple cart,” a senior Administration official told me. “So it’s different from the era of Hu Jintao, where there was very little exchange.” Hu almost never departed from his notes, and American counterparts wondered how much he believed his talking points. “Xi is reading what I’m confident Xi believes,” the official said, though their engagements remain stilted: “There’s still a cadence that is very difficult to extract yourself from in these exchanges. . . . We want to have a conversation.”

For years, American military leaders worried that there was a growing risk of an accidental clash between China and the U.S., in part because Beijing protested U.S. policies by declining meetings between senior commanders. In 2011, Mike Mullen, then the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, visited Xi in Beijing, and appealed to his military experience, telling him, as he recalled to me, “I just need you to stop cutting off military relationships as step one, every time you get ticked off.” That has improved. In Beijing last November, Xi and Obama spent five hours at dinner and meetings and announced coöperation on climate change, a high-tech free-trade deal that China had previously resisted, and two military agreements to encourage communication between forces operating near each other in the South China and East China Seas. Mullen, who has met Xi again since their initial encounter, is encouraged: “They still get ticked off, they take steps, but they don’t cut it off.”

“You dont have to do the quotes every time Brian—we know youre not Shakespeare.”

As China ejects Western ideas, Xi is trying to fill that void with an affirmative set of ideas to offer at home and abroad. Recently, I rode the No. 1 subway line eastbound, beneath the Avenue of Eternal Peace—under Party headquarters, the Central Propaganda Department, and the Ministries of Commerce and Public Security—and got off the train at the Second Ring Road, where the old City Wall once stood. Near the station, at a Starbucks, I met Zhang Lifan, a well-known historian. At sixty-four, he defies the usual rumpled stereotype of the liberal intelligentsia; he is tall, with elegant hints of gray hair, and he wore a black mandarin-collar jacket and a winter cap covered in smooth black fur. Zhang grew up around politics; his father, a banker before the revolution, served as a minister in the early years of Mao’s government. I asked him what message Xi hoped to promote from China around the world. He said, “Ever since Mao’s day, and the beginning of reform and opening up, we all talk about a ‘crisis of faith,’ ” the sense that rapid growth and political turmoil have cut China off from its moral history. “He is trying to solve that problem, so that there can be another new ideology.”

Zhang writes about politics, and he is occasionally visited by police who remind him to avoid sensitive subjects. “Sometimes, they will pass by and say it through the closed front door,” Zhang said. He commented, “They tried to stop me from coming today. They followed me here.” He indicated a slim young man in a windbreaker, watching us from a nearby table. In remote areas, where police are unaccustomed to the presence of foreigners, authorities often try to prevent people from meeting reporters. But, in a decade of writing about China, this was the first time I’d encountered that situation in the capital. I suggested we postpone our discussion. He shook his head. In a stage whisper, he said, “What I say and what I write are the same. There’s no difference.”

The most surprising thing about the era of Xi Jinping is the decision to close off the margins—those minor mutinies and indulgences that used to be tolerated as a way to avoid driving China’s most prosperous and well-educated citizens abroad. For years, the government tacitly allowed people to gain access to virtual private networks, or V.P.N.s, which allow users to reach Web sites that are blocked in China. The risks seemed manageable; most Chinese users had less interest in politics than in reaching a celebrity’s Instagram feed (Instagram, like Facebook, Twitter, Bloomberg, Reuters, and the Times , is blocked). Keeping them open, the theory went, allowed sophisticated users to get what they wanted or needed—for instance, researchers accessing Google Scholar, or businesses doing transactions—while preventing the masses from employing technology that worries the Party. But on January 23rd, while I was in Beijing, the government abruptly blocked the V.P.N.s, and state media reiterated that they were illegal. Overnight, it became radically more difficult to reach anything on the Internet outside China. Before the comments were shut down on the Web site Computer News, twelve thousand people left their views. “What are you afraid of?” one asked. “Big step toward becoming a new North Korea,” another wrote. Another wrote: “One more advertisement for emigration.”

A decade ago, the Chinese Internet was alive with debate, confession, humor, and discovery. Month by month, it is becoming more sterilized and self-contained. To the degree that China’s connection to the outside world matters, the digital links are deteriorating. Voice-over-Internet calls, viral videos, podcasts—the minor accessories of contemporary digital life—are less reachable abroad than they were a year ago. It’s an astonishing thing to observe in a rising superpower. How many countries in 2015 have an Internet connection to the world that is worse than it was a year ago?

The General Secretary, in his capacity as Big Uncle Xi, has taken to offering advice on nonpolitical matters: last fall, he lamented an overly “sensual” trend in society. (In response, Chinese auto executives stopped having lightly clad models lounge around vehicles at car shows.) In January, he urged people to get more sleep, “however enthusiastic you may be about the job,” saying that he goes to bed before midnight. Online, people joked that it seemed implausible: since taking office, Xi has acquired heavy bags under his eyes and a look of near-constant irritation.

For a generation, the Communist Party forged a political consensus built on economic growth and legal ambiguity. Liberal activists and corrupt bureaucrats learned to skirt (or flout) legal boundaries, because the Party objected only intermittently. Today, Xi has indicated that consensus, beyond the Party élite, is superfluous—or, at least, less reliable than a hard boundary between enemies and friends.

It is difficult to know precisely how much support Xi enjoys. Private pollsters are not allowed to explicitly measure his public support, but Victor Yuan, the president of Horizon Research Consultancy Group, a Beijing polling firm, told me, “We’ve done some indirect research, and his support seems to be around eighty per cent. It comes from two areas: one is the anticorruption policy and the other is foreign policy. The area where it’s unclear is the economy. People say they’ll have to wait and see.”

China’s economy is likely to be Xi’s greatest obstacle. After economic growth of, on average, nearly ten per cent a year, for more than three decades, the Party expected growth to slow to a sustainable pace of around seven per cent, but it could fall more sharply. China remains the world’s largest manufacturer, with four trillion dollars in foreign-exchange reserves (a sum equivalent to the world’s fourth-largest economy). In November, 2013, the Party announced plans to reinvigorate competition by expanding the role of private banks, allowing the market (instead of bureaucrats) to decide where water, oil, and other precious resources are directed, and forcing state firms to give up larger dividends and compete with private businesses. Last spring, China abolished registered-capital and other requirements for new companies, and in November it allowed foreign investors to trade shares directly on the Shanghai stock market for the first time. “A fair judgment is that Xi’s government has achieved more progress, in more areas, in the past eighteen months than the Hu government did in its entire second term,” Arthur Kroeber, a longtime Beijing-based economist at Gavekal Dragonomics, a research firm, told me. And yet, Kroeber added, “my confidence level is only slightly above fifty per cent” that the reforms will be enough to head off a recession.

“Well well looks like we got ourselves a coupla city types here and a couple more city types right behind em and a whole...

The risks to China’s economy have rarely been more visible. The workforce is aging more quickly than in other countries (because of the one-child policy), and businesses are borrowing money more rapidly than they are earning it. David Kelly, a co-founder of China Policy, a Beijing-based research and advisory firm, said, “The turning point in the economy really was about four, five years ago, and now you see the classical problem of the declining productivity of capital. For every dollar you invest, you’re getting far less bang for your buck.” The growth of demand for energy and raw materials has slowed, more houses and malls are empty, and nervous Chinese savers are sending money overseas, to protect it in the event of a crisis. Some factories have not paid wages, and in the last quarter of 2014 workers held strikes, or other forms of protest, at three times the rate of the same period a year earlier.

Xi’s ability to avoid an economic crisis depends partly on whether he has the political strength to prevail over state firms, local governments, and other powerful interests. In his meetings with Rudd, the former Australian Prime Minister, Xi mentioned his father’s frustrated attempts to achieve market-oriented reforms. “Xi Jinping is legitimately proud of his father,” Rudd said, adding, “His father had a record of real achievement and was, frankly, a person who paid a huge political and personal price for being a dedicated Party man and a dedicated economic reformer.”

Historically, the Party has never perceived a contradiction between political crackdown and economic reform. In 2005, Premier Wen Jiabao met with a delegation from the U.S. Congress, and one member, citing a professor who had recently been fired for political reasons, asked the Premier why. Wen was baffled by the inquiry; the professor was a “small problem,” he said. “I don’t know the person you spoke of, but as Premier I have 1.3 billion people on my mind.”

To maintain economic growth, China is straining to promote innovation, but by enforcing a political chill on Chinese campuses Xi risks suppressing precisely the disruptive thinking that the country needs for the future. At times, politics prevails over rational calculations. In 2014, after China had spent years investing in science and technology, the share of its economy devoted to research and development surpassed Europe’s. But, when the government announced the recipients of grants for social-science research, seven of the top ten projects were dedicated to analyzing Xi’s speeches (officially known as “General Secretary Xi’s Series of Important Speeches”) or his signature slogan: the Chinese Dream.

The era of Xi Jinping has defied the assumption that China’s fitful opening to the world is too critical and productive to stall. The Party today perceives an array of threats that, in the view of He Weifang, the law professor, will only increase in the years ahead. Before the Web, the professor said, “there really weren’t very many people who were able to access information from outside, so in Deng Xiaoping’s era the Party could afford to be a lot more open.” But now, if the Internet were unrestricted, “I believe it would bring in things that the leaders would consider very dangerous.”

Like many others I met this winter, He Weifang worries that the Party is narrowing the range of acceptable adaptation to the point that it risks uncontrollable change. I asked him what he thinks the Party will be like in ten or fifteen years. “I think, as intellectuals, we must do everything we can to promote a peaceful transformation of the Party—to encourage it to become a ‘leftist party’ in the European sense, a kind of social-democratic party.” That, he said, would help its members better respect a true system of law and political competition, including freedom of the press and freedom of thought. “If they refuse even these basic changes, then I believe China will undergo another revolution.”

It is a dramatic prediction—and an oddly commonplace one these days. Zhang Lifan, the historian I saw at Starbucks, said, in full view of his minder, “In front of a lot of princeling friends, I’ve said that, if the Communist Party can’t take sufficient political reform in five or ten years, it could miss the chance entirely. As scholars, we always say it’s better to have reform than revolution, but in Chinese history this cycle repeats itself. Mao said we have to get rid of the cycle, but right now we’re still in it. This is very worrying.”

Two months after the events of New Year’s Eve, the Party again confronted a collision between its instinct for control and the complexity of Chinese society. For years, the government had downplayed the severity of environmental pollution, describing it as an unavoidable cost of growth. But, year by year, the middle class was becoming less accommodating; in polls, urban citizens described pollution as their leading concern, and, using smartphones, they compared daily pollution levels to the standards set by the World Health Organization. After a surge of smog in 2013, the government intensified efforts to consolidate power plants, close small polluters, and tighten state control. Last year, it declared a “war against pollution,” but conceded that Beijing will not likely achieve healthy air before 2030. In a moment of candor, the mayor pronounced the city “unlivable.”

In February, Chinese video sites posted a privately funded documentary, titled “Under the Dome,” in which Chai Jing, a former state-television reporter, described her growing alarm at the risks that air pollution poses to her infant daughter. It was a sophisticated production: Chai, in fashionable faded jeans and a white blouse, delivered a fast-paced, TED -style talk to a rapt studio audience, unspooling grim statistics and scenes in which bureaucrats admitted that powerful companies and agencies had rendered them incapable of protecting public health. In spirit, the film was consistent with the official “war on corruption,” and state-run media responded with a coördinated array of flattering coverage.

The film raced across social media, and by the end of the first week it had been viewed two hundred million times—a level usually reserved for pop-music videos rather than dense, two-hour documentaries. The following weekend, the authorities ordered video sites to withdraw the film, and news organizations took down their coverage. As quickly as it had appeared, the film vanished from the Chinese Web—a phenomenon undone.

“Well thats the only song we know so we can play it another two or three times or we can cut our losses. Waddya say...

In the era of Xi Jinping, the public had proved, again, to be an unpredictable partner. It was a lesson that Xi absorbed long ago. “The people elevated me to this position so that I’d listen to them and benefit them,” he said in 2000. “But, in the face of all these opinions and comments, I had to learn to enjoy having my errors pointed out to me, but not to be swayed too much by that. Just because so-and-so says something, I’m not going to start weighing every cost and benefit. I’m not going to lose my appetite over it.” ♦

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When Tyranny Takes Hold

By Patrick Radden Keefe

When Foster Parents Don’t Want to Give Back the Baby

By Eli Hager

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Xi Jinping leads a gala in Beijing

Xi by Kerry Brown review – the man who became China’s president

His personal life remains an enigma, but this is a valuable primer for anyone looking to get up to speed on Xi Jinping’s rise to global power

I n November 2012 Xi Jinping was made general secretary of the Chinese Communist party, the top spot in the country’s political system. Since March 2013 he has also been president, a largely ceremonial but diplomatically significant post. Having held those positions for almost a decade, and showing no sign that he plans to hand either on anytime soon, Xi is now sometimes described not just as the most powerful person in China, but the most powerful individual in the world.

And yet we know relatively little about him, a fact that Kerry Brown’s new biography – though thorough in many respects – fails to fully remedy. The facts of Xi’s early life are fairly well documented. The son of a veteran revolutionary, his family went through a major reversal of fortune late in the Mao period, when his father was purged. Xi went from enjoying a privileged lifestyle in Beijing to becoming one of the millions of “sent down” youths encouraged to learn from the peasants by working in the countryside. Once his father was back in favour under Deng Xiaoping, he studied at China’s elite Tsinghua University and took up various posts, first in the military and then in civilian bureaucracies.

The dramatic upward trajectory of Xi’s life began when he was in his 50s, a period during which he was named Hu Jintao’s heir apparent, in 2007. His period in power, initially expected to last 10 years, has encompassed the longest lasting and furthest reaching anti-corruption drive the country has ever seen, the belt and road initiative that seeks to establish ties between the People’s Republic of China and scores of other countries, and of course, Covid.

A discussion of the invasion of Ukraine will have to wait for the next edition, and one wishes there was more about Vladimir Putin in this book than the comment that neither he nor Xi show signs of disappearing from the scene anytime soon. Brown does, however, have plenty to say about other events making global headlines, especially the pandemic, which has gone from seeming likely to undermine Xi’s position to serving to strengthen it. In Brown’s words, as a tightly controlled media plays up pandemic governance failures in other parts of the world, and hides or plays down domestic missteps, Covid has “provided the fuel by which Chinese nationalism has been turbo-charged” – and this is important to Xi since, as the author rightly stresses throughout the book, he is motivated above all by a fierce patriotism and a strong desire to see the Chinese Communist party (CCP) stay in power. News of staggering death tolls in Europe and the US have been presented as “positive proof that socialism with Chinese characteristics” can “perform better than western capitalism” in a crisis.

It is curious that it has taken so long for an accessible English-language biography of Xi like this to come out. Among the reasons is the fact that neither he nor anyone in his inner circle gives interviews, and it is not even clear who exactly is in his inner circle. There are no candid tell-all memoirs by him or people close to him to offer insights.

As a result, this book is a valuable primer for anyone looking to get up to speed on how Xi achieved power (largely by inheriting and cultivating an unusually wide array of connections to members of different wings of the CCP elite) and what he has done with it in political terms. But it is less compelling as a window on to the private man, who remains an enigma. And while Brown does not shy away from mentioning the dark sides of Xi’s reign – and there are many, from horrific human rights abuses in Xinjiang and Tibet , to the strangling of civil liberties in Hong Kong , and the clampdown on critical intellectuals and journalists in Beijing – one feels the emphasis on these could be stronger.

Sometimes, Brown falls into the trap of implying that what is good for the CCP is good for the country and its people, and makes a prediction that he presumably found himself wishing he could alter as the harsh Shanghai lockdown began to make headlines around the world. “Even in the depths of 2022, with no immediate end in sight for the Covid-19 pandemic,” he writes late in the book, “my faith in China, under Xi or whoever replaces him, being able to surmount the formidable challenges facing it, and creating its own unique version of modernity, is still strong. And what a world it might be, where the whole of China buzzes with the energy and life of the great city of Shanghai.”

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bio of xi jinping

Xi Jinping, male, Han nationality, is a native of Fuping County, Shaanxi Province. He was born in 1953, entered the work force in 1969, joined the CYLC in 1971 and joined the CPC in 1974. Xi has served in four provinces during his government and Party career: Shaanxi, Hebei, Fujian and Zhejiang. He has held Party positions in the CPC Fuzhou City Committee, and in 1990 he became president of the Party school in Fuzhou City. In 1999 he was elected vice-governor of Fujian province, then governor a year later. In 2002 he took up senior government and Party positions in Zhejiang Province. Xi Jinping was an alternate member of the 15th CPC Central Committee and was a member of the 16th CPC Central Committee. In 2007 he became a member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo Bureau of the 17th CPC Central Committee and Chairman of 17th CPC Central Committee Party Building Leading Small Group. He is also the President of the Party School of the CPC Central Committee. In 2008, he became Vice-President of the People's Republic of China. In 2010 he became Vice-Chairman of the CPC Central Military Commission and Vice-Chairman, Central Military Commission of the PRC. In 2012 he became General Secretary of the 18th CPC Central Committee a member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the 18th CPC Central Committee and Chairman of the CPC Central Military Commission. In 2013 Xi was elected Chairman of the PRC Central Military Commission and President of China. In 2014 Xi became head of China's new national security commission. In 2017 Xi became Head of the CPC Central Committee's Central Commission for Integrated Military and Civilian Development. He was also named as a delegate to 19th CPC National Congress. As of 2017 Xi is also General Secretary of the 19th CPC Central Committee a member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the 19th CPC Central Committee and Chairman of the CPC Central Military Commission.

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  • About Xi Jinping

The following is the biographical sketch of Xi Jinping :

Xi Jinping, born in June 1953, is a male ethnic Han from Fuping , Shaanxi Province. He entered the workforce in January 1969 and joined the Communist Party of China (CPC) in January 1974. He graduated from the School of Humanities and Social Sciences at Tsinghua University with a major in Marxist theory and ideological and political education, has an in-service postgraduate education and holds the degree of Doctor of Laws.

He is currently general secretary of the CPC Central Committee, chairman of the CPC Central Military Commission, vice president of the People's Republic of China (PRC), vice chairman of the PRC Central Military Commission, and president of the Central Party School.

1969-1975 Educated youth and Party Branch secretary, Liangjiahe Brigade, Wen'anyi Commune, Yanchuan County, Shaanxi Province

1975-1979 Student of basic organic synthesis, Department of Chemical Engineering, Tsinghua University

1979-1982 Secretary, General Office, State Council and Central Military Commission (AD)

1982-1983 Deputy secretary, CPC Zhengding County Committee, Hebei Province

1983-1985 Secretary, CPC Zhengding County Committee, Hebei Province; concurrently first commissar and Party Committee first secretary, Zhengding County Military Affairs Department

1985-1988 Member, Standing Committee, CPC Xiamen Municipal Committee, Fujian Province; and vice mayor, Xiamen

1988-1990 Secretary, CPC Ningde Prefectural Committee, Fujian Province; and concurrently first secretary, Party Committee, Ningde Military Sub-region

1990-1993 Secretary, CPC Fuzhou Municipal Committee, Fujian Province; chairman, Standing Committee, Fuzhou Municipal People's Congress; and concurrently first secretary, Party Committee, Fuzhou Military Sub-region

1993-1995 Member, Standing Committee, CPC Fujian Provincial Committee; secretary, CPC Fuzhou Municipal Committee; chairman, Standing Committee, Fuzhou Municipal People's Congress; first secretary, Party Committee, Fuzhou Military Sub-region

1995-1996 Deputy secretary, CPC Fujian Provincial Committee; secretary, CPC Fuzhou Municipal Committee; chairman, Standing Committee, Fuzhou Municipal People's Congress; first secretary, Party Committee, Fuzhou Military Sub-region

1996-1999 Deputy secretary, CPC Fujian Provincial Committee; first commissar, Fujian Provincial Antiaircraft Artillery Reserve Division

1999-2000 Deputy secretary, CPC Fujian Provincial Committee; acting governor, Fujian Province; deputy director, National Defense Mobilization Committee, Nanjing Military Area Command; director, Fujian Provincial National Defense Mobilization Committee; first commissar, Fujian Provincial Antiaircraft Artillery Reserve Division

2000-2002 Deputy secretary, CPC Fujian Provincial Committee; governor, Fujian Province; deputy director, National Defense Mobilization Committee, Nanjing Military Area Command; director, Fujian Provincial National Defense Mobilization Committee; first commissar, Fujian Provincial Antiaircraft Artillery Reserve Division (1998-2002: studied Marxist theory and ideological and political education in the In-service Postgraduate Class at the School of Humanities and Social Sciences at Tsinghua University, and awarded the degree of Doctor of Laws)

2002-2002 Deputy secretary, CPC Zhejiang Provincial Committee; acting governor, Zhejiang Province; deputy director, National Defense Mobilization Committee, Nanjing Military Area Command; director, Zhejiang Provincial National Defense Mobilization Committee

2002-2003 Secretary, CPC Zhejiang Provincial Committee; acting governor, Zhejiang Province; first secretary, Party Committee, Zhejiang Provincial Military Region; deputy director, National Defense Mobilization Committee, Nanjing Military Area Command; director, Zhejiang Provincial National Defense Mobilization Committee

2003-2007 Secretary, CPC Zhejiang Provincial Committee; chairman, Standing Committee, Zhejiang Provincial People's Congress; first secretary, Party Committee, Zhejiang Provincial Military Region

2007-2007 Secretary, CPC Shanghai Municipal Committee; first secretary, Party Committee, Shanghai Garrison Command

2007-2008 Member, Standing Committee, Political Bureau; and member, Secretariat; of the CPC Central Committee; president, Central Party School

2008-2010 Member, Standing Committee, Political Bureau; and member, Secretariat; of the CPC Central Committee; vice president, PRC; president, Central Party School

2010-2012 Member, Standing Committee, Political Bureau; and member, Secretariat; of the CPC Central Committee; vice president, PRC; vice chairman, CPC and PRC Central Military Commission; president, Central Party School

2012- General secretary, CPC Central Committee; chairman, CPC Central Military Commission; vice president, PRC; vice chairman, PRC Central Military Commission; president, Central Party School

Alternate member, Fifteenth CPC Central Committee; member, Sixteenth through Eighteenth CPC Central Committees; member, Political Bureau and its Standing Committee, and Secretariat, Seventeenth CPC Central Committee; member, Political Bureau and its Standing Committee, and general secretary, Eighteenth CPC Central Committee; elected as vice president of the PRC at the First Session of the Eleventh National People's Congress ( NPC ); appointed as a vice chairman of the CPC Central Military Commission at the Fifth Plenary Session of the Seventeenth CPC Central Committee; appointed as a vice chairman of the PRC Central Military Commission at the Seventeenth Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Eleventh NPC; appointed as chairman of the CPC Central Military Commission at the First Plenary Session of the Eighteenth CPC Central Committee.

(source: Xinhua)

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Biography:Xi Jinping

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  • 2007–: 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th Politburo Standing Committee
  • 2007–: 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th Politburo
  • 2007–2012: Secretary (first-ranked), 17th Central Secretariat
  • 2002–: Full member, 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th Central Committee
  • 1997–2002: Alternate member, 15th Central Committee
  • 1998–: Delegate, 9th, 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th National People's Congress
  • 2018–present: Director, Central Financial and Economic Affairs Commission
  • 2018–present: Director, Central Foreign Affairs Commission
  • 2018–present: Director, Central Cyberspace Affairs Commission
  • 2018–present: Director, Central Comprehensively Deepening Reforms Commission
  • 2014–present: Leader, Leading Group for Defence and Military Reform
  • 2014–2018: Leader, Leading Group for Internet Security and Informatization
  • 2013–present: Chairman, National Security Commission
  • 2013–2018: Leader, Leading Group for Financial and Economic Affairs
  • 2013–2018: Leader, Central Leading Group for Comprehensively Deepening Reforms
  • 2012–present: Leader, Central Leading Group for Taiwan Affairs
  • 2012–2018: Leader, Foreign Affairs Leading Group
  • 2007–2012: Leader Group for Party Building
  • c. 2007–2012: Leader, Leading Group for Activities of Deepening the Study and Practice of the Outlook of Scientific Development
  • 2007–2012: Leader, Central Coordination Group for Hong Kong and Macau Affairs
  • 2016–present: Supreme Commander, Joint Battle Command of the People's Liberation Army
  • 2010–2013: Vice Chairman, State Central Military Commission
  • 2010–2012: Vice Chairman, Party Central Military Commission
  • 2008–2013: Vice President of the People's Republic of China
  • 2007–2012: President, Central Party School
  • 2007: Party Committee Secretary , Shanghai municipality
  • 2002–2007: Party Secretary, Zhejiang province, director, Standing Committee of the Zhejiang Provincial People's Congress
  • 2002: Deputy Party Secretary & acting governor, Zhejiang province
  • 1999–2002: Governor, Fujian province
  • 1995–2002: Deputy Party Secretary , Fujian province
  • 1990–1996: Party Secretary, Fuzhou
  • 1990–1996: Chairman, Standing Committee of the Fuzhou Municipal People's Congress
  • 1988–1990: Party Secretary, Ningde
  • 1985–1988: Deputy Mayor, Xiamen
  • 1983–1985: Party Secretary, Zhengding County
  • ← Hu Jintao
  • ( Current holder )

Xi Jinping ( Chinese : 习近平 ; pinyin : Xí Jìnpíng , pronounced [ɕǐ tɕîn.pʰǐŋ] ; [lower-alpha 1] born 15 June 1953) is a Chinese politician who has been the general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), and thus as the paramount leader of China, since 2012. Xi has also been the president of the People's Republic of China (PRC) since 2013. He belongs to the fifth generation of Chinese leadership.

The son of Chinese Communist veteran Xi Zhongxun, Xi was exiled to rural Yanchuan County as a teenager following his father's purge during the Cultural Revolution. He lived in a yaodong in the village of Liangjiahe, Shaanxi province, where he joined the CCP after several failed attempts and worked as the local party secretary . After studying chemical engineering at Tsinghua University as a worker-peasant-soldier student, Xi rose through the ranks politically in China's coastal provinces. Xi was governor of Fujian from 1999 to 2002, before becoming governor and party secretary of neighboring Zhejiang from 2002 to 2007. Following the dismissal of the party secretary of Shanghai, Chen Liangyu, Xi was transferred to replace him for a brief period in 2007. He subsequently joined the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) of the CCP the same year and was the first-ranking secretary of the Central Secretariat in October 2007. In 2008, he was designated as Hu Jintao's presumed successor as paramount leader; to that end, Xi was appointed vice president of the PRC and vice chairman of the CMC. He officially received the title of leadership core from the CCP in 2016.

Xi is the first CCP general secretary born after the establishment of the PRC. Since assuming power, Xi has introduced far-ranging measures to enforce party discipline and to impose internal unity. His anti-corruption campaign led to the downfall of prominent incumbent and retired CCP officials, including former PSC member Zhou Yongkang. He has also enacted or promoted a more aggressive foreign policy, particularly with regard to China's relations with the U.S., the nine-dash line in the South China Sea, and the Sino-Indian border dispute. He has sought to expand China's African and Eurasian influence through the Belt and Road Initiative . Xi has expanded support for state-owned enterprises (SOEs), advanced military-civil fusion , overseen targeted poverty alleviation programs, and has attempted to reform the property sector. He has also promoted "common prosperity", a series of policies designed with stated goal to increase equality, oversaw a broad crackdown and major slew of regulations against the tech and tutoring sectors in 2021. Xi met with Taiwanese president Ma Ying-jeou in 2015, the first time PRC and Republic of China leaders met, though relations deteriorated after Tsai Ing-wen of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) won the presidential elections in 2016. He responded to the COVID-19 pandemic in mainland China with a zero-COVID approach from January 2020 until December 2022, afterwards shifting towards a mitigation strategy. Xi also oversaw the passage of a national security law in Hong Kong, clamping down on political opposition in the city, especially pro-democracy activists .

Often described as an authoritarian leader by political and academic observers, Xi's tenure has included an increase of censorship and mass surveillance, deterioration in human rights, including the internment of a million Uyghurs in Xinjiang (which some observers have described as part of a genocide ), a cult of personality developing around Xi, and the removal of term limits for the presidency in 2018. Xi's political ideas and principles, known as Xi Jinping Thought , have been incorporated into the party and national constitutions. As the central figure of the fifth generation of leadership of the PRC, Xi has centralized institutional power by taking on multiple positions, including new CCP committees on national security, economic and social reforms, military restructuring and modernization, and the Internet. He and the CCP Central Committee passed a "historical resolution" in November 2021. In October 2022, Xi secured a third term as CCP General Secretary, and was reelected state president for a third term in March 2023.

  • 1 Early life and education
  • 2 Early political career
  • 3.1 Trips as Vice President
  • 3.2 Accession to top posts
  • 4.1 Anti-corruption campaign
  • 4.2 Censorship
  • 4.3.1 Cult of personality
  • 4.4 Economy and technology
  • 4.5.1 Political reforms
  • 4.5.2 Legal reforms
  • 4.5.3 Military reforms
  • 4.6.1 Security
  • 4.6.2 Africa
  • 4.6.3 European Union
  • 4.6.4 India
  • 4.6.5 Japan
  • 4.6.6 Middle East
  • 4.6.7 North Korea
  • 4.6.8 Russia
  • 4.6.9 South Korea
  • 4.6.10 Southeast Asia
  • 4.6.11 Taiwan
  • 4.6.12 United States
  • 4.6.13 Economic relations
  • 4.7 National security
  • 4.8 Hong Kong
  • 4.9.1 Xinjiang
  • 4.10 COVID-19 pandemic
  • 4.11 Environmental policy
  • 4.12 Governance style
  • 5.1 Chinese Dream
  • 5.2 Cultural revival
  • 5.3.1 Xi Jinping Thought
  • 6.2 Personality
  • 7 Public life
  • 8.1 Key to the City
  • 8.2 Honorary doctorates
  • 11.1 Citations
  • 11.2 Works cited
  • 12 Further reading
  • 13 External links

Early life and education

Xi Jinping was born in Beijing on 15 June 1953, [1] the third child of Xi Zhongxun and his second wife Qi Xin. After the founding of the PRC in 1949, Xi's father held a series of posts, including Party propaganda chief, vice-premier, and vice chairperson of the National People's Congress. [2] Xi had two older sisters, Qiaoqiao, born in 1949 and An'an ( 安安 ; Ān'ān ), born in 1952. [3] [4] Xi's father was from Fuping County, Shaanxi. [5]

Xi went to the Beijing Bayi School, [6] [7] and then the Beijing No. 25 School, [8] in the 1960s. He became friends with Liu He, who attended Beijing No. 101 School in the same district, who later became China's vice premier and a close advisor to Xi after he became China's paramount leader. [9] [10] In 1963, when he was aged 10, his father was purged from the CCP and sent to work in a factory in Luoyang, Henan. [11] In May 1966, the Cultural Revolution cut short Xi's secondary education when all secondary classes were halted for students to criticise and fight their teachers. Student militants ransacked the Xi family home and one of Xi's sisters, Xi Heping, "was persecuted to death". [12] [13]

Later, his mother was forced to publicly denounce his father, as he was paraded before a crowd as an enemy of the revolution. His father was later imprisoned in 1968 when Xi was aged 15. Without the protection of his father, Xi was sent to work in Liangjiahe Village, Wen'anyi, Yanchuan County, Yan'an, Shaanxi, in 1969 in Mao Zedong's Down to the Countryside Movement. [14] He worked as the party secretary of Liangjiahe, where he lived in a cave house. [15] According to people who knew him, this experience led him to feel affinity with the rural poor. [16] After a few months, unable to stand rural life, he ran away to Beijing. He was arrested during a crackdown on deserters from the countryside and sent to a work camp to dig ditches, but he later returned to the village. He then spent a total of seven years there. [17] [18]

The misfortunes and suffering of his family in his early years hardened Xi's view of politics. During an interview in 2000, he said, "People who have little contact with power, who are far from it, always see these things as mysterious and novel. But what I see is not just the superficial things: the power, the flowers, the glory, the applause. I see the bullpens and how people can blow hot and cold. I understand politics on a deeper level." The "bullpens" (牛棚) was a reference to Red Guards' detention houses during the Cultural Revolution. [16]

After seven rejections, Xi joined the Communist Youth League of China in 1971 on his eighth attempt after he befriended a local official. [7] He reunited with his father in 1972, because of a family reunion ordered by premier Zhou Enlai. [13] From 1973, he applied to join the CCP ten times and was finally accepted on his tenth attempt in 1974. [19] [20] [21] From 1975 to 1979, Xi studied chemical engineering at Tsinghua University as a worker-peasant-soldier student in Beijing. The engineering majors there spent about 15 percent of their time studying Marxism–Leninism–Maoism and 5 percent of their time doing farm work and "learning from the People's Liberation Army". [22]

Early political career

From 1979 to 1982, Xi was secretary for his father's former subordinate Geng Biao, the then vice premier and secretary-general of the CMC. [7] In 1982, he was sent to Zhengding County in Hebei as deputy party secretary of Zhengding County. He was promoted in 1983 to secretary, becoming the top official of the county. [23] Xi subsequently served in four provinces during his regional political career: Hebei (1982–1985), Fujian (1985–2002), Zhejiang (2002–2007), and Shanghai (2007). [24] Xi held posts in the Fuzhou Municipal Party Committee and became the president of the Party School in Fuzhou in 1990. In 1997, he was named an alternate member of the 15th Central Committee of the CCP. However, of the 151 alternate members of the Central Committee elected at the 15th Party Congress, Xi received the lowest number of votes in favour, placing him last in the rankings of members, ostensibly due to his status as a princeling. [lower-alpha 2] [25]

From 1998 to 2002, Xi studied Marxist theory and ideological education in Tsinghua University, [26] graduating with a doctorate in law and ideology in 2002. [27] In 1999, he was promoted to the office of Vice Governor of Fujian, and became governor a year later. In Fujian, Xi made efforts to attract investment from Taiwan and to strengthen the private sector of the provincial economy. [28] In February 2000, he and then-provincial party secretary Chen Mingyi were called before the top members of PSC – general secretary Jiang Zemin, premier Zhu Rongji, vice president Hu Jintao and Discipline Inspection secretary Wei Jianxing – to explain aspects of the Yuanhua scandal. [29]

In 2002, Xi left Fujian and took up leading political positions in neighbouring Zhejiang. He eventually took over as provincial Party Committee secretary after several months as acting governor, occupying a top provincial office for the first time in his career. In 2002, he was elected a full member of the 16th Central Committee, marking his ascension to the national stage. While in Zhejiang, Xi presided over reported growth rates averaging 14% per year. [30] His career in Zhejiang was marked by a tough and straightforward stance against corrupt officials. This earned him a name in the national media and drew the attention of China's top leaders. [31] Between 2004 and 2007, Li Qiang acted as Xi's chief of staff through his position as secretary-general of the Zhejiang Party Committee, where they developed close mutual ties. [32]

Following the dismissal of Shanghai Party secretary Chen Liangyu in September 2006 due to a social security fund scandal, Xi was transferred to Shanghai in March 2007, where he was the party secretary there for seven months. [33] [34] In Shanghai, Xi avoided controversy and was known for strictly observing party discipline. For example, Shanghai administrators attempted to earn favour with him by arranging a special train to shuttle him between Shanghai and Hangzhou for him to complete handing off his work to his successor as Zhejiang party secretary Zhao Hongzhu. However, Xi reportedly refused to take the train, citing a loosely enforced party regulation that stipulated that special trains can only be reserved for "national leaders". [35] While in Shanghai, he worked on preserving unity of the local party organisation. He pledged there would be no 'purges' during his administration, despite the fact many local officials were thought to have been implicated in the Chen Liangyu corruption scandal. [36] On most issues, Xi largely echoed the line of the central leadership. [37]

Rise to power

bio of xi jinping

Xi was appointed to the nine-man PSC at the 17th Party Congress in October 2007. He was ranked above Li Keqiang, an indication that he was going to succeed Hu Jintao as China's next leader. In addition, Xi also held the first secretary of the CCP's Central Secretariat. This assessment was further supported at the 11th National People's Congress in March 2008, when Xi was elected as vice president of the PRC. [38] Following his elevation, Xi held a broad range of portfolios. He was put in charge of the comprehensive preparations for the 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing, as well as being the central government's leading figure in Hong Kong and Macau affairs. In addition, he also became the new president of the Central Party School of the CCP, its cadre-training and ideological education wing. In the wake of the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, Xi visited disaster areas in Shaanxi and Gansu. He made his first foreign trip as vice president to North Korea, Mongolia, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Yemen from 17 to 25 June 2008. [39] After the Olympics, Xi was assigned the post of committee chair for the preparations of the 60th Anniversary Celebrations of the founding of the PRC. He was also reportedly at the helm of a top-level CCP committee dubbed the 6521 Project, which was charged with ensuring social stability during a series of politically sensitive anniversaries in 2009. [40]

Xi's position as the apparent successor to become the paramount leader was threatened with the rapid rise of Bo Xilai, the party secretary of Chongqing at the time. Bo was expected to join the PSC at the 18th Party Congress, with most expecting that he would try to eventually maneuver himself into replacing Xi. [41] Bo's policies in Chongqing inspired imitations throughout China and received praise from Xi himself during Xi's visit to Chongqing in 2010. Records of praises from Xi were later erased after he became paramount leader. Bo's downfall would come with the Wang Lijun incident, which opened the door for Xi to come to power without challengers. [42]

Xi is considered one of the most successful members of the Princelings, a quasi-clique of politicians who are descendants of early Chinese Communist revolutionaries. Former prime minister of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew, when asked about Xi, said he felt he was "a thoughtful man who has gone through many trials and tribulations". [43] Lee also commented: "I would put him in the Nelson Mandela class of persons. A person with enormous emotional stability who does not allow his personal misfortunes or sufferings affect his judgment. In other words, he is impressive". [44] Former U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson described Xi as "the kind of guy who knows how to get things over the goal line". [45] Australian prime minister Kevin Rudd said that Xi "has sufficient reformist, party and military background to be very much his own man". [46]

Trips as Vice President

In February 2009, in his capacity as vice-president, Xi Jinping embarked on a tour of Latin America, visiting Mexico, [47] Jamaica, [48] Colombia, [49] Venezuela, [50] Brazil, [51] and Malta, after which he returned to China. [52] On 11 February 2009, while visiting Mexico, Xi spoke in front of a group of overseas Chinese and explained China's contributions during the international financial crisis, saying that it was "the greatest contribution towards the whole of human race, made by China, to prevent its 1.3 billion people from hunger". [lower-alpha 3] He went on to remark: "There are some bored foreigners, with full stomachs, who have nothing better to do than point fingers at us. First, China doesn't export revolution; second, China doesn't export hunger and poverty; third, China doesn't come and cause you headaches. What more is there to be said?" [lower-alpha 4] [53] The story was reported on some local television stations. The news led to a flood of discussions on Chinese Internet forums and it was reported that the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs was caught off-guard by Xi's remarks, as the actual video was shot by some accompanying Hong Kong reporters and broadcast on Hong Kong TV, which then turned up on various Internet video websites. [54]

bio of xi jinping

In the European Union , Xi visited Belgium, Germany, Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania from 7 to 21 October 2009. [55] He visited Japan, South Korea, Cambodia, and Myanmar on his Asian trip from 14 to 22 December 2009. [56] He later visited the United States, Ireland and Turkey in February 2012. This visit included meeting with then U.S. president Barack Obama at the White House and vice president Joe Biden (with Biden as the official host); [57] and stops in California and Iowa. In Iowa, he met with the family that previously hosted him during his 1985 tour as a Hebei provincial official. [58]

Accession to top posts

A few months before his ascendancy to the party leadership, Xi disappeared from official media coverage and cancelled meeting with foreign officials for several weeks beginning on 1 September 2012, causing rumors. [7] He then reappeared on 15 September. [59] On 15 November 2012, Xi was elected to the posts of general secretary of the CCP and chairman of the CMC by the 18th Central Committee of the CCP. This made him, informally, the paramount leader and the first to be born after the founding of the PRC. The following day Xi led the new line-up of the PSC onto the stage in their first public appearance. [60] The PSC was reduced from nine to seven, with only Xi and Li Keqiang retaining their seats; the other five members were new. [61] [62] [63] In a marked departure from the common practice of Chinese leaders, Xi's first speech as general secretary was plainly worded and did not include any political slogans or mention his predecessors. [64] Xi mentioned the aspirations of the average person, remarking, "Our people ... expect better education, more stable jobs, better income, more reliable social security, medical care of a higher standard, more comfortable living conditions, and a more beautiful environment." Xi also vowed to tackle corruption at the highest levels, alluding that it would threaten the CCP's survival; he was reticent about far-reaching economic reforms. [65]

In December 2012, Xi visited Guangdong in his first trip outside Beijing since taking the Party leadership. The overarching theme of the trip was to call for further economic reform and a strengthened military. Xi visited the statue of Deng Xiaoping and his trip was described as following in the footsteps of Deng's own southern trip in 1992 , which provided the impetus for further economic reforms in China after conservative party leaders stalled many of Deng's reforms in the aftermath of the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre. On his trip, Xi consistently alluded to his signature slogan, the "Chinese Dream". "This dream can be said to be the dream of a strong nation. And for the military, it is a dream of a strong military", Xi told sailors. [66] Xi's trip was significant in that he departed from the established convention of Chinese leaders' travel routines in multiple ways. Rather than dining out, Xi and his entourage ate regular hotel buffet. He travelled in a large van with his colleagues rather than a fleet of limousines, and did not restrict traffic on the parts of the highway he travelled. [67]

Xi was elected president on 14 March 2013, in a confirmation vote by the 12th National People's Congress in Beijing. He received 2,952 for, one vote against, and three abstentions. [60] He replaced Hu Jintao, who retired after serving two terms. [68] In his new capacity as president, on 16 March 2013 Xi expressed support for non-interference in China–Sri Lanka relations amid a United Nations Security Council vote to condemn that country over government abuses during the Sri Lankan Civil War. [69] On 17 March, Xi and his new ministers arranged a meeting with the chief executive of Hong Kong, CY Leung, confirming his support for Leung. [70] Within hours of his election, Xi discussed cyber security and North Korea with U.S. President Barack Obama over the phone. Obama announced the visits of treasury and state secretaries Jacob Lew and John F. Kerry to China the following week. [71]

Anti-corruption campaign

— Xi Jinping during a speech in 2012 [72] [73]

Xi vowed to crack down on corruption almost immediately after he ascended to power at the 18th Party Congress. In his inaugural speech as general secretary, Xi mentioned that fighting corruption was one of the toughest challenges for the party. [74] A few months into his term, Xi outlined the Eight-point Regulation, listing rules intended to curb corruption and waste during official party business; it aimed at stricter discipline on the conduct of party officials. Xi also vowed to root out "tigers and flies", that is, high-ranking officials and ordinary party functionaries. [75]

Xi initiated cases against former CMC vice-chairmen Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong, former PSC member and security chief Zhou Yongkang and former Hu Jintao chief aide Ling Jihua. [76] Along with new disciplinary chief Wang Qishan, Xi's administration spearheaded the formation of "centrally-dispatched inspection teams" ( 中央巡视组 ). These were essentially cross-jurisdictional squads of officials whose main task was to gain more in-depth understanding of the operations of provincial and local party organizations, and in the process, also enforce party discipline mandated by Beijing. Many of the work teams also had the effect of identifying and initiating investigations of high-ranking officials. Over one hundred provincial-ministerial level officials were implicated during a massive nationwide anti-corruption campaign. These included former and current regional officials (Su Rong, Bai Enpei, Wan Qingliang), leading figures of state-owned enterprises and central government organs (Song Lin, Liu Tienan), and highly ranked generals in the military (Gu Junshan). In June 2014, the Shanxi provincial political establishment was decimated, with four officials dismissed within a week from the provincial party organization's top ranks. Within the first two years of the campaign alone, over 200,000 low-ranking officials received warnings, fines, and demotions. [77]

The campaign has led to the downfall of prominent incumbent and retired CCP officials, including members of the PSC. [78] Xi's anti-corruption campaign is seen by critics, such as The Economist , as a political tool with the aim of removing potential opponents and consolidating power. [79] [80] Xi's establishment of a new anti-corruption agency, the National Supervision Commission, ranked higher than the supreme court, has been described by Amnesty International's East Asia director as a "systemic threat to human rights" that "places tens of millions of people at the mercy of a secretive and virtually unaccountable system that is above the law." [81] [82]

Xi has overseen significant reforms of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), CCP's highest internal control institution. [83] He and CCDI Secretary Wang Qishan further institutionalized CCDI's independence from the day-to-day operations of the CCP, improving its ability to function as a bona fide control body. [83] According to The Wall Street Journal , any anti-corruption punishment to officials at or above the vice ministerial level need approval from Xi. [84] Another article from The Wall Street Journal said that when he wants to neutralize a political rival, he asks inspectors to prepare hundreds of pages of evidence. The article also said that he sometimes authorizes investigations on close associates of a high-ranking politician to replace them with his own proteges and puts political rivals in less important positions to separate them from their political bases. Reportedly, these tactics have even been used against Wang Qishan, Xi's close friend. [85]

According to historian and sinologist Wang Gungwu, Xi Jinping inherited a political party that was faced with pervasive corruption. [86] [87] Xi believed that the amount of corruption at the higher levels of the CCP put both the party and the country at risk of collapse. [86] Wang further adds that Xi has a belief that only the CCP is capable of governing China, and that a collapse of the party would be disastrous for the Chinese people. Xi and the new generational leaders reacted by launching the anti-corruption campaign to eliminate corruption at the higher levels of the government. [86]

Since Xi became the CCP general secretary, censorship, including internet censorship, has been significantly stepped up. [88] [89] Chairing the 2018 China Cyberspace Governance Conference on 20 and 21 April 2018, Xi committed to "fiercely crack down on criminal offenses including hacking, telecom fraud, and violation of citizens' privacy." [90] During a visit to Chinese state media, Xi stated that "party and government-owned media must hold the family name of the party" ( 党和政府主办的媒体必须姓党 ) and that the state media "must embody the party's will, safeguard the party's authority". [91]

His administration has overseen more Internet restrictions imposed in China, and is described as being "stricter across the board" on speech than previous administrations. [92] Xi has taken a very strong stand to control internet usage inside China, including Google and Facebook , [93] advocating Internet censorship in the country under the concept of internet sovereignty . [94] [95] The censorship of Wikipedia has also been stringent; in April 2019, all versions of Wikipedia were blocked in China. [96] Likewise, the situation for users of Weibo has been described as a change from fearing that individual posts would be deleted, or at worst one's account, to fear of arrest. [97]

A law enacted in September 2013 authorized a three-year prison term for bloggers who shared more than 500 times any content considered "defamatory". [98] The State Internet Information Department summoned a group of influential bloggers to a seminar instructing them to avoid writing about politics, the CCP, or making statements contradicting official narratives. Many bloggers stopped writing about controversial topics, and Weibo went into decline, with much of its readership shifting to WeChat users speaking to very limited social circles. [98] In 2017, telecommunications carriers in China were instructed by the government to block individuals' use of Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) by February 2018. [99]

Xi has spoken out against "historical nihilism", meaning historical viewpoints that challenge the official line of the CCP. [100] Xi said that one of the reasons for the collapse of the Soviet Union has been historical nihilism. [101] The Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) has established a telephone hotline for people to report acts of historical nihilism, while Toutiao and Douyin urged its users to report instances of historical nihilism. [102] In May 2021, the CAC reported that it removed two million online posts for historical nihilism. [103]

Consolidation of power

bio of xi jinping

Political observers have called Xi the most powerful Chinese leader since Mao Zedong, especially since the ending of presidential two-term limits in 2018. [104] [105] [106] [107] Xi has notably departed from the collective leadership practices of his post-Mao predecessors. He has centralised his power and created working groups with himself at the head to subvert government bureaucracy, making himself become the unmistakable central figure of the new administration. [108] Beginning in 2013, the CCP under Xi has created a series of Central Leading Groups: supra-ministerial steering committees, designed to bypass existing institutions when making decisions, and ostensibly make policy-making a more efficient process. The most notable new body is the Central Leading Group for Comprehensively Deepening Reforms. It has broad jurisdiction over economic restructuring and social reforms, and is said to have displaced some of the power previously held by the State Council and its premier. [109]

Xi also became the leader of the Central Leading Group for Internet Security and Informatization, in charge of cyber-security and Internet policy. The Third Plenum held in 2013 also saw the creation of the National Security Commission of the CCP, another body chaired by Xi, which commentators have said would help Xi consolidate over national security affairs. [110] [111] In the opinion of at least one political scientist, Xi "has surrounded himself with cadres he met while stationed on the coast, Fujian and Shanghai and in Zhejiang." [112] Control of Beijing is seen as crucial to Chinese leaders; Xi has selected Cai Qi, one of the cadres mentioned above, to manage the capital. [113] Xi was also believed to have diluted the authority of premier Li Keqiang, taking authority over the economy which has generally been considered to be the domain of the premier. [114] [115]

Since coming to power, various observers have said that Xi has seriously diluted the influence of the once-dominant "Tuanpai", also called the Youth League Faction, which were CCP officials who rose through the Party's Communist Youth League (CYLC). [116] He criticized the cadres of the CYLC, saying that [these cadres] can't talk about science, literature and art, work or life [with young people]. All they can do is just repeat the same old bureaucratic, stereotypical talk." [117] Its budget was also cut, dropping from around 700 million yuan ($96 million) in 2012 to 260 million yuan ($40 million) in 2021, while its membership dropped from 90 million to 74 million in the same period. [116] He also led to the closure of the Central School of the Communist Youth League of China, merging it with the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, and effectively demoted Qin Yizhi, first secretary of the CYLC, in 2017. [118]

In March 2018, the National People's Congress (NPC) passed a set of constitutional amendments including removal of term limits for the president and vice president, the creation of a National Supervisory Commission, as well as enhancing the central role of the CCP. [119] [120] On 17 March 2018, the Chinese legislature reappointed Xi as president, now without term limits; Wang Qishan was appointed vice president. [121] [122] The following day, Li Keqiang was reappointed premier and longtime allies of Xi, Xu Qiliang and Zhang Youxia, were voted in as vice-chairmen of the CMC. [123] Foreign minister Wang Yi was promoted to state councillor and General Wei Fenghe was named defence minister. [124] According to the Financial Times , Xi expressed his views of constitutional amendment at meetings with Chinese officials and foreign dignitaries. Xi explained the decision in terms of needing to align two more powerful posts—general secretary of the CCP and chairman of the CMC—which have no term limits. However, Xi did not say whether he intended to be party general secretary, CMC chairman and state president, for three or more terms. [125]

In its sixth plenary session in November 2021, CCP adopted a historical resolution, a kind of document that evaluated the party's history. This was the third of its kind after ones adopted by Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, [126] [127] and the document for the first time credited Xi as being the "main innovator" of Xi Jinping Thought [128] while also declaring Xi's leadership as being "the key to the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation". [129] In comparison with the other historical resolutions, Xi's one did not herald a major change in how the CCP evaluated its history. [130] To accompany the historical resolution, the CCP promoted the terms Two Establishes and Two Safeguards, calling the CCP to unite around and protect Xi's core status within the party. [131] In 2022, Xi appointed his close ally Wang Xiaohong as the Minister of Public Security, giving him further control over the security establishment. [132]

The 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, held between 16 and 22 October 2022, has overseen amendments in the CCP constitution and the re-election of Xi as general secretary of the CCP and chairman of the CMC for a third term, with the overall result of the Congress being further strengthening of Xi's power. [133] The newly amended CCP constitution included the term two safeguards, reinforcing Xi's power. [134] It also included concepts promoted by Xi like common prosperity, "Chinese-style modernization" and " whole-process people's democracy ". [135] Xi's re-election made him the first party leader since Mao Zedong to be chosen for a third term, though Deng Xiaoping ruled the country informally for a longer period. [136] Xi was further re-elected as the PRC president and chairman of the PRC Central Military Commission on 10 March 2023 during the opening of the 14th National People's Congress. [137] File:Xi Jinping leads CPC leadership in meeting the press.webm The new Politburo Standing Committee elected just after the CCP Congress was filled almost completely with people close to Xi, with four out of the seven members of the previous PSC including premier Li Keqiang and CPPCC chairman Wang Yang stepping down. [138] Li Qiang, a close Xi ally, became the second-ranking member of the PSC, and was further promoted to premier in 2023. [133] [139] Other allies of Xi, including Cai Qi, Ding Xuexiang and Li Xi have also joined the PSC, and became the first secretary of the CCP Secretariat, first vice premier, and secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection respectively. [140] The only remaining members of the previous PSC except Xi were Zhao Leji and Wang Huning, though their ranking and positions changed, [140] and became the NPC Standing Committee and CPPCC chairmen respectively on 10 March 2023. [141] [142] Reuters remarked that the retirement of Wang Yang and Li Keqiang, as well as the demotion of vice premier Hu Chunhua from the Politburo meant the wipeout of Tuanpai, [116] while Willy Wo-Lap Lam wrote that there were no representatives from the Tuanpai or the Shanghai clique, leading to a total dominance of Xi's own faction. [143]

Cult of personality

Xi has had a cult of personality constructed around himself since entering office [144] [145] with books, cartoons, pop songs and dance routines honouring his rule. [146] Following Xi's ascension to the leadership core of the CCP, he had been referred to as Xi Dada ( 习大大 , Uncle or Papa Xi), [146] [147] though this stopped in April 2016. [148] The village of Liangjiahe, where Xi was sent to work, has become a "modern-day shrine" decorated with CCP propaganda and murals extolling the formative years of his life. [149] The CCP's Politburo named Xi Jinping lingxiu ( 领袖 ), a reverent term for "leader" and a title previously only given to Mao Zedong and his immediate successor Hua Guofeng. [150] [151] [152] He is also sometimes called the "pilot at the helm" ( 领航掌舵 ). [153] On 25 December 2019, the Politburo officially named Xi as "People's Leader" ( 人民领袖 ; rénmín lǐngxiù ), a title only Mao had held previously. [154]

Economy and technology

Xi was initially seen as a market reformist, [155] and the Third Plenum of the 18th Central Committee under him announced that "market forces" would begin to play a "decisive" role in allocating resources. [156] This meant that the state would gradually reduce its involvement in the distribution of capital, and restructure China's state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to allow further competition, potentially by attracting foreign and private sector players in industries that were previously highly regulated. This policy aimed to address the bloated state sector that had unduly profited from an earlier round of re-structuring by purchasing assets at below-market prices, assets that were no longer being used productively. Xi also launched the Shanghai Free-Trade Zone in August 2013, which was seen as part of the economic reforms. [157] In However, by 2017, Xi's promise of economic reforms has been said to stall by experts. [158] [155] In 2015, the Chinese stock market bubble popped , which led Xi to use state forces to fix the issue. [159] From 2012 to 2022, the share of the market value of private sector firms in China's top listed companies has increased from around 10% to over 40%. [160] He has also overseen the relaxation of restrictions on foreign direct investment (FDI) and increased cross-border holdings of stocks and bonds. [160]

Xi has increased state control over China's economy, voicing support for SOEs, [161] [155] while also supporting the country's private sector. [162] CCP control of SOEs has increased under Xi, while some limited steps towards market liberalization, such as increasing mixed ownership of SOEs were also undertaken. [163] Under Xi, "government guidance funds", public-private investment funds set up by or for government bodies, have raised more than $900 billion for early funding to companies that work in sectors the government deems as strategic. [164] Xi has increased the role of the Central Financial and Economic Affairs Commission at the expense of the State Council. [165] His administration made it easier for banks to issue mortgages , increased foreign participation in the bond market, and increased the national currency renminbi's global role, helping it to join IMF's basket of special drawing right . [166] In the 40th anniversary of the launching of Chinese economic reforms in 2018, he has promised to continue reforms but has warned that nobody "can dictate to the Chinese people". [167]

Xi has also personally made eradicating extreme poverty through "targeted poverty alleviation" a key goal. [168] In 2021, Xi declared a "complete victory" over extreme poverty, saying that nearly 100 million people have been lifted out of poverty under his tenure, though some experts said that China's poverty threshold was relatively lower than the one set by the World Bank . [169] In 2020, premier Li Keqiang, citing the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) said that China still had 600 million people living with less than 1000 yuan ($140) a month, although an article from The Economist said that the methodology NBS used was flawed, stating that the figure took the combined income, which was then equally divided. [170] When Xi took office in 2012, 51.4% of people in China were living on less than $6.85 per day, in 2020, 7 years into Xi's tenure, this figure had fallen by more than half to 24.7%. [171]

China's economy has grown under Xi, with GDP in nominal terms more than doubling from $8.53 trillion in 2012 to $17.73 trillion in 2021, [172] while China's nominal GDP per capita surpassed the world average in 2021, [173] though the rate of growth has slowed from 7.9% in 2012 to 6% in 2019. [174] Xi has stressed the importance of "high-quality growth" rather than "inflated growth". [175] He has additionally stated that China will focus on quality of economic growth and that it has abandoned a growth-at-all-costs strategy which Xi refers to as "GDP heroism". [176] (p22) Instead, Xi said that other social issues such as environmental protection are important. [176] (p22) His administration pursued a debt-deleveraging campaign, seeking to slow and cut the unsustainable amount of debt China has accrued during its economic growth. [177] Though China's total non-financial-sector debt-to-GDP ratio reached a record 270.9% by 2020 during the COVID-19 crisis, it fell to reach around 262.5% by 2021 before going up again to 273.2% in 2022, mainly due to the pressure put by the zero-COVID policy to local finances. [178]

Xi has circulated a policy called "dual circulation", meaning reorienting the economy towards domestic consumption while remaining open to foreign trade and investment. [179] Xi has also made boosting productivity in the economy a priority. [180] Xi has attempted to reform the property sector to combat the steep increase in the property prices and to cut Chinese economy's dependence on the real estate sector. [181] In the 19th CCP National Congress, Xi declared "Houses are built to be inhabited, not for speculation". [182] In 2020, Xi's government formulated the "three red lines" policy that aimed to deleverage the heavily indebted property sector. [183] Xi additionally has supported a property tax, for which he has faced resistance from members of the CCP. [184]

Xi's administration has promoted "Made in China 2025" plan that aims to make China self-reliant in key technologies, although publicly China de-emphasised this plan due to the outbreak of a trade war with the U.S. Since the outbreak of the trade war in 2018, Xi has revived calls for "self-reliance", especially on the matters of technology. [185] Domestic spending on R&D has significantly increased under Xi, surpassing the total of the European Union (EU) and reaching a record $564 billion in 2020. [186] In August 2022, Xi's administration has allocated more than $100 billion to support China's efforts at semiconductor independence. [187] The Chinese government has also supported technology companies like Huawei through grants, tax breaks, credit facilities and other forms of assistance, enabling their rise but also leading to countermeasures by the U.S. [188] In 2023, Xi put forwarded "new productive forces " during his inspection tour to northeast China, refers to a new form of productive forces derived from continuous sci-tech breakthroughs and innovation that drive strategic emerging industries and future industries in a more intelligent information era . [189] Xi has also been personally involved in the development of Xiong'an, a new area announced in 2017, planned to become a major metropolis near Beijing and Tianjin in Hebei province; the relocation aspect is estimated to last until 2035 while it is planned to developed into a "modern socialist city" by 2050. [190]

— Xi Jinping during a speech in 2021 [191]

In November 2020, The Wall Street Journal reported that Xi personally ordered a halt to Ant Group's initial public offering (IPO), in reaction to its founder Jack Ma criticizing government regulation in finance. [192] Xi's administration has also overseen a decrease in offshore IPOs by Chinese companies, with most Chinese IPOs taking place either in Shanghai or Shenzhen (As of 2022) , and has increasingly directed funding to IPOs of companies that works in sectors it deems as strategic, including electric vehicles, biotechnology , renewable energy, artificial intelligence , semiconductors and other high-technology manufacturing. [164]

Since 2021, Xi has promoted the term "common prosperity", a term which he defined as an "essential requirement of socialism", described as affluence for all and said entailed reasonable adjustments to excess incomes. [191] [193] Common prosperity has been used as the justification for large-scale crackdowns and regulations towards the perceived "excesses" of several sectors, most prominently tech and tutoring industries. [194] The examples of actions taken against tech companies have included fining large tech companies [195] and passing of laws such as the Data Security Law. China also banned private tutoring companies from making profits and teaching school syllabus during weekends and holidays, effectively destroying the whole industry. [196] Xi additionally opened a new stock exchange in Beijing targeted for small and medium enterprises (SMEs), which was another part of his common prosperity campaign. [197] There have also been other numerous cultural regulations, such as limiting video game usage by minors to 90 minutes during weekdays and 3 hours during weekends, [198] complete banning of cryptocurrency , [199] cracking down on idol worship, fandom and celebrity culture [200] and cracking down on "sissy men". [201] The Wall Street Journal has also reported in October 2021 that Xi had launched a round of inspections of the country's financial institutions, including state-owned banks, investment funds and financial regulators, on whether their ties to private firms had become too close, with the investigations being led by Central Commission for Discipline Inspection. [202]

In November 2013, at the conclusion of the Third Plenum of the 18th Central Committee, the Communist Party delivered a far-reaching reform agenda that alluded to changes in both economic and social policy. Xi signaled at the plenum that he was consolidating control of the massive internal security organization that was formerly the domain of Zhou Yongkang. [156] A new National Security Commission was formed with Xi at its helm. The Central Leading Group for Comprehensively Deepening Reforms—another ad hoc policy coordination body led by Xi upgraded to a commission in 2018—was also formed to oversee the implementation of the reform agenda. [203] Termed "comprehensive deepening reforms" ( 全面深化改革 ; quánmiàn shēnhuà gǎigé ), they were said to be the most significant since Deng Xiaoping's 1992 Southern Tour. The plenum also announced economic reforms and resolved to abolish the laogai system of "re-education through labour", which was largely seen as a blot on China's human rights record. The system has faced significant criticism for years from domestic critics and foreign observers. [156] In January 2016, a two-child policy replaced the one-child policy, [204] which was in turn was replaced with a three-child policy in May 2021. [205] In July 2021, all family size limits as well as penalties for exceeding them were removed. [206]

Political reforms

Xi's administration taken a number of changes to the structure of the CCP and state bodies, especially in a large overhaul in 2018. In March 2014, the CCP Central Committee merged the Office for External Propaganda (OEP), externally known as the State Council Information Office (SCIO), to the CCP's Central Propaganda Department. SCIO is now used by the Central Propaganda Department as an external name under an arrangement called "one institution with two names". [207] February earlier that year oversaw the creation of the Central Leading Group for Cybersecurity and Informatization. The State Internet Information Office (SIIO), previously under the OEP and SCIO, was transferred to the central leading group and renamed in English into the Cyberspace Administration of China . [208] As part of managing the financial system, the Financial Stability and Development Committee, a State Council body, was established in 2017. Chaired by vice premier Liu He during its existence, the committee was disestablished by the newly established Central Financial Commission during the 2023 Party and state reforms. [209]

2018 has seen larger reforms to the bureaucracy. In that year, several central leading groups including reform, cyberspace affairs, finance and economics. and foreign affairs were upgraded to commissions. [210] [211] In the area of media, the State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film and Television (SAPPRFT) was renamed into the National Radio and Television Administration (NRTA) with its film, news media and publications being transferred to the Central Propaganda Department. [211] Additionally, the control of China Central Television (CCTV, including its international edition, China Global Television), China National Radio (CNR) and China Radio International (CRI) were transferred to the newly established China Media Group (CMG) under the control of the Central Propaganda Department. [211] [212] Two State Council departments. one dealing with overseas Chinese, and other one dealing with religious affairs, were merged into the United Front Work Department while another commission dealing with ethnic affairs was brought under formal UFWD leadership. [211]

2023 has seen further reforms to the CCP and state bureaucracy, most notably the strengthening of Party control over the financial and technology domains. [213] This included the creation of two CCP bodies for overseeing finance; the Central Financial Commission (CFC), as well as the revival of the Central Financial Work Commission (CFWC) that was previously dissolved in 2002. [213] The CFC would broadly manage the financial system while the CFWC would focus on strengthening the ideological and political role of the CCP in the sector. [209] Additionally, a new CCP Central Science and Technology Commission would be established to broadly oversee the technology sector, while a newly created Social Work Department was tasked with CCP interactions with several sectors, including civic groups, chambers of commerce and industry groups, as well as handling public petition and grievance work. [213] A new Central Hong Kong and Macau Work Office would also be established, with the State Council's Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office being turned into the new body's external name. [213]

At the State Council, the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission was replaced by the National Administration of Financial Regulation (NAFR), which is taking a much larger responsibility on financial regulation, effectively overseeing all financial activities except the securities industry, which was continued to be regulated by the China Securities Regulatory Commission, now elevated to a government body. [214] Several regulatory responsibilities were also transferred from the People's Bank of China (PBoC) to the SAFS, while the PBoC will also reopen offices around the country that were closed in a previous reorganization. [215]

Legal reforms

— Xi Jinping during a speech in November 2020 [216]

The party under Xi announced a raft of legal reforms at the Fourth Plenum held in the fall 2014, and he called for "Chinese socialistic rule of law" immediately afterwards. The party aimed to reform the legal system, which had been perceived as ineffective at delivering justice and affected by corruption, local government interference and lack of constitutional oversight. The plenum, while emphasizing the absolute leadership of the party, also called for a greater role of the constitution in the affairs of state and a strengthening of the role of the National People's Congress Standing Committee in interpreting the constitution. [217] It also called for more transparency in legal proceedings, more involvement of ordinary citizens in the legislative process, and an overall "professionalization" of the legal workforce. The party also planned to institute cross-jurisdictional circuit legal tribunals as well as giving provinces consolidated administrative oversight over lower level legal resources, which is intended to reduce local government involvement in legal proceedings. [218]

Military reforms

— Xi Jinping during a speech [224]

Though predating Xi, his administration has taken a more assertive stance towards maritime affairs, and has boosted CCP control over the maritime security forces. [225] In 2013, the previously separate rival maritime law enforcements of China were merged into the China Coast Guard. Initially under the joint administration of the State Oceanic Administration and the Ministry of Public Security, it was placed squarely under the administration of the People's Armed Police (PAP) in 2018. [225]

Xi announced a reduction of 300,000 troops from the PLA in 2015, bringing its size to 2 million troops. Xi described this as a gesture of peace, while analysts such as Rory Medcalf have said that the cut was done to reduce costs as well as part of PLA's modernization. [226] On 2016, he reduced the number of theater commands of the PLA from seven to five. [227] He has also abolished the four autonomous general departments of the PLA, replacing them with 15 agencies directly reporting to the CMC. [219] Two new branches of the PLA were created under his reforms, the Strategic Support Force [228] and the Joint Logistics Support Force. [229] In 2018, the PAP was placed under the sole control of the CMC; the PAP was previously under the joint command of the CMC and the State Council through the Ministry of Public Security. [230] :15

On 21 April 2016, Xi was named commander-in-chief of the country's new Joint Operations Command Center of the PLA by Xinhua News Agency and the broadcaster China Central Television. [231] [232] Some analysts interpreted this move as an attempt to display strength and strong leadership and as being more "political than military". [233] According to Ni Lexiong, a military affairs expert, Xi "not only controls the military but also does it in an absolute manner, and that in wartime, he is ready to command personally". [234] According to a University of California, San Diego expert on Chinese military, Xi "has been able to take political control of the military to an extent that exceeds what Mao and Deng have done". [235]

Under Xi, China's official military budget has more than doubled, [186] reaching a record $224 billion in 2023. [236] The PLA Navy has grown rapidly under Xi, with China adding more warships, submarines, support ships and major amphibious vessels than the than the entire number of ships under the United Kingdom navy between 2014 and 2018. [237] In 2017, China established the navy's first overseas base in Djibouti. [238] Xi has also undertaken an expansion of China's nuclear arsenal, with him calling China to "establish a strong system of strategic deterrence". The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) has estimated China's total amount of nuclear arsenals to be 410 in 2023, with the US Department of Defense estimating that China's arsenal could reach 1,000 by 2030. [239]

Foreign policy

Xi has promoted "major-country diplomacy" ( 大国外交 ), stating that China is already a "big power" and breaking away from previous Chinese leaders who had a more precautious diplomacy. [240] He has adopted a hawkish foreign policy posture called "wolf warrior diplomacy", [241] while his foreign policy thoughts are collectively known as "Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy". [242] In March 2021, he said that "the East is rising and the West is declining" ( 东升西降 ), saying that the power of the Western world was in decline and their COVID-19 response was an example of this, and that China was entering a period of opportunity because of this. [243] Xi has frequently alluded to " community with a shared future for mankind ", which Chinese diplomats have said doesn't imply an intention to change the international order, [244] but which foreign observers say China wants a new order that puts it more at the centre. [245] Under Xi, China has, along with Russia, also focused on increasing relations with the Global South in order to blunt the effect of Western sanctions. [246]

Xi has put an emphasis on increasing China's "international discourse power" ( 国际话语权 ) to create a more favorable global opinion of China in the world. [247] In this pursuit, Xi has emphasised the need to "tell China's story well" ( 讲好中国故事 ), meaning expanding China's external propaganda ( 外宣 ) and communications. [248] Xi has expanded the focus and scope of the united front, which aims to consolidate support for CCP in non-CCP elements both inside and outside China, and has accordingly expanded the United Front Work Department. [249] Xi has unveiled the Global Development Initiative (GDI), [250] the Global Security Initiative (GSI), [251] and the Global Civilisation Initiative (GCI), in 2021, 2022 and 2023, respectively, aiming to increase China's influence in the international order. [252]

Under Xi, China has promoted reformation of the international system, with Xi calling for a "rejection of hegemonic power structures in global governance". [253] Addressing a regional conference in Shanghai on 21 May 2014, he called on Asian countries to unite and forge a way together, rather than get involved with third party powers, seen as a reference to the United States. "Matters in Asia ultimately must be taken care of by Asians. Asia's problems ultimately must be resolved by Asians and Asia's security ultimately must be protected by Asians", he told the conference. [254] His proposed Global Security Initiative has been aiming to create a new global security architecture, incorporating the term "indivisible security", a concept also supported by Russia. [251] He has also advocated for international security cooperation; during a meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in September 2021, he spoke out against "interference in other countries' internal affairs", and called for joint cooperation in warding off against "colour revolutions". [255]

Under Xi, China has cut back lending to Africa after fears that African countries couldn't repay their debts to China. [256] Xi has also promised that China would write off debts of some African countries. [257] In November 2021, Xi promised African nations 1 billion doses of China's COVID-19 vaccines, which was in addition to the 200 million already supplied before. This has been said to be part of China's vaccine diplomacy . [258]

European Union

bio of xi jinping

China's efforts under Xi has been for the European Union (EU) to stay in a neutral position in their contest with the U.S. [259] China and the EU announced the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) in 2020, although the deal was later frozen due to mutual sanctions over Xinjiang. [260] Xi has supported calls for EU to achieve "strategic autonomy", [261] and has also called on the EU to view China "independently". [262]

bio of xi jinping

Relations between China and India had ups and downs under Xi, later deteriorating due to various factors. In 2013, the two countries had a standoff in Depsang for three weeks, which ended with no border change. [263] In 2017, the two countries again had a standoff over a Chinese construction of a road in Doklam, a territory both claimed by Bhutan, India's ally, and China, [264] though by 28 August, both countries mutually disengaged. [265] The most serious crisis in the relationship came when the two countries had a deadly clash in 2020 at the Line of Actual Control, leaving some soldiers dead. [266] [267] The clashes created a serious deterioration in relations, with China seizing 2,000 sq km territory that India controlled. [268] [269]

China–Japan relations have initially soured under Xi's administration; the most thorny issue between the two countries remains the dispute over the Senkaku islands, which China calls Diaoyu. In response to Japan's continued robust stance on the issue, China declared an Air Defense Identification Zone in November 2013. [270] However, the relations later started to improve, with Xi being invited to visit in 2020, [271] though the trip was later delayed due to the COVID-19 pandemic. [272] In August 2022, Kyodo News reported that Xi personally decided to let ballistic missiles land within Japan's exclusive economic zone (EEZ) during the military exercises held around Taiwan, to send a warning to Japan. [273]

Middle East

bio of xi jinping

While China has historically been wary of getting closer to the Middle East countries, Xi has changed this approach. [274] China has grown closer to both Iran and Saudi Arabia under Xi. [274] During a visit to Iran in 2016, Xi proposed a large cooperation program with Iran, [275] a deal that was later signed in 2021. [276] China has also sold ballistic missiles to Saudi Arabia and is helping build 7,000 schools in Iraq. [274] In 2013, Xi proposed a peace deal between Israel and Palestine that entails a two-state solution based on the 1967 borders. [277] Turkey, with whom relations were long strained over Uyghurs, has also grown closer to China. [278] On 10 March 2023, Saudi Arabia and Iran agreed to restore diplomatic ties cut in 2016 after a deal brokered between the two countries by China following secret talks in Beijing. [279]

North Korea

Under Xi, China initially took a more critical stance on North Korea due to its nuclear tests. [280] However, starting in 2018, the relations started to improve due to meetings between Xi and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. [281] Xi has also supported denuclearization of North Korea, [282] and has voiced support for economic reforms in the country. [283] At the G20 meeting in Japan, Xi called for a "timely easing" of sanctions imposed on North Korea. [284] After the 20th CCP National Congress in 2022, Rodong Sinmun , official newspaper of the ruling Workers' Party of Korea, wrote a long editorial praising Xi, titling both Kim and Xi Suryong (수령), a title historically reserved for North Korea's founder Kim Il Sung . [285]

bio of xi jinping

Xi has cultivated stronger relations with Russia, particularly in the wake of the Ukraine crisis of 2014. He seems to have developed a strong personal relationship with president Vladimir Putin. Both are viewed as strong leaders with a nationalist orientation who are not afraid to assert themselves against Western interests. [286] Xi attended the opening ceremonies of the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi. Under Xi, China signed a $400 billion gas deal with Russia; China has also become Russia's largest trading partner. [286]

Xi and Putin met on 4 February 2022 during the run up to the 2022 Beijing Olympics during the massive Russian build-up of force on the Ukrainian border, with the two expressing that the two countries are nearly united in their anti-US alignment and that both nations shared "no limits" to their commitments. [287] [288] U.S. officials said that China had asked Russia to wait for the invasion of Ukraine until after the Beijing Olympics ended on 20 February. [288] In April 2022, Xi Jinping expressed opposition to sanctions against Russia. [289] On 15 June 2022, Xi Jinping reasserted China's support for Russia on issues of sovereignty and security. [290] However, Xi also said China is committed to respecting "the territorial integrity of all countries", [291] and said China was "pained to see the flames of war reignited in Europe". [292] China has additionally kept a distance from Russia's actions, instead putting itself as a neutral party. [288] In February 2023, China released a 12-point peace plan to "settle the acute crisis in Ukraine"; the plan was praised by Putin but criticized by the U.S. and European countries. [293]

bio of xi jinping

During the war Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy has given a nuanced take to China, [294] saying that the country has the economic leverage to pressure Putin to end the war, adding "I'm sure that without the Chinese market for the Russian Federation, Russia would be feeling complete economic isolation. That's something that China can do – to limit the trade [with Russia] until the war is over." In August 2022, Zelenskyy said that since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, Xi Jinping did not respond to his requests for direct talks with him. [295] He additionally said that while he would like China to take a different approach to the war in Ukraine, he also wanted the relationship to improve every year and said that China and Ukraine shared similar values. [296] On 26 April 2023, Zelenskyy and Xi held their first phone call since the start of the war. [297]

South Korea

Xi has initially improved relationships with South Korea, [280] and the two countries signed a free-trade agreement in December 2015. [298] Starting in 2017, China's relationship with South Korea soured over the Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD), a missile defence system, purchase of the latter. which China sees as a threat but which South Korea says is a defence measure against North Korea. [299] Ultimately, South Korea halted the purchase of the THAAD after China imposed unofficial sanctions. [300] China's relations with South Korea improved again under president Moon Jae-in. [301]

Southeast Asia

bio of xi jinping

Since Xi came to power, China has been rapidly building and militarizing islands in the South China Sea, a decision Study Times of the Central Party School said was personally taken by Xi. [302] In April 2015, new satellite imagery revealed that China was rapidly constructing an airfield on Fiery Cross Reef in the Spratly Islands of the South China Sea. [303] In November 2014, in a major policy address, Xi called for a decrease in the use of force, preferring dialogue and consultation to solve the current issues plaguing the relationship between China and its South East Asian neighbors. [304]

bio of xi jinping

In 2015, Xi met with Taiwanese president Ma Ying-jeou, which marked the first time the political leaders of both sides of the Taiwan Strait have met since the end of the Chinese Civil War in Mainland China in 1950. [305] Xi said that China and Taiwan are "one family" that cannot be pulled apart. [306] However, the relations started deteriorating after Tsai Ing-wen of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) won the presidential elections in 2016. [307]

In the 19th Party Congress held in 2017, Xi reaffirmed six of the nine principles that had been affirmed continuously since the 16th Party Congress in 2002, with the notable exception of "Placing hopes on the Taiwan people as a force to help bring about unification". [308] According to the Brookings Institution, Xi used stronger language on potential Taiwan independence than his predecessors towards previous DPP governments in Taiwan. [308] He said that "we will never allow any person, any organisation, or any political party to split any part of the Chinese territory from China at any time at any form." [308] In March 2018, Xi said that Taiwan would face the "punishment of history" for any attempts at separatism. [309]

In January 2019, Xi Jinping called on Taiwan to reject its formal independence from China, saying: "We make no promise to renounce the use of force and reserve the option of taking all necessary means." Those options, he said, could be used against "external interference". Xi also said that they "are willing to create broad space for peaceful reunification, but will leave no room for any form of separatist activities." [310] [311] President Tsai responded to the speech by saying Taiwan would not accept a one country, two systems arrangement with the mainland, while stressing the need for all cross-strait negotiations to be on a government-to-government basis. [312]

In 2022, after the Chinese military exercises around Taiwan, the PRC published a white paper called "The Taiwan Question and China's Reunification in the New Era", which was the first white paper regards to Taiwan since 2000. [313] The paper urged Taiwan to become a special administrative region of the PRC under the one country two systems formula, [313] and said that "a small number of countries, the U.S. foremost amongst them" are "using Taiwan to contain China". [314] Notably, the new white paper excluded a part that previously said the PRC would not send troops or officials to Taiwan after unification. [314]

United States

bio of xi jinping

Xi has called China–United States relations in the contemporary world a "new type of great-power relations", a phrase the Obama administration had been reluctant to embrace. [315] Under his administration the U.S.–China Strategic and Economic Dialogue that began under Hu Jintao has continued, until it was suspended by the administration of Donald Trump. [316] On China–U.S. relations, Xi said, "If [China and the United States] are in confrontation, it would surely spell disaster for both countries". [317] The U.S. has been critical of Chinese actions in the South China Sea. [315] In 2014, Chinese hackers compromised the computer system of the U.S. Office of Personnel Management, [318] resulting in the theft of approximately 22 million personnel records handled by the office. [319] Xi has also indirectly spoken out critically on the U.S. "strategic pivot" to Asia. [320]

Relations with the U.S. soured after Donald Trump became president in 2017. [321] Since 2018, U.S. and China have been engaged in an escalating trade war. [322] In 2020, the relations further deteriorated due to the COVID-19 pandemic. [323] In 2021, Xi has called the U.S. the biggest threat to China's development, saying that "the biggest source of chaos in the present-day world is the United States". [243] Xi has also scrapped a previous policy in which China did not challenge the U.S. in most instances, while Chinese officials said that they now see China as an "equal" to the U.S. [324] On 6 March 2023, during a speech to the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), Xi said that "Western countries—led by the U.S.—have implemented all-round containment, encirclement and suppression" against China, which he said brought "unprecedentedly severe challenges to our country's development". [325]

— Xi Jinping told visiting California Governor Gavin Newsom in 2023 [326]

bio of xi jinping

Economic relations

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was unveiled by Xi in September and October 2013 during visits to Kazakhstan and Indonesia, [327] and was thereafter promoted by Premier Li Keqiang during state visits to Asia and Europe. Xi made the announcement for the initiative while in Astana, Kazakhstan, and called it a "golden opportunity". [328] BRI has been called Xi's "signature project", involving numerous infrastructure development and investment projects throughout Asia, Europe, Africa, and the Americas. [329] BRI was added to the CCP Constitution at the closing session of the 19th Party Congress on 24 October 2017, [330] further elevating its importance. [331] Since the BRI was launched, China became the world's largest lender, lending about $1 trillion in a decade to almost 150 countries. However, by 2022, many BRI projects have stalled, and most of China's debt became held by countries in financial distress, leading the Chinese leaders to adopt a more conservative approach to BRI, dubbed as "Belt and Road Initiative 2.0". [332]

Xi officially proposed the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in October 2013 during a visit to Indonesia, [333] which officially launched in January 2016. [334] The membership of the AIIB has included numerous countries, including allies of the United States and Western countries, despite opposition from the US. [334] Since its launch until 2022, AIIB has invested $36.43 billion to 190 projects. [335] Xi's tenure has seen a signing of several free-trade deals, including with Australia in 2014, [336] South Korea in 2015, [298] and the larger Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) in 2020. [337] Xi has also expressed his interest in China joining the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), with China formally applying to join in September 2021. [338]

National security

Xi has devoted a large amount of work towards national security, calling for a "holistic national security architecture" that encompasses "all aspects of the work of the party and the country". [339] During a private talk with U.S. president Obama and vice president Biden, he said that China had been a target of "colour revolutions", foreshadowing his focus on national security. [340] Since its creation by Xi, the National Security Commission has established local security committees, focusing on dissent. [340] In the name of national security, Xi's government has passed numerous laws including a counterespionage law in 2014, [341] national security [342] and a counterterrorism law in 2015, [343] a cybersecurity law [344] and a law restricting foreign NGOs in 2016, [345] a national intelligence law in 2017, [346] and a data security law in 2021. [347] Under Xi, China's mass surveillance network has dramatically grown, with comprehensive profiles being built for each citizen. [348]

bio of xi jinping

During his leadership, Xi has supported and pursued a greater political and economic integration of Hong Kong to mainland China, including through projects such as the Hong Kong–Zhuhai–Macau Bridge. [349] He has pushed for the Greater Bay Area project, which aims to integrate Hong Kong, Macau, and nine other cities in Guangdong. [349] Xi's push for greater integration has created fears of decreasing freedoms in Hong Kong. [350] Many of the views held by the central government and eventually implemented in Hong Kong were outlined in a white paper published by the State Council in 2014 named The Practice of the 'One Country, Two Systems' Policy in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region , which outlined that the China's central government has "comprehensive jurisdiction" over Hong Kong. [351] Under Xi, the Chinese government also declared the Sino-British Joint Declaration to be legally void. [351]

In August 2014, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (NPCSC) made a decision allowing universal suffrage for the 2017 election of the chief executive of Hong Kong, but also requiring the candidates to "love the country, and love Hong Kong", as well as other measures that ensured the Chinese leadership would be the ultimate decision-maker on the selection, leading to protests, [352] and the eventual rejection of the reform bill in the Legislative Council due to a walk-out by the pro-Beijing camp to delay to vote. [353] In the 2017 chief executive election, Carrie Lam was victorious, reportedly with the endorsement of the CCP Politburo. [354]

Xi has supported the Hong Kong Government and Carrie Lam against the protesters in the 2019–2020 Hong Kong protests, which broke out after a proposed bill that would allow extraditions to China. [355] He has defended the Hong Kong police's use of force, saying that "We sternly support the Hong Kong police to take forceful actions in enforcing the law, and the Hong Kong judiciary to punish in accordance with the law those who have committed violent crimes." [356] While visiting Macau on 20 December 2019 as part of the 20th anniversary of its return to China, Xi warned of foreign forces interfering in Hong Kong and Macau, [357] while also hinting that Macau could be a model for Hong Kong to follow. [358]

bio of xi jinping

In 2020, the NPCSC passed a national security law in Hong Kong that dramatically expanded government clampdown over the opposition in the city; amongst the measures were the dramatic restriction on political opposition and the creation of a central government office outside Hong Kong jurisdiction to oversee the enforcement of the law. [351] This was seem as the culmination of a long-term project under Xi to further closely integrate Hong Kong with the mainland. [351] Xi visited Hong Kong as president in 2017 and 2022, in the 20th and 25th anniversary of the handover of Hong Kong respectively. [359] In his 2022 visit, he swore in John Lee as chief executive, a former police officer that was backed by the Chinese government to expand control over the city. [360] [361] While in the city, he said Hong Kong had moved from "chaos" to "stability". [362] Since John Lee became chief executive, Hong Kong government officials including Lee himself have shown public displays of loyalty towards Xi, similar to the mainland but previously unheard in the city. [363]

Human rights

According to the Human Rights Watch, Xi has "started a broad and sustained offensive on human rights" since he became leader in 2012. [364] The HRW also said that repression in China is "at its worst level since the Tiananmen Square massacre." [365] Since taking power, Xi has cracked down on grassroots activism, with hundreds being detained. [366] He presided over the 709 crackdown on 9 July 2015, which saw more than 200 lawyers, legal assistants and human rights activists being detained. [367] His term has seen the arrest and imprisonment of activists such as Xu Zhiyong, as well as numerous others who identified with the New Citizens' Movement. Prominent legal activist Pu Zhiqiang of the Weiquan movement was also arrested and detained. [368]

In 2017, the local government of the Jiangxi province told Christians to replace their pictures of Jesus with Xi Jinping as part of a general campaign on unofficial churches in the country. [369] [370] [371] According to local social media, officials "transformed them from believing in religion to believing in the party". [369] According to activists, "Xi is waging the most severe systematic suppression of Christianity in the country since religious freedom was written into the Chinese constitution in 1982", and according to pastors and a group that monitors religion in China, has involved "destroying crosses, burning bibles, shutting churches and ordering followers to sign papers renouncing their faith". [372]

Under Xi, the CCP has embraced assimilationist policies towards ethnic minorities, scaling back affirmative action in the country by 2019, [373] and scrapping a wording in October 2021 that guaranteed the rights of minority children to be educated in their native language, replacing it with one that emphasized teaching the national language. [374] In 2020, Chen Xiaojiang was appointed as head of the National Ethnic Affairs Commission, the first Han Chinese head of the body since 1954. [375] On 24 June 2022, Pan Yue, another Han Chinese, became the head of the commission, with him reportedly holding assimilationist policies toward ethnic minorities. [376] Xi outlined his official views relations between the majority Han Chinese and ethnic minorities by saying "[n]either Han chauvinism nor local ethnic chauvinism is conducive to the development of a community for the Chinese nation". [377]

bio of xi jinping

Following several terrorist attacks in Xinjiang in 2013 and 2014, the CCP leaders held a secret meeting to find a solution to the attacks, [378] leading to Xi to launch the Strike Hard Campaign Against Violent Terrorism in 2014, which involved mass detention, and surveillance of ethnic Uyghurs there. [379] [380] Xi made an inspection tour in Xinjiang between 27 and 30 April in 2014. [381] The program was massively expanded in 2016, after the appointment of Chen Quanguo as the Xinjiang CCP secretary. The campaign included the detainment of 1.8 million people in internment camps , mostly Uyghurs but also including other ethnic and religious minorities, by 2020, [378] and a birth suppression campaign that led to a large drop in the Uyghur birth rate by 2019. [382] Various human rights groups and former inmates have described the camps as "concentration camps", where Uyghurs and other minorities have been forcibly assimilated into China's majority ethnic Han society. [383] This program has been called a genocide by some observers, while a report by the UN Human Rights Office said they may amount to crimes against humanity. [384] [385]

Internal Chinese government documents leaked to the press in November 2019 showed that Xi personally ordered a security crackdown in Xinjiang, saying that the party must show "absolutely no mercy" and that officials use all the "weapons of the people's democratic dictatorship " to suppress those "infected with the virus of extremism". [380] [386] The papers also showed that Xi repeatedly discussed about Islamic extremism in his speeches, likening it to a "virus" or a "drug" that could be only addressed by "a period of painful, interventionary treatment." [380] However, he also warned against the discrimination against Uyghurs and rejected proposals to eradicate Islam in China, calling that kind of viewpoint "biased, even wrong". [380] Xi's exact role in the building of internment camps has not been publicly reported, though he's widely believed to be behind them and his words have been the source for major justifications in the crackdown in Xinjiang. [387] [388] In the Xinjiang Police Files leaked in 2022, a document quoting Minister of Public Security Zhao Kezhi suggested that Xi had been aware of the internment camps. [389]

COVID-19 pandemic

bio of xi jinping

After getting the outbreak in Wuhan under control, Xi has favoured what has officially been termed "dynamic zero-COVID policy" [396] that aims to control and suppress the virus as much as possible within the country's borders. This has involved local lockdowns and mass-testing. [397] While initially credited for China's suppression of the COVID-19 outbreak, the policy was later criticized by foreign and some domestic observers for being out of touch with the rest of the world and taking a heavy toll on the economy. [397] This approach has especially come under criticism during a 2022 lockdown on Shanghai, which forced millions to their homes and damaged the city's economy, [398] denting the image of Li Qiang, close Xi ally and Party secretary of the city. [399] Conversely, Xi has said that the policy was designed to protect people's life safety. [400] On 23 July 2022, the National Health Commission reported that Xi and other top leaders have taken the local COVID-19 vaccines. [401]

At the 20th CCP Congress, Xi confirmed the continuation of the zero-COVID policy, [402] stating he would "unswervingly" carry out "dynamic zero-COVID" and promising to "resolutely win the battle," [403] though China started a limited easing of the policies in the following weeks. [404] In November 2022, protests broke out against China's COVID-19 policies, with a fire in a high-rise apartment building in Ürümqi being the trigger. [405] The protests were held in multiple major cities, with some of the protesters demanding the end of Xi's and the CCP's rule. [405] The protests were mostly suppressed by December, [405] though the government further eased COVID-19 restrictions in the time since. [406] On 7 December 2022, China announced large-scale changes to its COVID-19 policy, including allowing quarantine at home for mild infections, reducing of PCR testing , and decreasing the power of local officials to implement lockdowns. [407]

Environmental policy

In September 2020, Xi announced that China will "strengthen its 2030 climate target (NDC), peak emissions before 2030 and aim to achieve carbon neutrality before 2060". [408] If accomplished, this would lower the expected rise in global temperature by 0.2–0.3 °C – "the biggest single reduction ever estimated by the Climate Action Tracker". [408] Xi mentioned the link between the COVID-19 pandemic and nature destruction as one of the reasons for the decision, saying that "Humankind can no longer afford to ignore the repeated warnings of nature." [409] On 27 September, Chinese scientists presented a detailed plan how to achieve the target. [410] In September 2021, Xi announced that China will not build "coal-fired power projects abroad, which was said to be potentially "pivotal" in reducing emissions. The Belt and Road Initiative did not include financing such projects already in the first half of 2021. [411]

Xi has popularized a metaphor of "two mountains" to emphasize the importance of environmental protection. [412] (p164) The concept is that a mountain made of gold or silver is valuable, but green mountains with clear waters are more valuable. [412] (p164) The slogan's meaning is that economic development priorities must also provide for economic protection. [412] (p164)

Xi Jinping did not attend COP26 personally. However, a Chinese delegation led by climate change envoy Xie Zhenhua did attend. [413] [414] During the conference, the United States and China agreed on a framework to reduce GHG emission by co-operating on different measures. [415]

Governance style

Known as a very secretive leader, little is known publicly about how Xi makes political decisions, or how he came to power. [416] [417] Xi's speeches generally get released months or years after they are made. [416] Xi has also never given a press conference since becoming paramount leader, except in rare joint press conferences with foreign leaders. [416] [418] The Wall Street Journal reported that Xi prefers micromanaging in governance, in contrast to previous leaders such as Hu Jintao who left details of major policies to lower-ranking officials. [84] Reportedly, ministerial officials try to get Xi's attention in various ways, with some creating slide shows and audio reports. The Wall Street Journal also reported that Xi created a performance-review system in 2018 to give evaluations on officials on various measures, including loyalty. [84] According to The Economist , Xi's orders have generally been vague, leaving lower level officials to interpret his words. [387] Chinese state media Xinhua News Agency said that Xi "personally reviews every draft of major policy documents" and "all reports submitted to him, no matter how late in the evening, were returned with instructions the following morning". [419] With regard to behavior of Communist Party members, Xi emphasizes the "Two Musts" (members must not be arrogant or rash and must keep their hard-working spirit) and the "Six Nos" (members must say no to formalism, bureaucracy, gift-giving, luxurious birthday celebrations, hedonism, and extravagance). [176] (p52) Xi called for officials to practice self-criticism which, according to observers, is in order to appear less corrupt and more popular among the people. [420] [421] [422]

Political positions

Chinese dream.

bio of xi jinping

Xi and CCP ideologues coined the phrase "Chinese Dream" to describe his overarching plans for China as its leader. Xi first used the phrase during a high-profile visit to the National Museum of China on 29 November 2012, where he and his Standing Committee colleagues were attending a "national revival" exhibition. Since then, the phrase has become the signature political slogan of the Xi era. [423] [424] The origin of the term "Chinese Dream" is unclear. While the phrase has been used before by journalists and scholars, [425] some publications have posited the term likely drew its inspiration from the concept of the American Dream . [426] The Economist noted the abstract and seemingly accessible nature of the concept with no specific overarching policy stipulations may be a deliberate departure from the jargon-heavy ideologies of his predecessors. [427] Xi has linked the "Chinese Dream" with the phrase "great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation". [428] [lower-alpha 5]

Cultural revival

In recent years, top political leaders of the CCP such as Xi have overseen the rehabilitation of ancient Chinese philosophical figures like Han Fei into the mainstream of Chinese thought alongside Confucianism . At a meeting with other officials in 2013, he quoted Confucius , saying "he who rules by virtue is like the Pole Star, it maintains its place, and the multitude of stars pay homage." While visiting Shandong, the birthplace of Confucius, in November, he told scholars that the Western world was "suffering a crisis of confidence" and that the CCP has been "the loyal inheritor and promoter of China's outstanding traditional culture." [429]

According to several analysts, Xi's leadership has been characterised by a resurgence of the ancient political philosophy Legalism . [430] [431] [432] Han Fei gained new prominence with favourable citations; one sentence of Han Fei's that Xi quoted appeared thousands of times in official Chinese media at the local, provincial, and national levels. [432] Xi has additionally supported the Neo-Confucian philosopher Wang Yangming , telling local leaders to promote him. [433]

Xi has also overseen a revival of traditional Chinese culture, breaking from the CCP's previous path, which had often attacked it. [434] He has called traditional culture the "soul" of the nation and the "foundation" of the CCP's culture. [435] Xi has also called for integrating the basic tenets of Marxism with China's traditional culture. [252] Hanfu, the traditional dress of Han Chinese, has seen a revival under him, associated with the revival of traditional culture. [436] He has established the "four matters of confidence", which has later been added to the CCP constitution, calling for CCP members, government officials and the Chinese people to be "confident in our chosen path, confident in our guiding theories, confident in our political system, and confident in our culture". He has unveiled Global Civilisation initiative in 2023, calling for "respecting the diversity of civilisations, advocating the common values of humanity, valuing the inheritance and innovation of civilisations, and strengthening international people-to-people exchanges and cooperation" [252]

Xi has said that "only socialism can save China". [437] Xi has also declared socialism with Chinese characteristics to be the "only correct path to realize national rejuvenation". [438] According to BBC News, while the CCP was perceived to have abandoned its communist ideology since it initiated economic reforms in the 1970s, Xi is believed by some observers to be more believing in the "idea of a communist project", [439] being described as a Marxist–Leninist by former Australian prime minister Kevin Rudd. [440] Xi's emphasis on prioritizing ideology has included re-asserting the Party's goal of eventually realizing communism and reprimanding those who dismiss communism as impractical or irrelevant. [163] Xi described the communist ideal as the "calcium" in a Party member's spine, without which the Party member would suffer the "osteoporosis" of political decay and be unable to stand upright. [163]

Subscribing to the view that socialism will eventually triumph over capitalism, Xi has said "Marx and Engels's analysis of the basic contradictions of capitalist society is not outdated, nor is the historical materialist view that capitalism is bound to die out and socialism bound to win". [441] Xi has overseen the increase of "Socialist Political Economy With Chinese Characteristics" as a major study topic for academics in China, aiming to decrease the influence of Western-influenced economics. [441] Though he has called a stop to what he considers to be "disorderly expansion of capital", he has also said that "it is necessary to stimulate the vitality of capital of all types, including nonpublic capital, and give full play to its positive role". [441]

— Xi Jinping during a speech in 2018 [442]

Xi has supported greater CCP control over the PRC, saying "government, the military, society and schools, north, south, east and west – the party leads them all". [443] During the 100th anniversary of the CCP in 2021, he said that "without the Communist Party of China, there would be no new China and no national rejuvenation", and that "the leadership of the Party is the defining feature of socialism with Chinese characteristics and constitutes the greatest strength of this system". [444] He has said that China, despite many setbacks, has achieved great progress under the CCP, saying that "socialism with Chinese characteristics has become the standard-bearer of 21st-century socialist development". [442] However, he has also warned that it will take a long time for China under the CCP to complete its rejuvenation, and during this timeframe, party members must be vigilant to not let CCP rule collapse. [442]

Xi has ruled out a multi-party system for China, saying that "constitutional monarchy, imperial restoration, parliamentarism, a multi-party system and a presidential system, we considered them, tried them, but none worked". [445] However, Xi considers China to be a democracy, saying that "China's socialist democracy is the most comprehensive, genuine and effective democracy". [446] China's definition of democracy is different from liberal democracies and is rooted in Marxism–Leninism, and is based on the phrases " people's democratic dictatorship " and " democratic centralism ". [446] Xi has additionally coined the term "whole-process people's democracy" which he said was about having "the people as masters". [447] Foreign analysts and observers have widely disputed that China is a democracy, saying that it is a one-party authoritarian state and Xi an authoritarian leader. [454] Some observers, including German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock, [455] have called Xi a dictator, citing the large centralisation of power around him unseen compared to his predecessors. [456] [457] Xi has additionally rejected Westernisation as the only way to modernize, instead promoting what he says is "Chinese-style modernisation". [458] He has identified five concepts as part of Chinese-style modernisation, including modernisation of a huge population, common prosperity, material and cultural-ethical advancement, harmony between humanity and nature, and peaceful development. [459]

Xi Jinping Thought

bio of xi jinping

In September 2017, the CCP Central Committee decided that Xi's political philosophies, generally referred to as "Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era", would become part of the Party Constitution. [460] [461] Xi first made mention of the "Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era" in his opening day speech delivered to the 19th Party Congress in October 2017. His Politburo Standing Committee colleagues, in their own reviews of Xi's keynote address at the Congress, prepended the name "Xi Jinping" in front of "Thought". [462] On 24 October 2017, at its closing session, the 19th Party Congress approved the incorporation of Xi Jinping Thought into the Constitution of the CCP, [104] while in March 2018, the National People's Congress changed the state constitution to include Xi Jinping Thought. [463]

bio of xi jinping

Xi himself has described the Thought as part of the broad framework created around socialism with Chinese characteristics, a term coined by Deng Xiaoping that places China in the primary stage of socialism. In official party documentation and pronouncements by Xi's colleagues, the Thought is said to be a continuation of Marxism–Leninism , Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, the Three Represents, and the Scientific Outlook on Development, as part of a series of guiding ideologies that embody "Marxism adopted to Chinese conditions" and contemporary considerations. [462] It has additionally been described as the "21st century Marxism" by two professors in the Central Party School of the CCP. [16] Wang Huning, a top political adviser and a close ally of Xi, has been described as pivotal to developing Xi Jinping Thought. [16] The concepts and context behind Xi Jinping Thought are elaborated in Xi's The Governance of China book series, published by the Foreign Languages Press for an international audience. Volume one was published in September 2014, followed by volume two in November 2017. [464]

An app for teaching Xi Jinping Thought had become the most popular smartphone app in China in 2019, as the country's ruling CCP launched a new campaign that calls on its cadres to immerse themselves in the political doctrine every day. Xuexi Qiangguo is now the most downloaded item on Apple's domestic App Store, surpassing in demand social media apps such as WeChat and TikTok. [465] In 2021, the government included Xi Jinping Thought in the curriculum including to students from primary schools to university, which created pushback from parents. For much of the preceding 30 years, political ideology and communist doctrine were not a standard taught in Chinese schools until middle school, and textbooks featured a wider set of Chinese leaders with less emphasis on a single leader like Xi. [466]

Personal life

bio of xi jinping

Xi's first marriage was to Ke Lingling, the daughter of Ke Hua, China's ambassador to the United Kingdom in the early 1980s. They divorced within a few years. [467] The two were said to fight "almost every day", and after the divorce Ke moved to England. [7] In 1987, Xi married the prominent Chinese folk singer Peng Liyuan. [468] Xi and Peng were introduced by friends as many Chinese couples were in the 1980s. Xi was reputedly academic during their courtship, inquiring about singing techniques. [469] Peng Liyuan, a household name in China, was better known to the public than Xi until his political elevation. The couple frequently lived apart due largely to their separate professional lives. Peng has played a much more visible role as China's "first lady" compared to her predecessors; for example, Peng hosted U.S. First Lady Michelle Obama on her high-profile visit to China in March 2014. [470]

Xi and Peng have a daughter named Xi Mingze, who graduated from Harvard University in the spring of 2015. While at Harvard, she used a pseudonym and studied Psychology and English. [471] Xi's family has a home in Jade Spring Hill, a garden and residential area in north-western Beijing run by the CMC. [472]

In June 2012, Bloomberg News reported that members of Xi's extended family have substantial business interests, although there was no evidence he had intervened to assist them. [473] The Bloomberg website was blocked in mainland China in response to the article. [474] Since Xi embarked on an anti-corruption campaign, The New York Times reported members of his family were selling their corporate and real estate investments beginning in 2012. [475] Relatives of highly placed Chinese officials, including seven current and former senior leaders of the Politburo of the CCP, have been named in the Panama Papers , including Deng Jiagui, [476] Xi's brother-in-law. Deng had two shell companies in the British Virgin Islands while Xi was a member of the Politburo Standing Committee, but they were dormant by the time Xi became general secretary of the CCP in November 2012. [477]

Personality

Peng described Xi as hardworking and down-to-earth: "When he comes home, I've never felt as if there's some leader in the house. In my eyes, he's just my husband." [478] In 1992, The Washington Post journalist Lena H. Sun had an interview with Xi, then CCP secretary of Fuzhou; Sun described Xi as considerably more at ease and confident than many officials his age, and said that he talked without consulting notes. [479] He was described in a 2011 The Washington Post article by those who know him as "pragmatic, serious, cautious, hard-working, down to earth and low-key". He was described as a good hand at problem solving and "seemingly uninterested in the trappings of high office". [480]

Xi is an avid soccer fan. [481] According to reports, when working in Hebei, Xi often asked his friend Nie Weiping, a professional Go player, for soccer tickets. The two walked out of a match between Chinese national team and a team from UK because they disappointed at the performance of the Chinese team. [482] During a visit to Ireland in 2012 as China's vice-president, Xi showcased his soccer technique at Croke Park. [481] In 2011, Xi outlined a vision to turn China from a footballing minnow to a soccer superpower. He outlined a three stage plan for the national team: to qualify for another World Cup, to host a World Cup and to win a World Cup. [483] In 2015, Xi approved China’s 50-point plan for the sport, which included including soccer in the national school curriculum and setting up 50,000 soccer schools in the country by 2025. [484] However, according to CNN, poor financial decisions and alleged high-level corruption coupled with a three-year pandemic have left the sport in tatters. [483] In 2023, Xi said he is "not so sure" of the abilities of the national team. [485]

Public life

It is hard to gauge the opinion of the Chinese public on Xi, as no independent surveys exist in China and social media is heavily censored. [486] However, he is believed to be widely popular in the country. [487] [488] According to a 2014 poll co-sponsored by the Harvard Kennedy School's Ash Center for Democratic Governance and Innovation, Xi ranked 9 out of 10 in domestic approval ratings. [489] A YouGov poll released in July 2019 found that about 22% of people in mainland China list Xi as the person they admire the most, a plurality, although this figure was less than 5% for residents of Hong Kong . [490] In the spring of 2019, the Pew Research Center made a survey on confidence on Xi Jinping among six-country medians based on Australia, India, Indonesia, Japan, Philippines and South Korea, which indicated that a median 29% have confidence in Xi Jinping to do the right thing regarding world affairs, meanwhile a median of 45% have no confidence; these numbers are slightly higher than those of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un (23% confidence, 53% no confidence). [491] A poll by Politico and Morning Consult in 2021 found that 5% of Americans have a favorable opinion of Xi, 38% unfavorable, 17% no opinion and 40%, a plurality, never hearing of him. [492]

In 2017, The Economist named him the most powerful person in the world. [493] In 2018, Forbes ranked him as the most powerful and influential person in the world, replacing Russian President Vladimir Putin, who had been ranked so for five consecutive years. [494] Since 2013, Reporters Without Borders, an international non-profit and non-governmental organization with the stated aim of safeguarding the right to freedom of information, included Xi among the list of press freedom predators. [495]

Unlike previous Chinese leaders, Chinese state media has given a more encompassing view of Xi's private life, although still strictly controlled. According to Xinhua News Agency, Xi would swim one kilometer and walk every day as long as there was time, and is interested in foreign writers, especially Russian. [419] He is known to love films and TV shows such as Saving Private Ryan , The Departed, The Godfather and Game of Thrones, [496] [497] [498] also praising the independent film-maker Jia Zhangke. [499] The Chinese state media has also cast him as a fatherly figure and a man of the people, determined to stand up for Chinese interests. [417]

Key to the City

Xi holds a "key to the city", an honor granted to attending guests to symbolize their significance, in:

Honorary doctorates

  • Xi, Jinping (1999). Theory and Practice on Modern Agriculture . Fuzhou: Fujian Education Press.  
  • Xi, Jinping (2001). A Tentative Study on China's Rural Marketization . Beijing: Tsinghua University (Doctoral Dissertation) . https://qiwen.lu/uploads/xilunwen.pdf .  
  • Xi, Jinping (2007). Zhijiang Xinyu . Hangzhou: Zhengjiang People's Publishing House. ISBN   9787213035081 .  
  • Xi, Jinping (2014). The Governance of China . I . Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. ISBN   9787119090573 .  
  • Xi, Jinping (2014). General Secretary Xi Jinping important speech series . I . Beijing: People's Publishing House & Study Publishing House. ISBN   9787119090573 .  
  • Xi, Jinping (2016). General Secretary Xi Jinping important speech series . II . Beijing: People's Publishing House & Study Publishing House. ISBN   9787514706284 .  
  • Xi, Jinping (2017). The Governance of China . II . Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. ISBN   9787119111643 .  
  • Xi, Jinping (2018). Quotations from Chairman Xi Jinping . Some units of the PLA.  
  • Xi, Jinping (2019). The Belt And Road Initiative . Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. ISBN   978-7119119960 .  
  • Xi, Jinping (2020). The Governance of China . III . Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. ISBN   9787119124117 .  
  • Xi, Jinping (2020). On Propaganda and Ideological Work of Communist Party . Beijing: Central Party Literature Press. ISBN   9787507347791 .  
  • Xi, Jinping (2021). On History of the Communist Party of China . Beijing: Central Party Literature Press. ISBN   9787507348033 .  
  • Xi, Jinping (2022). The Governance of China . IV . Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. ISBN   9787119130941 .  
  • ↑ The closest pronunciation using only sounds common in spoken English would be ( English: / ˈ ʃ iː tʃ ɪ n ˈ p ɪ ŋ / SHEE chin- PING .
  • ↑ Liu Yandong, Wang Qishan, and Deng Pufang (Deng Xiaoping's son) all placed among the bottom of the alternate member list. Like Xi, all three were seen as "princelings". Bo Xilai was not elected to the Central Committee at all; that is, Bo placed lower in the vote count than Xi.
  • ↑ Original simplified Chinese : 在国际金融风暴中,中国能基本解决13亿人口吃饭的问题,已经是对全人类最伟大的贡献 ; traditional Chinese : 在國際金融風暴中,中國能基本解決13億人口吃飯的問題,已經是對全人類最偉大的貢獻
  • ↑ Original: simplified Chinese : 有些吃饱没事干的外国人,对我们的事情指手画脚。中国一不输出革命,二不输出饥饿和贫困,三不折腾你们,还有什么好说的? ; traditional Chinese : 有些吃飽沒事干的外國人,對我們的事情指手畫腳。中國一不輸出革命,二不輸出飢餓和貧困,三不折騰你們,還有什麽好說的?
  • ↑ Chinese: 中华民族伟大复兴 , which can also be translated as the "Great Renaissance of the Chinese nation" or the "Great revival of the Chinese people".

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Works cited

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Further reading

  • Template:Cite journal
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  • includes McGregor, Richard. "Xi Jinping's Quest to Dominate China." Foreign Affairs 98 (Sept 2019): 18+.
  • Magnus, George. Red Flags: Why Xi's China is in Danger (Yale UP, 2018).
  • Template:Cite news Review of comment accompanying Xi's visit.
  • Template:Cite news Describes Xi Jinping's life.
  • Osnos, Evan, "China's Age of Malaise: Facing a grim economy, disillusioned youth, and fleeing entrepreneurs, Xi Jinping turns to the past," The New Yorker , 30 October 2023, pp. 34–45. "Xi [...] has abandoned Deng [Xiaoping]'s 'courageous experiments' and ushered [China] into a straitened new age." (p. 34.) "Year by year, Xi appears more at home in the world of the man he calls his 'best and closest friend,' Vladimir Putin." (p. 36.) "Can Xi's China still manage the pairing of autocracy and capitalism ?" (p. 37.) "At his core, a longtime observer told me, Xi is 'Mao with money.'" (p. 38.) "Xi [has] got[ten] rid of anyone with power, [an] entrepreneur said: 'If you have influence, you have power. If you have capital, you have power.'" (p. 40.)

External links

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  • Biography at Chinavitae.com
  • Template:C-SPAN
  • Xi Jinping collected news and commentary at the China Digital Times
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  • Xi Jinping 2012 profile on BBC Radio Four

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Xi Jinping’s Succession Dilemma

The most intellectually honest answer to the question of who will succeed Xi Jinping as China’s paramount leader is simply, “We don’t know.”

Xi’s succession is the ultimate “known unknown” of Chinese politics. We do not know when Xi will leave office. We do not know how Xi will leave office. We do not know whether Xi will handpick a political heir. We do not even know how a successor would be chosen if Xi does not designate one.

This opacity is concerning. China is arguably the world’s second most powerful country. Xi’s role as general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) gives him a central role in economic, diplomatic, and military decisions that reverberate across the globe.

Would a new leader embrace or reject Xi’s legacy? Governments and businesses everywhere have a stake in his replacement’s preferences on political control, market reform, U.S.-China relations, and territorial ambition regarding Taiwan and the South China Sea. But it is hard to speculate about the future of such issues without any insight into the nature of Xi’s departure or how his successor would be selected.

Still, the absence of clear foresight does not mean we should just throw up our hands and not think about Xi’s succession. Peering into a future largely devoid of information makes it even more important to identify and evaluate the evidence that does exist.

Such evidence does not tell us what will happen with Xi’s succession. But it does allow us to engage in informed conjecture about what might happen. The evidence includes Xi’s political behavior over his first 11 years in power, the history of succession politics in the CCP and other Leninist governing parties, and a handful of Party-state regulations.

This evidence leads to three conjectures: First, Xi is unlikely to anoint a successor, or at least not a strong successor, well in advance. Second, the ultimate outcome of Xi’s succession is unlikely to be orderly or predictable, because of contending political networks and manipulable Party regulations. Third, the policy outcomes of Xi’s succession will depend on China’s situation when he leaves office, although some continuities are probable regardless of Xi’s performance.

Xi is Unlikely to Anoint a Successor Far in Advance

There are many ways Xi could leave office, including a voluntary resignation, an elite rebellion, a military coup, or a sudden illness — with huge potential for variation within each scenario. Several possibilities are discussed by Richard McGregor and Jude Blanchette in their stellar article After Xi: Future Scenarios for Leadership Succession in Post-Xi Jinping Era .

Xi will likely rule China until he “goes to meet Marx,” as the saying goes. Xi had acquired enough power to ignore the nascent precedent saying he should indicate a successor at the 19th Party Congress in 2017. The next year, he amended the state constitution to remove term limits on his concurrent role as head of state, allowing him to rule for life as president as well as head of the Party and the military. In 2022, at age 69, Xi ignored previous norms that said leaders aged 68 or older should retire from the Politburo.

Xi is unlikely to voluntarily name a successor, let alone hand over power, anytime soon. Doing so could weaken his authority, exacerbate divisions within his network of supporters, and eventually threaten his political legacy and personal safety. And right now, Xi’s power — especially his centralized control of personnel, ideology, security services, and the military — makes it very difficult for any rivals to organize against him, even if his policies become unpopular.

Elite rebellion is not impossible. Research conducted by Milan Svolik shows that  two-thirds of deposed authoritarians fall to inside challengers. Yuhua Wang finds that  almost 60% of Chinese emperors who did not exit office by natural death were murdered, deposed, forced to abdicate, or forced to commit suicide by regime elites. A conceivable trigger for Xi would be an economic depression or military misadventure, or if he began purging his closest allies.

Naming a successor could undermine Xi’s authority. Once Xi announces the next paramount leader, he could become a lame duck as the political elite begin to softly cultivate ties with and take more political cues from the successor. Even if that person did nothing but follow Xi’s orders, there would effectively be more than one power center in the Party. The successor would also provide a focal point that would make it somewhat less difficult for Party insiders to rally against Xi’s leadership in any moment of crisis.

Choosing a successor could also weaken Xi’s political support. Xi would probably choose a close political ally to advance his political project. But that choice would mean not choosing others, which could alienate top lieutenants who are overlooked. It could also empower lower-ranking officials with close ties to the designated heir, while disempowering those without such ties. Such fractures could weaken Xi’s ability to mobilize the Party elite to implement his decisions. If Xi were to try to overcome this problem by nominating an outside candidate, all his close allies might feel vulnerable, and together they could undermine the successor — and, by extension, Xi himself.

Finally, handing power to a successor could threaten Xi’s legacy. Xi could retain formidable informal influence after retirement, but he appears to prefer the security of formal office, having worked assiduously to institutionalize the powers of the general secretary and ban the informal  “old person” politics practiced by Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin . Leaving office would also render Xi vulnerable to the hidden preferences and political talents of his successor (indeed, few glimpsed Xi’s true colors before he became leader and began displaying the extent of his personal ambition and political skill). His anti-corruption campaign and ideological crackdowns have made him many enemies, and Xi may fear for his freedom and safety, or at least for the longevity of his policy priorities. More fundamentally, Xi seems to see himself as a man of destiny, a true believer in the Party’s mission of national rejuvenation and his own ability to achieve that goal. One look at U.S. politics is enough to see that politicians everywhere have egos and like to stick around.

But there are good reasons for Xi to have a plan, or multiple plans …

We cannot see into Xi’s mind, and any succession plan that currently exists would be one of his most closely guarded political secrets. In his excellent book  Party of One: The Rise of Xi Jinping and China's Superpower Future , Chun Han Wong makes the most persuasive counterargument that an orderly succession is in the cards. Wong  contends that “Xi’s ability to engineer a smooth succession could determine whether his vision of a rejuvenated China will survive him.” If Xi can install a strong successor who will continue his policy agenda and protect his family, that could avoid a power struggle that risks dividing the Party, harming the country, and undermining Xi’s legacy. Xi would surely like to do this, but the political price could be prohibitive.

Party history offers little precedent that would appeal to Xi in this regard. Mao Zedong launched the Cultural Revolution in part to attack his heir apparent, Liu Shaoqi , for undermining Maoist economic policy. Lin Biao , the next designated successor, died in a plane crash as he attempted to flee Beijing after his son hatched a plot to assassinate Mao. Deng Xiaoping purged his first two protégés, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang , for wavering in their commitment to Party dominance, and then he had to force Jiang Zemin to re-embrace economic reform with his 1992 “Southern Tour.” And Xi must surely see how Jiang’s support for his own rise ended up severely curtailing Jiang’s political influence.

The pitfalls outlined above will likely discourage Xi from naming a replacement anytime soon, even to the detriment of his longer-term legacy. The likeliest precedent for Xi’s succession would therefore be that of Mao to Hua Guofeng . Following Lin Biao’s death in 1971, Mao eyed Wang Hongwen as his successor, then changed his mind and eventually tapped Hua Guofeng five months before dying in September 1976. Hua was plucked from relative obscurity but barely lasted two years as paramount leader until Deng outmaneuvered him (although both sought to revise Maoist policies).

This history illuminates another confounding variable in succession prognostications: Xi might change his mind, perhaps even multiple times, about whether to appoint a successor and who it ought to be. As Xi ages, he could increasingly cultivate political heirs, and he will likely have to delegate more duties to subordinates. But the very hint of Xi’s retirement would be a seismic shock to elite politics, and the reaction of perceived allies and adversaries will influence his thinking. If he feels uneasy or threatened, he could cancel his plans. Likewise, even if a successor is decided, if Xi comes to doubt their loyalty or competence, that designation may not last.

Xi’s Succession is Unlikely to be Orderly or Predictable

Xi’s successor is unlikely to be as powerful, regardless of how the succession occurs. The later a successor is appointed prior to Xi’s departure, the weaker they are likely to be. If Xi appoints no successor, different networks of Xi followers are likely to struggle over the top job.

Much of this uncertainty stems from the Party’s lack of clear succession mechanisms. Mao tapped Hua, Deng ousted Hua, Deng elevated Jiang, Deng anointed Hu, and then Jiang supported Xi. It is backroom politics through and through.

Xi’s selection as Hu’s heir apparent after the 17th Party Congress in 2007 was reportedly helped by his victory over Li Keqiang in a straw poll of senior officials. But Xi ended intra-Party voting after 2012 in favor of choosing new leadership lineups through elite interviews.

If Xi picks a successor, he will likely go through the motions of an orchestrated but seemingly rigorous selection process to bolster the legitimacy of the chosen cadre. He could also embed the choice in authoritative Party documents and make other leaders declare their assent, making it more difficult (or at least more awkward) to turn on the successor.

If Xi experiences a sudden health incident, there is no way to know what would happen next. Article 23 of the  Party charter simply states that the general secretary is elected by a plenum of the Central Committee and must be drawn from the ranks of the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC). Xi’s successor would likely, but not necessarily, be a current PSC member, because a plenum could technically add a new member and then make that person the general secretary.

But how would the Central Committee even convene a plenum without a general secretary? The Party Charter says that the Politburo is responsible for convening plenums, but it is the general secretary who is responsible for convening the Politburo. This legal conundrum lays bare the importance of informal power in determining political outcomes in Beijing.

History can be a guide to the future …

The best account of the transition from Mao to Hua to Deng is Joseph Torigian ’s book  Prestige, Manipulation, and Coercion , the title of which sets out the three key factors that matter for succession struggles in Leninist one-party regimes.

First, the importance of prestige means that victory often depends more on interpersonal authority than policy differences or economic interests. If we apply this theory to the case study of Xi’s succession, we can examine the different networks that connect senior leaders below Xi.

Two potential rival networks of Xi loyalists  seem to be emerging . The first is a group of officials connected to Fujian Province who either got to know Xi when he was a local leader there from 1985 to 2002 or worked with him there afterward, including Xi's chief of staff Cai Qi  and new economic czar He Lifeng . The second is a group of officials with similar ties through Zhejiang Province, where Xi was leader from 2002 to 2007. Atop this group is Li Qiang , who, as premier, leads the work of the ministries in the State Council. However, we know little of the personal relationships between top leaders or the possible coherence of such networks without Xi. And, the longer Xi rules, the more of his longtime associates will retire into “Party elder” status and vie for post-Xi political influence with emerging “seventh generation” leaders born in the 1970s.

Second, victory depends on coercion. That is, gaining the support or control of the military, police, intelligence services, and other security-related ministries to enforce the succession. For Xi’s succession, we might look at which networks of Xi followers appear well placed to leverage China’s centers of coercive power.

One could argue that the Fujian network is best placed to deploy coercion. It likely includes top security official Chen Wenqing and Minister of Public Security Wang Xiaohong , as well as newly empowered Central Military Commission (CMC) Vice Chairman He Weidong and his fellow CMC member Miao Hua . Cai Qi’s remit includes the Central Guard Bureau, which is responsible for the security of Party leaders. Chen Yixin , the minister of state security and a close colleague of Xi and Li Qiang in Zhejiang, could emerge as a rival powerbroker.

The third key factor, manipulation, means victory depends more on the ability to control the process of selection rather than playing to a defined “selectorate.” However, while rules can be bent or even ignored, the appearance of legality, legitimacy, and stability is still important.

If Xi were to depart suddenly, who could best manipulate the process of selection? The situation would be extremely fluid, but a case can be made that Cai Qi — or someone in his position in the future — would play a role. Cai has an unusually central role in managing internal Party affairs as a PSC member who leads both the Central Secretariat and the General Office of the Central Committee. He would likely be the first senior leader to learn of any developments regarding Xi’s health or decision-making.

The Party charter produces the legal conundrum discussed earlier, but Article 23 also establishes the Central Secretariat as the working body of the Politburo. In the absence of a general secretary, Cai could argue for a generous interpretation of this article that allows the Central Secretariat to call a Politburo meeting that then convenes a plenum.

An aspiring leader would not need universal support to pull this off. According to Article 25 of the  Central Committee Work Regulations (which the General Office has the authority to interpret), only a majority of Politburo members must be present to hold a meeting. So, 13 Politburo members could convene a plenum. Article 24 says that a majority of Central Committee members then need to be present to hold a plenum. That is 103 members. Just half of those members are then needed to pass a decision. Thus, following the Party’s own rules, one would theoretically need the support of only 52 Central Committee members to appoint a new general secretary. (This minimum condition assumes that the 52 Central Committee members include 13 Politburo members.)

However, executing such a plan would require many other things to go one’s way, including control of the propaganda system, support from the military and security services, and rivals too weak or disorganized to challenge the move. Moreover, any new leader would prefer to come to power with the façade of unanimous support within the Party.

Another wildcard could be the vice president. Article 84 of the state constitution says that if the presidency becomes vacant, then the vice president becomes president. While the largely ceremonial presidency is easily the least important of Xi’s three main roles, the new officeholder would hold constitutional powers to promulgate laws, appoint state leaders, grant special pardons, declare a state of emergency, and even declare war and issue mobilization orders.

However, the constitution says that the president exercises these powers “pursuant to decisions of the National People’s Congress and the National People’s Congress Standing Committee [NPCSC].” Still, an accidental president could still try to affect the succession process by blocking government action. If they collaborated with a powerful NPCSC chairman, they could use lawfare, new appointments, or emergency decrees to gain more leverage.

These thought exercises are not concrete forecasts, however, and they are most valuable as illustrations of the uncertainty and unpredictability of succession politics within the Party, especially if there is a sudden succession crisis or a move to depose an anointed yet unpopular successor.

Post-Succession Policies Will Depend on Xi’s Level of Success

The history of succession politics in China points to the third major conjecture about Xi’s succession. That history suggests the Party is more likely to continue Xi’s policy agenda if China is on a positive trajectory when he leaves office, and more likely to depart from Xi’s legacy if China is experiencing significant difficulties.

For example, strong elite and popular support for change emerged following Mao’s passing in 1976 in a society traumatized by the chaos of the Cultural Revolution and the disaster of the Great Leap Forward. Hua Guofeng and then Deng Xiaoping embraced political loosening and economic reform.

Similarly, when Xi succeeded Hu in 2012, there was widespread social discontent with weak leadership, rampant corruption, and lax regulation, and Party insiders were alarmed by the disunity evident in the Bo Xilai scandal. A mood of crisis arguably helped Xi consolidate power.

It is impossible to say what China will look like by the time Xi’s successor is determined. While pessimism is rising, and the country’s growth trajectory will notably underperform its world-beating past, it is far from certain that China is destined for crisis or even for stagnation.

What is least likely to change after Xi is the continuation of CCP rule. The officials around Xi, whether they like him or not, have a vested interest in perpetuating the system that has defined their lives and careers. Not even the Cultural Revolution could convince cadres otherwise. Of course, Xi’s departure would open a window for social protests, but the Party could probably still deploy its forbidding internal security forces to suppress dissent.

A successor will almost certainly owe much to Xi. They may lean into Xi’s legacy to burnish their own legitimacy, at least at first, necessitating continued veneration for Xi Jinping Thought even if it is repurposed to advance different policy objectives, much as Deng did with Mao’s legacy.

A successor is unlikely to enjoy Xi’s same concentration of political authority, which would mean more power sharing, perhaps among different networks of Xi supporters. This could create a somewhat looser ideological environment with more room for policy debates and more decentralized governance. In that environment, Chinese society could become somewhat more open and tolerant.

An intriguing consideration that is leading some analysts to take a more optimistic view of China’s political future is generational change — that is, future leaders may have different values, and so may govern differently. Research by Wei Shan and Juan Chen finds that  young Chinese are more individualistic, more desiring of self-expression, and less compliant with authority figures. But they are also less likely to prefer democracy as a form of governance, probably because of propaganda, patriotic education, and growing political dysfunction in many democracies. Fundamentally, however, the study of generations cannot fully explain how an individual will respond to their times. Many people assumed that Xi’s personal traumas during the Cultural Revolution and his professional experiences in the Reform and Opening era would make him a relatively liberal leader. They were wrong.

Economic policy is more fertile ground for anyone wishing to depart from Xi’s legacy. Even senior policymakers today know that China’s economy is facing unprecedented challenges, and Xi’s preferences for security and control are affecting its performance.

After Xi, an elite consensus could conceivably emerge around shifting course on the economy and moving toward more market-oriented policy settings, stronger support for the private sector, greater openness to foreign firms, and new approaches such as household stimulus packages.

Foreign policy is less likely to change than economic policy. U.S.-China strategic competition increasingly resembles something like a new Cold War, wherein both Beijing and Washington view competition with the other as a foreign policy priority. This strategic dynamic would make it politically and practically difficult for any new leader to engineer a structural rapprochement with the United States, although they may pursue détente while Beijing seeks to address domestic challenges (like the path that Xi is currently pursuing with the United States).

However, a new leader could also feel the need for a show of force to boost their political status and prove their control of the military. Torigian shows how Deng did this by invading Vietnam in 1979; Xi arguably did something similar by leading China’s response to the Diaoyu/Senkaku crisis in late 2012.

Xi’s succession is unlikely to precipitate an extreme scenario like an invasion or blockade of Taiwan. But it raises the possibility of Chinese military actions, such as Sino-Indian border incursions, island reclamation in the South China Sea, or massive military exercises around Taiwan.

Predicting the future is hard. Foreign Policy  published an article in 2017 claiming that Xi had already chosen his successor: Chen Min’er . Seven years later, Chen is not even on the PSC. Likewise, there is little chance that we can guess the precise process and result of China’s next succession.

But analyzing the history, regulations, and structure of Chinese politics suggests we can have a higher degree of confidence in some more general projections. Xi is unlikely to anoint a successor anytime soon and may never settle on a durable plan. Whether a plan exists or not, the process will probably be influenced by personal rivalries, political machinations, and the security apparatus. Policy shifts will depend on China’s situation at the time.

And Xi could rule for a long time yet. He would be 84 years old at the 23rd Party Congress in 2037. If Joe Biden wins the U.S. presidential election in 2024, he would be 86 at the end of his second term. Deng was 87 when he embarked on his landmark Southern Tour in 1992.

What is the likely impact if Xi effectively rules for life? Politics would become progressively less stable, as other leaders maneuver against each other in case of a sudden succession crisis. Decision-making could become increasingly personalistic and volatile. Policy would probably continue to emphasize national security, adopt state-heavy solutions to economic problems, and play into strategic competition with the United States and its allies and partners.

That assessment sounds bleak, but we should also remember the possibility of change. Julian Gewirtz has written of the need to avoid “ historical determinism ” about China’s future. The uncertainties highlighted here underscore the dangers of assuming that China will always be like it is today.

After all, history is driven by a combination of individual leaders, institutional structures, economic constraints, social pressures, and international relations, all of which interact in ways that are fundamentally dynamic and difficult to foresee. Xi’s legacy may endure with minor tweaks. Or China could see even stronger militarism, instability, and repression under its next leader. But there is also a chance that a new general secretary will move the Party toward more tolerant politics and more open markets.

While a wide range of succession scenarios are possible, one thing is clear: all of them have enormous geopolitical implications. Given the stakes, and despite the many uncertainties, the imperative to monitor and assess Xi’s succession is more powerful than ever.

This article is adapted from an invited keynote address delivered by the author on September 26, 2023, at the inaugural Global Conference on New Sinology hosted by the Organisation for Research on China and Asia in New Delhi, India. A shorter summary of the address can be found in the GCNS Conference Report 2023. The author would like to thank Dominic Chiu , Christopher Johnson , Joseph Torigian , Chun Han Wong , and Guoguang Wu for their valuable comments and feedback. Any errors and conjectures remain the author’s own.

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COMMENTS

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