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- Book I: Section I
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The major intent of the debate in the Republic is to determine an extended definition of what constitutes Justice in a given state, whether or not a concept of Justice may be determined by citizens in a given state at the time that Plato is writing, and how Justice may be accomplished in a given state (how laws might be enacted that would serve the citizens of a just state in courts of law). Thus it is that the conversation in the Republic proceeds from a question of meaning (what is Justice?), augmented by questions of fact (are there examples of justice in action or of just men?), to a question of policy (what laws may be effected to ensure the carriage of justice?). Of course if a given state could be founded on a resolution and emulation of such precepts, it would be an ideal state; Plato is generally acknowledged to be an idealistic philosopher.
The argument advanced in this dialogue, then, is an attempt to outline a possible and realistic policy for securing well-being and happy concord (the good life) for the citizens of the state: just citizens dwelling in a just state. The Republic , we are reminded, is translated from a dialogue first written in ancient Greek; perhaps a better translation of its title might be the State , or the Ideal State .
As Plato advances the argument in this dialogue, he sees that he will have to incorporate questions having to do with the education of the ideal citizens; questions having to do with the place of the fictive arts (music, poetry, drama, and so on) in his ideal state, and the philosophies and metaphysics (true knowledge) from which these things ensue.
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Five Kinds of Government
- All right, so the dudes have all agreed that in the best city, people will have everything in common: women, the education of children, and the military. Soldiers will have common housing and will receive only a very small wage to cover their service to the city.
- Now Socrates wants to return to whatever they were talking about way back when, before they got on this tangent. Glaucon reminds him that he was about to outline four types of government and four types of men that are different from what they've created but still worth discussing. This discussion will hopefully help them understand whether the best people are also happy and whether the worst are unhappy.
- The four types of governments are: 1) the Cretan and Laconian regimes (the kind of government Sparta was famous for, where athleticism and military ability were the most important things—Socrates later invents a word and calls it a "timocracy," which means "the rule of honor"), 2) oligarchy (when a group of powerful, often wealthy people are in charge), 3) democracy, and 4) tyranny.
- Socrates suggests that these four types are more like a general outline of common forms of government; there are actually a huge number of types of governments. There are probably as many kinds of governments as there are types of people—since, you know, people ultimately make up all kinds of government.
- Socrates has already said the best kind of government, the kind that their republic is, is an aristocracy, and that a person who rules himself as if he were an aristocracy himself is the best kind of person.
- Socrates then suggests that they go through each kind of regime step-by-step in order to determine what qualities each has. They'll then imagine the kind of individual who would have these qualities. This will allow them to see how justice and injustice function, and it will allow them to decide whether justice or injustice makes you happier.
- The first regime they consider is 2) the Laconian regime, which Socrates names a "timocracy" ("a government of honor") because this kind of government is completely obsessed with honor and glory.
- First, Socrates wants to understand how such a government comes to be. He imagines that a timocracy arises when something goes wrong in an aristocracy.
- How? Well, even though aristocracy is the best kind of government, no one is perfect, so Socrates imagines that at some point some people will disobey the rules of the government and will have children when they shouldn't. For some very strange and weird reasons related to geometry, these children will be worse than they should be and will not govern as well.
- Eventually, there will be a division between those who are interested in making money and having possessions and those interested in philosophy and virtue. Eventually, they will reintroduce private property, people will be enslaved, and war will consume all their energy.
- Everyone agrees that this is how such a government would come to exist. They also agree that timocracy is the type of government that comes between aristocracy and oligarchy.
- They next imagine that some aspects of this new government will be like aristocracy, so they will divide the duties of the city into separate roles (farming vs. military) and will engage in their meals and their athletic training all in common spaces.
- But, unlike the previous regime, and more like an oligarchy, the timocracy won't put the wisest guys in charge of the city; they'll put the ones who are totally into war and conflict in charge. These rulers will also be into money and will try to do anything to acquire and save their own moolah while happily spending their friends' money on bad things.
- Why are these rulers like this? Because their education was forced on them and because athletics was way more emphasized than music or philosophy.
- They all agree that they've done a good job describing this kind of government, considering that they can't spend too much time on each. This government, they decide, will be especially characterized by its love of victory and of honor.
- Now they need to figure out what kind of person would be most like this government.
- Adeimantus suggests that it might be someone like Glaucon, but Socrates says that Glaucon is not stubborn enough and too good at music. Furthermore, this kind of person would love rhetoric, without actually being good at it. He would be harsh to his slaves but respectful to his equals. He would be a hunting enthusiast and would love athletics. Even though he would not be obsessed with money in his youth, he would come to like it when he grew older.
- Because this man would not have been properly trained in both music and argumentation, he wouldn't be as devoted to virtue as he should be.
- Everyone agrees that this sounds like a timocratic man, so Socrates goes on to explain how such a man would come to be.
- Socrates says such a person would be the child of an idealistic father and a nagging mother. Because the father hated all the gossip and pettiness of political life, he would have left that world and tried to mind his own business.
- As a result, his wife would always be angry with him because their family wasn't in a better position socially and financially. So the young boy would hear both these things and perceive that his father wasn't very highly esteemed in the city. He would feel divided in what he cared about. His father would appeal and cultivate the boy's sense of thoughtfulness and virtue, but the other outside influences would cultivate his spirit and his desires (the lower two parts of the soul, remember?).
- He would therefore not be a bad kid, but he would be too arrogant and too obsessed with honor.
- Everyone thinks Socrates has got it exactly right, and so they decide to move onto oligarchy.
- Socrates defines oligarchy as the rule of the rich founded on an obsession with acquiring property.
- Next, Socrates describes how a timocracy will turn into an oligarchy as people become greedier and greedier.
- As people compete with each other to acquire more wealth, it soon becomes the case that the most honorable thing to be in the city is wealthy. Virtue is totally degraded, because wealth and virtue are always at odds, and soon no one will care about being virtuous at all. They'll just care about money... and more money.
- Now that the city is obsessed with money, the people will select the wealthiest people in the city to be their rulers. They'll make all these laws dictating how much money you need to have in order to rule.
- Next, Socrates describes the character of the city and the problems it has.
- First of all, because it makes wealth the criterion for ruling, it's quite possible that the best potential leaders won't be in charge, simply because they aren't rich enough.
- Second, because there is such a sharp divide between the rich and the poor, they will always be plotting against each other and causing problems.
- The oligarchy will be terrible at fighting war because they won't want to arm their citizens out of fear of a rebellion. They also won't want to fight themselves. And they won't want to actually fund a war, because they love their money too much. That doesn't leave many options.
- Also, everyone will be trying to do too many things at once—like farm, make money, and fight—so no one will do one particular thing very well.
- Intense poverty will be a huge problem, because everyone will want more for themselves and won't care if someone else loses everything.
- And these super-duper wealthy people... are they even helping the city out? Doing anything for it? Nope. They're just interested in their own moolah and their own private problems.
- Just as drones (you know, bees) have either wings or stingers but are annoying either way, so will the city be filled will either beggars or troublemakers. Everyone knows that wherever you see lots of poverty, you're also sure to see lots of crime, too.
- In fact, Socrates and friends all suspect that pretty much everyone in that kind of city will end up being poor except for the rulers.
- All these problems come from the fact that this city will have a bad educational system, bad parenting, and a bad form of governing.
- Next, Socrates and company need to figure out what kind of person corresponds to this government and how he comes into being.
- Socrates imagines that the oligarchic man will be the son of a timocratic man who will at first look up to his father and emulate him. But then he will see his father fall from office due to corruption in the government, and he will watch his father lose everything.
- Once he sees this, he'll be afraid of the same thing happening to him. So he'll decide that he doesn't care about honor; he only cares about money.
- The oligarchic man will end up making the rational and the spirited parts of his soul subservient to the desiring part, and everything his soul will aim for will be about money.
- They all agree that this description sounds like the oligarchic man, and now they want to characterize him.
- He'll be intensely greedy. He'll think that money is the most important thing in life, and so he'll be totally stingy.
- He'll be kind of a hoarder, keeping things to himself and always trying to make a profit.
- He won't devote himself at all to education and will probably have plenty of nasty desires that he'll only keep in check because he's afraid of spending money.
- Socrates thinks that a way to really tell what the oligarchic man is like is to watch how he cares for other people, such as orphans.
- Because the oligarchic man's desires are never in order but are always competing for attention, he himself will be divided.
- He will be rather graceful, but not because he is harmonious on the inside.
- He won't be a very good member of any community, either, because he won't spend money on anything, not even to fight a war properly.
- Everyone agrees that this pretty much sums up what an oligarchic man would be like.
- All right. We're on to democracy. Let's find out how it came into being out of oligarchy.
- Socrates imagines that because an oligarchy isn't very well ruled and doesn't have any kind of legal system in place to monitor and aid the poor, the poor will become very angry and bitter.
- People become poor in the oligarchic city very easily because they can enter into contracts without any kind of potential risk to themselves.
- Now, because this city is sick, just the smallest little thing can push it over the edge and make it completely ill. For even a small reason, the poor will rise up, cast out the wealthy rulers, and establish a democracy.
- In this democracy, the poor will get to be the ones ruling, and they will create a system of ruling by vote.
- A city like this will be characterized by freedom. People will have freedom of speech, and they'll have the freedom to do whatever they want. Because they can do what they want, people will tend to involve themselves in their own private business.
- This kind of government will also produce the most diverse population. Socrates admits that there is a certain loveliness to this kind of government. It's like a cloak that is beautiful because it has so many colors.
- In fact, because democracy is so striking and beautiful, many people become mistakenly convinced that it's the best kind of government.
- Democracies are useful to people like Socrates and company, who are interested in studying all kinds of governments, because they contain such a variety of people and leadership styles.
- Democracies don't provide any legal compulsion for certain people to rule or to fight wars and they tend to be compassionate toward people who have been condemned.
- Furthermore, because of the way democracy works, it doesn't enforce rules that might determine what kind of people should be in charge; it simply rewards the person who has the most popular appeal.
- Now to figure out the democratic man. Socrates imagines that he will be the son of a stingy, oligarchic man and will be the kind of person who thinks that any of his desires that don't lead to moneymaking are unnecessary.
- Before describing the democratic man further, Socrates wants to quickly differentiate necessary desires from unnecessary ones.
- Necessary desires are desires that a person cannot justly ignore, often because they are part of human nature.
- Unnecessary desires are those that, with lots of practice, a person can free himself from and whose presence doesn't do the person any good.
- So, an example of a necessary desire would be eating out of hunger, while overeating just for pleasure would be an unnecessary desire.
- Socrates then compares these two kinds of desires to two attitudes towards money. He suggests that necessary desires are like making money, because they are useful and productive, while unnecessary desires are like being stingy, since they hoard without use.
- So, they conclude that the stingy, oligarchic man will be like necessary desires while a big spender will be like the unnecessary desires.
- Okay, so back to how the democratic man comes to exist. He's the son of a stingy, oligarchic guy, so his childhood is, well, stingy. When he gets a bit older and meets other people who are into pleasures and doing fun things, he'll follow them, since he's sick of his stingy childhood.
- However, he's still his father's son, so he's excited by new, fun opportunities, but at the same time, he's wary of being too overindulgent. So he's constantly at war with himself, not knowing what to do and not being able to rely on the solid foundation of a good education.
- Without this good education, arrogance and boasting will take hold of him, and in the end, he'll choose to hang out with the fun, pleasure-loving people who breed chaos, anarchy, and wastefulness.
- For the rest of his life, the democratic man will go and back forth between greater indulgence and lesser indulgence, not understanding why either might be better or worse for him but deciding it's best to just treat them equally.
- The democratic man will live day by day and try out whatever new and exciting thing strikes his fancy. Many people will say he lives a good life, full of variety, excitement, and freedom.
- Finally, it's time to talk about tyranny, which, you won't be at all surprised to hear, is born out of democracy.
- Just as oligarchy collapsed under its own obsession with wealth, so, too, will democracy collapse under its own obsession with freedom.
- If a ruler doesn't grant enough freedom, or if he tries to punish his citizens, he—and any of his followers—will be condemned as compromising freedom.
- Anarchy will be a part of every aspect of the city, since even animals will model themselves on the example of their government.
- Instead of people fearing their elders and those in positions of authority, the opposite will happen: people in authority will fear the people and so flatter and placate them.
- Disorder will be everywhere, and people will become so protective of the idea of their freedom that they will stop obeying the law altogether.
- So this is the kind of climate that ends up producing tyranny, a climate cursed with the same disease as oligarchy. It's a disease that makes them both fail, since an excessive amount of anything tends to lead to its opposite excess: too much freedom in democracy leads to slavery under tyranny.
- Adeimantus wants to know what exactly this disease is that's plagued both oligarchy and democracy. Socrates responds that it's having a class of opinionated, lazy, and extravagant people who have a bunch of tedious followers.
- Socrates says this metaphorical disease is what both doctors and rulers need to be the most diligent about preventing.
- To explain this disease in democracy further, Socrates goes on to say that in a democracy there are three distinct categories of people.
- First, there are 1) these lazy extravagant people. They're also the fiercest: because they're not given any actual positions of power in the city, so they're always having to fight to be heard.
- Next, there are 2) the wealthy, who are also the most powerful.
- Finally, there are 3) your average citizens who work, don't have much, and are very interested in participating in government.
- The leaders of a democracy realize this, and so they strategically keep giving money to the poor as a way to actually keep the majority of it for themselves.
- Now, when someone is in trouble and might have his property taken, he has to plead with the public in order to defend himself.
- It's also usually the case in a democracy that certain men grow very popular and are supported and groomed as future leaders. Socrates sees this as the very beginning of tyranny.
- A leader becomes a tyrant when he's fighting against the crowd and becomes vicious, for example by executing someone for no reason.
- Now that he's shed blood, this ruler will become ruthless and will either be killed or become a tyrant.
- Once he survives as a tyrant, he will forget any promises of legal change he's made.
- He'll lead an attack on the wealthy of the city and will cause resentment to build up against him. He'll then require the help of bodyguards from the city.
- The typical trajectory of a tyrant's reign begins on a good note: he's friendly, delivers on his promises, and feeds the poor to keep them quiet.
- Then he stirs up a war as a way to eliminate some of his internal enemies, and he starts to become less and less liked.
- When his trusted advisors offer him any kind of criticism, he'll kill them, too. He'll start to kill anyone who seems too impressive and who might be a challenger.
- Naturally, the people will hate him more and more, so he'll need even more security and more companions. He'll either get them from abroad or by freeing the slaves of some his citizens, making them his personal bodyguards.
- Socrates imagines that among these companions will be some wise men, since Euripides, a tragic poet, said that tyrants often surround themselves with the wise. For praising tyranny in this way, it's obvious yet again that poets won't be allowed in Socrates's city.
- In fact, poets are known to go around spreading praise for both tyranny and democracy, because both those regimes—but especially tyranny—offer poets the most support.
- Anyway, back to tyrants. Adeimantus suggests that a tyrant will get his money from spending the sacred money of the city and from all the property he's confiscated from his enemies.
- Once this runs out, the tyrant will rely on his friends, then on the parents of his friends, then even on his own parents, not at all respecting the idea that adults should take care of their parents.
- In fact, if the tyrant's father refuses to support his son, the tyrant will probably kill him.
- Well, now Socrates and the gang have seen how a government can change from being totally free to totally enslaving.
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Book 8 Notes from The Republic
The Republic Book 8
PHIL103: Moral and Political Philosophy
Read this summary of Plato's Republic. Pay particular attention to the summary of Books 6,7, and 8; the Theory of Universals; to the definition of justice; and to the Ideal City. What are the four types of government which Plato rejects, and why does he reject them?
Socrates discusses four unjust constitutions: timocracy, oligarchy, democracy, and tyranny. He argues that a society will decay and pass through each government in succession, eventually becoming a tyranny, the most unjust regime of all.
The starting point is an imagined, alternate aristocracy (ruled by a philosopher-king); a just government dominated by the wisdom-loving element. When its social structure breaks down and enters civil war, it is replaced by timocracy. The timocratic government is dominated by the spirited element, with a ruling class of property-owners consisting of warriors or generals (Ancient Sparta is an example). As the emphasis on honor is compromised by wealth accumulation, it is replaced by oligarchy. The oligarchic government is dominated by the desiring element, in which the rich are the ruling class. The gap between rich and poor widens, culminating in a revolt by the underclass majority, establishing a democracy. Democracy emphasizes maximum freedom, so power is distributed evenly. It is also dominated by the desiring element, but in an undisciplined, unrestrained way. The populism of the democratic government leads to mob rule, fueled by fear of oligarchy, which a clever demagogue can exploit to take power and establish tyranny. In a tyrannical government, the city is enslaved to the tyrant, who uses his guards to remove the best social elements and individuals from the city to retain power (since they pose a threat), while leaving the worst. He will also provoke warfare to consolidate his position as leader. In this way, tyranny is the most unjust regime of all.
In parallel to this, Socrates considers the individual or soul that corresponds to each of these regimes. He describes how an aristocrat may become weak or detached from political and material affluence, and how his son will respond to this by becoming overly ambitious. The timocrat in turn may be defeated by the courts or vested interests; his son responds by accumulating wealth in order to gain power in society and defend himself against the same predicament, thereby becoming an oligarch. The oligarch's son will grow up with wealth without having to practice thrift or stinginess, and will be tempted and overwhelmed by his desires, so that he becomes democratic, valuing freedom above all.
("Agamemnon", "Hom. Od. 9.1", "denarius")
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1 Strictly speaking, this applies only to the guardians, but Cf. Laws 739 C ff. Aristotle, Pol. 1261 a 6 and 1262 a 41, like many subsequent commentators, misses the point.
2 Cf. 445 D and What Plato Said, p. 539, on Menex. 238 C-D.
3 So Jowett. Adam ad loc. insists that the genitive is partitive, “those of their number are to be kings.”
4 Cf. 415 E.
5 Cf. 416 C.
6 Cf. 429 A.
7 Cf. on 403 E and 521 D. Polyb. i. 6. 6 ἀθληταὶ γεγονότες ἀληθινοὶ τῶν κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον ἔργων
8 Cf. 416 E.
9 Cf. Vol. I. p. 424, note c, and What Plato Said, p. 640, on Laws 857 C.
10 Cf. 449 A-B.
11 Cf. Aristot. Pol. 1285 b 1-2, 1289 b 9.
12 Aristot. Pol. 1291-1292 censures the limitation to four. But Cf. supra, Introd. p. xlv. Cf. Laws 693 D, where only two mother-forms of government are mentioned, monarchy and democracy, with Aristot. Pol. 1301 b 40 δῆμος καὶ ὀλιγαρχία . Cf. also Eth. Nic. 1160 a 31 ff. The Politicus mentions seven (291 f., 301 f.). Isoc. Panath. 132-134 names three kinds—oligarchy, democracy, and monarchy—adding that others may say much more about them. See note ad loc. in Loeb Isocrates and Class. Phil. vol. vii. p. 91. Cf. Hobbes, Leviathan 19 “Yet he that shall consider the particular commonwealths that have been and are in the world will not perhaps easily reduce them to three . . . as, for example, elective kingdoms,” etc.
13 For ὧν καὶ πέρι λόγον ἄξιον εἴη Cf. Laws 908 B ἃ καὶ διακρίσεως ἄξια , Laches 192 A οὗ καὶ πέρι ἄξιον λέγειν , Tim. 82 ἓν γένος ἐνὸν ἄξιον ἐπωνυμίας . Cf. also Euthydem. 279 C, Aristot. Pol. 1272 b 32, 1302 a 13, De part. an. 654 a 13, Demosth. v. 16, Isoc. vi. 56. and Vol. I. p. 420, note f, on 445 C.
14 For the relative followed by a demonstrative cf. also 357 B.
15 Plato's main point again. Cf. 545 A, 484 A-B and Vol. I. p.xii, note d.
16 Cf. on 572 b, p. 339, note e.
17 Cf. Phileb. 13 D εἰς τὰς ὁμοίας Phaedr. 236 B, Laws 682 E, Aristoph. Clouds 551 (Blaydes), Knights 841, Lysist. 672.
18 Cf. What Plato Said, p. 596, on Sophist 267 D.
19 Cf. Crito 52 E, Norlin on Isoc. Nicocles 24 (Loeb), Laws 612 D-E, Aristot. Pol. 1265 b 32, Xen. Mem. iii. 5. 15.
20 ἡ . . . αὔτη , “ista.” Cf. Midsummer Night's Dream, I. ii. ad fin. and Gorg. 502 B, 452 E.
21 Of course ironical. Cf. 454 A, and What Plato Said, p. 592, on Soph. 231 B.
22 Cf. 552 C, Protag. 322 d, Isoc. Hel. 34, Wilamowitz on Eurip. Heracles 542. For the effect of surprise Cf. Rep. 334 A, 373 A, 555 A, Theaet. 146 A, Phileb. 46 A κακόν and 64 E συμφορά .
23 ἰδέαν : cf. Introd. p. x.
24 Cf. 445 C. For διαφανεῖ Cf. Tim. 60 A, 67 A, Laws 634 C, and on 548 C, p. 253, note g.
25 δυναστεῖαι Cf. Laws 680 B, 681 D. But the word usually has an invidious suggestion. See Newman on Aristot. Pol. 1272 b 10. Cf. ibid. 1292 b 5-10, 1293 a 31, 1298 a 32; also Lysias ii. 18, where it is opposed to democracy, Isoc. Panath. 148, where it is used of the tyranny of Peisistratus, ibid. 43 of Minos. Cf. Panegyr. 39 and NorIin on Panegyr. 105 (Loeb). Isocrates also uses it frequently of the power or sovereignty of Philip, Phil. 3, 6, 69, 133, etc. Cf. also Gorg. 492 B, Polit. 291 D.
26 Newman on Aristot. Pol. 1273 a 35 thinks that Plato may have been thinking of Carthage. Cf. Polyb. vi. 56. 4.
27 Plato, as often is impatient of details, for which he was rebuked by Aristotle. Cf. also Tim. 57 D, 67 C, and the frequent leaving of minor matters to future legislators in the Republic and Laws, Vol. I. p. 294, note b, on 412 B.
28 For the correspondence of individual and state cf. also 425 E, 445 C-D, 579 C and on 591 E. Cf. Laws 829 A, Isoc. Peace 120.
29 Or “stock or stone,” i.e. inanimate, insensible things. For the quotation ἐκ δρυός ποθεν ἢ ἐκ πέτρας Cf. Odyssey xix. 163, Il. xxii. 126 aliter, Apol. 34 D and Thompson on Phaedrus 275 B; also Stallbaum ad loc.
30 The “mores,” 45 E, 436 A. Cf. Bagehot, Physics and Politics, p. 206: “A lazy nation may be changed into an industrious, a rich into a poor, a religious into a profane, as if by magic, if any single cause, though slight, or any combination of causes, however subtle, is strong enough to change the favorite and detested types of character.”
31 For the metaphor cf. also 550 E and on 556 E.
32 ἀριστοκρατία is used by both Plato and Aristotle some times technically, sometimes etymologically as the government of the best, whoever they may be. Cf. 445 D, and Menex. 238 C-D ( What Plato Said, p. 539).
33 Cf. Phaedr. 256 C 1, 475 A, 347 B.
34 Cf. on 544 A, p. 237, note g.
35 In considering the progress of degeneration portrayed in the following pages, it is too often forgotten that Plato is describing or satirizing divergences from ideal rather than an historical process. Cf. Rehm, Der Untergang Roms im abendländischen Denken, p. 11: “Plato gibt eine zum Mythos gesteigerte Naturgeschichte des Staates, so wie Hesiod eine als Mythos zu verstehende Natur-, d.h. Entartungsgeschichte des Menschengeschlechts gibt.” Cf. Sidney B. Fay, on Bury, The Idea of Progress, in “Methods of Social Science,” edited by Stuart A. Rice, p. 289: “ . . . there was a widely spread belief in an earlier ‘golden age’ of simplicity, which had been followed by a degeneration and decay of the human race. Plato's theory of degradation set forth a gradual deterioration through the successive stages of timocracy, oligarchy, democracy and despotism. The Greek theory of ‘cycles,’ with its endless, monotonous iteration, excluded the possibility of permanent advance or ‘progress.'” Kurt Singer, Platon der Gründer, p. 141, says that the timocratic state reminds one of late Sparta, the democratic of Athens after Pericles, the oligarchic is related to Corinth, and the tyrannical has some Syracusan features. Cicero, De div. ii., uses this book of the Republic to console himself for the revolutions in the Roman state, and Polybius's theory of the natural succession of governments is derived from it, with modifications (Polyb. vi. 4. 6 ff. Cf. vi. 9. 10 αὕτη πολιτειῶν ἀνακύκλωσις ). Aristotle objects that in a cycle the ideal state should follow the tyranny.
36 Cf. on 544 C, p. 238, note b.
37 In Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1160 a 33-34, the meaning is “the rule of those who possess a property qualification.”
38 Cf. 577 A-B.
39 Cf. 582 A ff.
40 For the qualified assent Cf. Hamlet I. i. 19 “What? is Horatio there? A piece of him.” It is very frequent in the Republic, usually with γοῦν . Cf. 442 D, 469 B, 476 C, 501 C, 537 C, 584 A, 555 B, 604 D,and Vol. I. p. 30, note a, on 334 A; also 460 C and 398 B, where the interlocutor adds a condition, 392 B, 405 B, 556 E, 581 B, and 487 A, where he uses the corrective μὲν οὖν .
41 For the idea that the state is destroyed only by factions in the ruling class cf. also Laws 683 E. Cf. 465 B, Lysias xxv. 21, Aristot. Pol. 1305 b, 1306 a 10 ὁμονοοῦσα δὲ ὀλιγαρχία οὐκ εὐδιάφθορος ἐξ αὑτῆς , 1302 a 10 Polybius, Teubner, vol. ii. p. 298 (vi. 57). Newman, Aristot. Pol. i. p. 521, says that Aristotle “does not remark on Plato's observation . . . though he cannot have agreed with it.” Cf. Halévy, Notes et souvenirs, p. 153 “l'histoire est là pour démontrer clairement que, depuis un siècle, not gouvernements n'ont jamais été renversés que par eux-mêmes”; Bergson, Les Deux Sources de la morale et de la religion, p. 303: “Mais l'instinct résiste. Il ne commence à céder que lorsque Ia classe supérieure elle-même l'y invite.”
42 For the mock-heroic style of this invocation Cf. Phaedr. 237 A, Laws 885 C.
43 Cf. 413 B, Meno 76 E, Aristot. Meteorol. 353 b 1, Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. p. 146.
44 Cf. Alc. I. 104 E.
45 Cf. What Plato Said, p. 627 on Laws 677 A; also Polyb. vi. 57, Cic. De rep. ii. 25.
46 Cf. Pindar, Mem. vi. 10-12 for the thought.
47 Cf. Tim. 28 A δόξῃ μετ᾽ αἰσθήσεως .
48 For its proverbial obscurity cf. Cic. Ad att. vii. 13 “est enim numero Platonis obscurius,” Censorinus, De die natali xi. See supra, Introd. p. xliv for literature on this “number.”
49 προσήγορα : Cf. Theaet. 146 A.
50 Cf. 534 D; also Theaet. 202 B ῥητάς .
51 Cf. 409 D.
52 αὖ : cf. my note in Class. Phil. xxiii. (1928) pp. 285-287.
53 This does not indicate a change in Plato's attitude toward music, as has been alleged.
54 Cf. 415 A-B.
55 Cf. Theaet. 159 A.
56 γε vi termini Cf. 379 A-B.
57 Cf. 416 E-417 A, 521 A, Phaedrus 279 B-C.
58 For εἰς μέσον Cf. Protag. 338 A; 572 D, 558 B.
59 An allusion to Sparta. On slavery in Plato cf. Newman i. p. 143. Cf. 549 A, 578-579, Laws 776-777; Aristot. Pol. 1259 a 21 f., 1269 a 36 f., 1330 a 29.
60 Cf. 417 A-B.
61 Cf. Aristot. Pol. 1328 b 41 and Newman i. pp. 107-108.
62 Cf. 416 E, 458 C, Laws 666 B, 762 C, 780 A-B, 781 C, 806 E, 839 C, Critias 112 C.
63 Cf. 397 E, Isoc. ii. 46 ἁπλοῦς δ᾽ ἡγοῦνται τοὺς νοῦν οὐκ ἔχοντας . Cf. the psychology of Thucyd. iii. 83.
64 This was said to be characteristic of Sparta. Cf. Newman on Aristot. Pol. 1270 a 13, Xen. Rep. Lac. 14, 203 and 7. 6, and the Chicago Dissertation of P. H. Epps, The Place of Sparta in Greek History and Civilization, pp. 180-184.
65 Cf. 416 D.
66 Cf. Laws 681 A, Theaet. 174 E.
67 νεοττιάς suggests Horace's ‘tu nidum servas” (Epist. i. 10.6). Cf also Laws 776 A.
68 Cf. Laws 806 A-C, 637 B-C, Aristot. Pol. 1269 b 3, and Newman ii. p. 318 on the Spartan women. Cf. Epps, op. cit. pp. 322-346.
69 φιλαναλωταί , though different, suggests Sallust's “alieni appetens sui profusus” ( Cat. 5). Cf. Cat. 52 “publice egestatem, privatim opulentiam.”
70 Cf. 587 A, Laws 636 D, Symp. 187 E, Phaedr. 251 E.
71 Cf. Aristot. Pol. 1270 b 34 with Newman's note; and Euthyphro 2 C “tell his mother the state.”
72 Cf. Laws 720 D-E. This is not inconsistent with Polit. 293 A, where the context and the point of view are different.
73 This is of course not the mixed government which Plato approves Laws 691-692, 712 D-E, 759 B. Cf. What Plato Said, p. 629.
74 For διαφανέστατον cf. 544 D. The expression διαφανέστατον . . . ἕν τι μόνον , misunderstood and emended by ApeIt, is colored by an idea of Anaxagoras expressed by Lucretius i. 877-878: “illud Apparere unum cuius sint plurima mixta. Anaxag. Fr. 12. Diels 1.3, p. 405 ἀλλ᾽ ὅτων πλεῖστα ἔνι , ταῦτα ἐνδηλότατα ἓν ἕκαστον ἐστι καὶ ἦν . Cf. Phaedr. 238 A, Cratyl. 393 misunderstood by Dümmler and emended ( ἐναργής for ἐγκρατής )with the approval of Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. p. 350.
75 There is no contradiction between this and Laws 870 C if the passage is read carefully.
76 Cf. on 544 D, p. 240, note a.
77 Cf. Phaedo 65 A, Porphyry, De abst. i. 27, Teubner, p. 59 ἐγγὺς τείνειν ἀποσιτίας .
78 αὐθαδέστερον . The fault of Prometheus (Aesch. P. V. 1034, 1937) and Medea must not be imputed to Glaucon.
79 Cf. Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, who imitates or parodies Plato throughout, e.g. p. 83 “A little inaccessible to ideas and light,” and pp. 54-55 “The peculiar serenity of aristocracies of Teutonic origin appears to come from their never having had any ideas to trouble them.”
80 Cf. 475 D, 535 D, Lysis 206 C.
81 Cf. p. 249, note g, on 547 C, and Newman ii. p. 317. In i. p. 143, n. 3 he says that this implies slavery in the ideal state, in spite of 547 C.
82 Cf. Lysias xix. 18. Lysias xxi. portrays a typical φιλότιμος . Cf Phaedr. 256 C, Eurip. I. A. 527. He is a Xenophontic type. Cf Xen. Oecon. 14. 10, Hiero 7. 3, Agesil. 10. 4. Isoc. Antid. 141 and 226 uses the word in a good sense. Cf. “But if it be a sin to covet honor,” Shakes. Henry V. iv. iii. 28.
83 Cf. the ἀξιώματα of Laws 690 A, Aristot. Pol. 1280 a 8 ff., 1282 b 26, 1283-1284.
84 Cf. Arnold on the “barbarians” in Culture and Anarchy, pp. 78, 82, 84.
85 For the ἦθος of a state cf. Isoc. Nic. 31.
86 The Greek words λόγος and μουσική are untranslatable. Cf. also 560 B. For μουσική cf. 546 D. Newman i. p. 414 fancies that his is a return to the position of Book IV. from the disparagement of music in 522 A. Cf. Unity of Plato's Thought , p. 4 on this supposed ABA development of Plato's opinions.
87 δέ γ᾽ marks the transition from the description of the type to its origin. Cf. 547 E, 553 C, 556 B, 557 B, 560 D, 561 E, 563 B, 566 E. Ritter, pp. 69-70, comments on its frequency in this book, but does not note the reason. There are no cases in the first five pages.
88 Cf. Lysias xix. 18 ἐκείνῳ μὲν γὰρ ἦν τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν , with the contrasted type ἀνήλωσεν ἐπιθυμῶν τιμᾶσθαι , Isoc. Antid. 227 ἀπραγμονεστάτους μὲν ὄντας ἐν τῇ πόλει . Cf. πολυπραγμοσύνη 444 B, 434 B, Isoc. Antid. 48, Peace 108,30, and 26, with Norlin's note (Loeb). Cf. also Aristoph. Knights 261.
89 ἐλαττοῦσθαι cf. Thuc. i. 77. 1, Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1198 b 26-32, Pol. 1319 a 3.
90 For πράγματα ἔχειν cf. 370 A, Gorg. 467 D, Alc. I. 119 B, Aristoph. Birds 1026, Wasps 1392. Cf. πράγματα παρέχειν , Rep. 505 A, 531 B, Theages 121 D, Herod. i. 155, Aristoph. Birds 931, Plutus 20, 102.
91 Wilamowitz, Platon, i. p. 434 with some exaggeration says that this is the only woman character in Plato and is probably his mother, Perictione. Pohlenz, Gött. Gel. Anz. 1921, p. 18, disagrees. For the complaints cf. Gerard, Four Years in Germany, p. 115 “Now if a lawyer gets to be about forty years old and is not some kind of a Rat his wife begins to nag him . . .”
92 Cf. Symp. 174 D, Isoc. Antid. 227.
93 Cf. the husband in Lysias i. 6.
94 λίαν ἀνειμένος : one who has grown too slack or negligent. Cf. Didot, Com. Fr. p. 728 τίς ὧδε μῶρος καὶ λίαν ἀνειμένος ; Porphyry, De abst. ii. 58.
95 Cf. Phaedo 60 A. For Plato's attitude towards women Cf. What Plato Said, p. 632, on Laws 631 D.
96 ὑμνεῖν . Cf. Euthydem. 296 D, Soph. Ajax 292. Commentators have been troubled by the looseness of Plato's style in this sentence. Cf. Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. p. 385.
97 Cf. Aristoph. Thesm. 167 ὅμοια γὰρ ποιεῖν ἀνάγκη τῇ φύσει .
98 ἕτερα τοιαῦτα : cf. on 488 B; also Gorg. 481 E, 482 A, 514 D, Euthyd. 298 E, Protag. 326 A, Phaedo 58 D, 80 D, Symp. 201 E, etc.
99 Cf. What Plato Said, p. 480, on Charm. 161 B.
100 τότε δή cf. 551 A, 566 C, 330 E, 573 A, 591 A, Phaedo 85 A, 96 B and D, Polit. 272 E. Cf. also τότ᾽ ἤδη , on 565 C.
101 Cf. on 439 D, Vol. I. p. 397, note d.
102 For these three principles of the soul cf. on 435 A ff., 439 D-E ff., 441 A.
103 Cf. the fragment of Menander, φθείρουσιν ἤθη χρήσθ᾽ ὁμιλίαι κακαί , quoted in 1 Cor. xv. 33 (Kock, C.A.F. iii. No. 218). Cf. also Phaedr. 250 A ὑπό τινων ὁμιλιῶν , Aesch. Seven Against Thebes 599 ἔσθ᾽ ὁμιλίας κακῆς κάκιον οὐδέν .
104 Cf. p. 249, note f.
105 Cf. 553 B-C, 608 B.
106 ὑψηλόφρων is a poetical word. Cf. Eurip. I. A. 919.
107 Cf. p. 255, note f.
108 λέγ᾽ ἄλλον ἄλλαις ἐν πύλαις εἰληχότα .
109 Cf. Laws 743 C, and Class. Phil. ix. (1914) p. 345.
110 Cf. Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1160 a 33, Isoc. Panath. 131, Laws 698 B aliter.
111 Cf. 465 D, Soph. 241 D.
112 Cf. 548 A, 416 D.
113 εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν : cf. 437 A, 604 B, Prot. 339 D, Symp. 174 D, Polit. 262 D, Soph. 258 C, 261 B, Alc. I. 132 B, Protag. 357 D where ἧς is plainly wrong, Aristoph. Knights 751.
114 Cf. 591 D, Laws 742 E, 705 B, 8931 C ff., 836 A, 919 B with Rep. 421 D; also Aristot. Pol. 1273 a 37-38.
115 Cf. on 544 E, Demosth. v. 12.
116 This sentence has been much quoted. Cf. Cic. Tusc. i. 2 “honos alit artes . . . iacentque ea semper, quae apud quosque inprobantur.” Themistius and Libanius worked it into almost every oration. Cf. Mrs. W. C. Wright, The Emperor Julian, p. 70, n. 3. Cf. also Stallbaum ad loc. For ἀσκεῖται cf. Pindar, Ol. viii. 22.
117 ὅρον : cf. 551 C, Laws 714 C, 962 D, 739 D, 626 B, Menex. 238 D, Polit. 293 E, 296 E, 292 C, Lysis 209 C, Aristot. Pol. 1280 a 7, 1271 a 35, and Newman i. p. 220, Eth. Nic. 1138 b 23. Cf. also τέλος Rhet. 1366 a 3. For the true criterion of office-holding see Laws 715 C-D and Isoc. xii. 131. For wealth as the criterion cf. Aristot. Pol. 1273 a 37.
118 For ταξάμενοι cf. Vol. I. p. 310, note c, on 416 E.
119 Cf. Aristot. Pol. 1301 b 13-14.
120 Cf. 557 A.
121 Cf. 488, and Polit. 299 B-C, What Plato Said, p. 521, on Euthydem. 291 D.
122 Stallbaum says that ἐπιτρέποι is used absolutely as in 575 D, Symp. 213 E, Lysis 210 B, etc. Similarly Latin permitto. Cf. Shorey on Jowett's translation of Meno 92 A-B, A. J. P. xiii. p. 367. See too Diog. L. i. 65.
123 Men are the hardest creatures to govern. Cf. Polit. 292 D, and What Plato Said, p. 635, on Laws 766 A.
124 For the idea that a city should be a unity Cf. Laws 739 D and on 423 A-B. Cf. also 422 E with 417 A-B, Livy ii. 24 “adeo duas ex una civitate discordia fecerat.” Aristot. Pol. 1316 b 7 comments ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ φάναι δύο πόλεις εἶναι τὴν ὀλιγαρχικήν , πλουσίων καὶ πενήτων . . . and tries to prove the point by his topical method.
125 Cf. 417 B.
126 For the idea that the rulers fear to arm the people cf. Thuc. iii. 27, Livy iii. 15 “consules et armare pIebem et inermem pati timebant.”
127 He plays on the word. In 565 C ὡς ἀληθῶς ὀλιγαρχικούς is used in a different sense. Cf. Symp. 181 A ὡς ἀληθῶς πάνδημος , Phaedo 80 D εἰς Ἅιδου ὡς ἀληθῶς .
128 Cf. 374 B, 434 A, 443 D-E. For the specialty of function Cf. What Plato Said, p. 480, on Charm. 161 E.
129 So in the Laws the householder may not sell his lot, Laws 741 B-C, 744 D-E. Cf. 755 A, 857 A, Aristot. Pol. 1270 a 19, Newman i. p. 376.
130 Cf Aristot. Pol. 1326 a 20, Newman i. pp. 98 and 109. Cf Leslie Stephen, Util. ii. 111 “A vast populace has grown up outside of the old order.”
131 Cf. Aristot. Pol. 1266 b 13.
132 ἑτοίμων “things ready at hand.” Cf. 573 A, Polyb. vi. (Teubner, vol. ii. p. 237); Horace Epist. i. 2. 27 “fruges consumere nati.”
133 Cf. Laws 901 A, Hesiod, Works and Days 300 f., Aristoph. Wasps 1071 ff., Eurip. Suppl. 242, Xen. Oecon. 17. 15, and Virgil, Georg. iv. 168 “ignavum fucos pecus a praesepibus arcent.” the sentence was much quoted. Stallbaum refers to Ruhnken on Tim. 157 ff. for many illustration, and to Petavius ad Themist. Orat. xxiii. p. 285 D.
134 Cf 498 A, Laws 653 A; also the modern distinction between defectives and delinquents.
135 κέκληνται : cf. 344 B-C.
136 βίᾳ is so closely connected with κατέχουσιν that the double dative is not felt to be awkward. But Adam takes ἐπιμελείᾳ as an adverb.
137 Cf. on 550 C. p. 261, note h.
138 Cf. 410 B, Homer Od. xix. 436 ἴχνη ἐρευνῶντος , ii. 406, iii. 30, v. 193, vii. 38 μετ᾽ ἴχνια βαῖνε .
139 For πταίσαντα cf.Aesch. Prom. 926, Ag. 1624 (Butl. emend.).
140 Cf. Aesch. Ag. 1007, Eumen. 564, Thuc. vii. 25. 7, and Thompson on Phaedr. 255 D.
141 Lit. “spilling.” Cf. Lucian, Timon 23.
142 For ἐκπεσόντα cf. 560 A, 566 A. In Xen. An. vii. 5. 13 it is used of shipwreck. Cf. εκ̓βάλλοντες 488 C.
143 Cf. Herod. vii. 136.
144 Cf. Aesch. Ag. 983. Cf. 550 B.
145 For γλίσχρως cf. on 488 A, Class. Phil. iv. p. 86 on Diog. L. iv. 59, Aelian, Epist. Rust. 18 γλίσχρως τε καὶ κατ᾽ ὀλίγον .
146 ἔνθεν καὶ ἔνθεν : Cf. Protag. 315 B, Tim. 46 C, Critias 117 C, etc., Herod. iv. 175.
147 Cf. 554 A, 556 C, Xen. Mem. ii. 6. 4 μηδὲ πρὸς ἓν ἄλλο σχολὴν ποιεῖται ἢ ὁπόθεν αὐτός τι κερδανεῖ , and Aristot. Pol. 1257 b 407, and 330 C. See too Inge, Christian Ethics, p. 220: “The Times obituary notice of Holloway (of the pills) will suffice. ‘Money-making is an art by itself; it demands for success the devotion of the whole man,'” etc. For the phrase σκοπεῖν ὁπόθεν cf. Isoc. Areop. 83, Panegyr. 133-134 σκοπεῖν ἐξ ὧν .
148 Cf. on 558 D, p. 291, note i.
149 αὐχμηρός : Cf. Symp. 203 D.
150 For περιουσίαν cf. Blaydes on Aristoph. Clouds 50 and Theaet. 154 E.
151 Cf. Phaedr. 256 E, Meno 90 A-B by implication. Numenius (ed. Mullach iii. 159) relates of Lacydes that he was “a bit greedy ( ὑπογλισχρότερος ) and after a fashion a thrifty manager ( οἰκονομικός ） —as the expression is—the sort approved by most people.” Emerson, The Young American, “they recommend conventional virtues, whatever will earn and preserve property.” But this is not always true in an envious democracy: cf. Isoc. xv. 159-160 and America today.
152 Plato distinctly refers to the blind god Wealth. Cf. Aristoph. Plutus, Eurip. fr. 773, Laws 631 C πλοῦτος οὐ τυφλός which was often quoted. Cf. What Plato Said, p. 624, Otto, p. 60.
153 Cf. Herod. iii. 34, vii. 107.
154 Cf. 552 E ἐπιμελείᾳ βίᾳ . For ἄλλης cf. 368 B ἐκ τοῦ ἄλλου τοῦ ὑμετέρου τρόπου .
155 For the treatment of inferiors and weaker persons as a test of character Cf. Laws 777 D-E, Hesiod, Works and Days, 330, and Murray, Rise of the Greek Epic, pp. 84-85, who, however, errs on the meaning of αἰδώς . For orphans cf. also Laws 926-928, 766 C, 877 C, 909 C-D.
156 ἐπιεικεῖ is here used generally, and not in its special sense of “sweet reasonableness.”
157 For ἐνούσας Cf. Phileb. 16 D, Symp. 187 E.
158 Cf. 463 D. For the idea here Cf. Phaedo 68-69, What Plato Said, p. 527.
159 For the idea “at war with himself,” Cf. 440 B and E ( στάσις ), Phaedr. 237 D-E, and Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1099 a 12 f.
160 Cf. 397 E.
161 Cf. on 443 D-E, Vol. I. p. 414, note e; also Phaedo 61 A, and What Plato Said, p. 485 on Laches 188 D.
162 ὀλιγαρχικῶς keeps up the analogy between the man and the state. Cf. my “Idea of Justice,” Ethical Record, Jan. 1890, pp. 188, 191, 195.
163 i.e. he saves the cost of a determined fight. For the effect of surprise cf. on 544 C, p. 239, note f.
164 ὁμοιότητι : cf. 576 C.
165 Cf. Phileb. 55 C εἰς τὴν κρίσιν , Laws 856 C, 943 C.
166 The σκοπός or ὅρος . Cf. on 551 A, p. 263, note e, and Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1094 a 2.
167 Ackermann, Das Christliche bei Plato, compares Luke xvi.13 “Ye cannot serve God and Mammon.” Cf. also Laws 742 D-E, 727 E f., 831 C.
168 ἀκολασταίνειν Cf. Gorg. 478 A, Phileb. 12 D.
169 Cf. Laws 832 A οὐκ ἀφυεῖς . For the men reduced to poverty swelling the number of drones cf. Eurip. Herc. Fur. 588-592, and Wilamowitz ad loc.
170 Cf. Aristot. Pol. 1305 b 40-41, 1266 b 14.
171 Cf. Persius, Sat. ii. 61 “o curvae in terras animae, et caelestium inanes,” Cf. 586 A κεκυφότες . Cf. also on 553 D for the general thought.
172 Cf. Euthyph. 5 C, Polit. 287 A, Aristoph. Peace 1051, Plut. 837, Eurip. Hippol. 119, I. T. 956, Medea 67, Xen. Hell. iv. 5. 6.
173 Or, as Ast, Stallbaum and others take it, “the poison of their money.” τιτρώσκοντες suggests the poisonous sting, especially as Plato has been speaking of hives and drones. For ἐνιέντες cf. Eurip. Bacchae 851 ἐνεὶς . . . λύσσαν , “implanting madness.” In the second half of the sentence the figure is changed, the poison becoming the parent, i.e. the principal, which breeds interest,. cf. 507 A, p. 96.
174 Cf. on 552 A, Laws 922 E-923 A.
175 Cf. Protag. 327 D ἀναγκάζουσα ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι , Symp. 185 B, and for ἐπιμελεῖσθαι Cf. What Plato Said, p. 464, on Apol. 29 D-E.
176 For refusing to enforce monetary contracts Cf. Laws 742 C, 849 E, 915 E, and Newman ii. p. 254 on Aristot. Pol. 1263 b 21.
177 Cf. What Plato Said, p. 483, on Laches 179 D, and Aristot. Pol. 1310 a 23.
178 Cf. 429 C-D, Laches 191 D-E, Laws 633 D.
179 Cf. Tucker on Aesch. Suppl. 726.
180 Cf. Soph. Ajax 758 περισσὰ κἀνόνητα σώματα .
181 For a similar picture cf. Aristoph. Frogs 1086-1098. Cf. also Gorg. 518 C, and for the whole passage Xen. Mem. iii. 5. 15, Aristot. Pol. 1310 a 24-25.
182 The poor, though stronger, are too cowardly to use force. For κακίᾳ τῇ σφετέρᾳ cf. Lysias ii. 65 κακίᾳ τῇ αὑτῶν , Rhesus 813-814 τῇ Φρυγῶν κακανδρίᾳ , Phaedrus 248 B, Symp. 182 D, Crito 45 E, Eurip. Androm. 967, Aristoph. Thesm. 868 τῇ κοράκων πονηρίᾳ .
183 Cf. Soph. O. T. 961 σμικρὰ παλαῖα σώματ᾽ εὐνάζει ῥοπή ” a slight impulse puts aged bodies to sleep,” Demosth. Olynth. ii. 9 and 21. Cf. 544 E.
184 Cf. Polyb. vi. 57. Montaigne, apud Höffding, i. 30 “Like every other being each illness has its appointed time of development and close—interference is futile,” with Tim. 89 B.
185 Cf. Thuc. i. 3, ii. 68, iv. 64, Herod. ii. 108.
186 στασιάζει is applied here to disease of body. Cf. Herod. v. 28 νοσήσασα ἐς τὰ μάλιστα στάσι , “grievously ill of faction.” Cf. on 554 D, p. 276, note c.
187 Cf. 488 C, 560 A, Gorg. 466 C, 468 D, Prot. 325 B. Exile, either formal or voluntary, was always regarded as the proper thing for the defeated party in the Athenian democracy. The custom even exists at the present time. Venizelos, for instance, has frequently, when defeated at the polls, chosen to go into voluntary exile. But that term, in modern as in ancient Greece, must often be interpreted cum grano salis.
188 ἐξ ἴσου : one of the watchwords of democracy. Cf. 561 B and C, 599 B, 617 C, Laws 919 D, Alc. I. 115 D, Crito 50 E, Isoc. Archid. 96, Peace 3.
189 But Isoc. Areop. 22-23 considers the lot undemocratic because it might result in the establishment in office of men with oligarchical sentiments. See Norlin ad loc.For the use of the lot in Plato Cf. Laws 759 B, 757 E, 690 C, 741 B-C, 856 D, 946 B, Rep. 460 A, 461 E. Cf. Apelt, p. 520.
190 Cf. 551 B.
191 ἐξουσία : cf. Isoc. xii. 131 τὴν δ᾽ ἐξουσίαν ὅ τι βούλεται τις ποιεῖν εὐδαιμονίαν . Cf. Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, chap. ii. Doing as One Likes.
192 κατασκευή is a word of all work in Plato. Cf. 419 A, 449 A, 455 A, Gorg. 455 E, 477 B, etc.
193 παντοδαπός usually has an unfavorable connotation in Plato. Cf. 431 b-C, 561 D, 567 E, 550 D, Symp. 198 B, Gorg. 489 C, Laws 788 C, etc. Isoc. iv. 45 uses it in a favorable sense, but in iii. 16 more nearly as Plato does. for the mixture of things in a democracy cf. Xen. Rep. Ath. 2. 8 φωνῇ καὶ διαίτῃ καὶ σχήματι . . . Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ κεκραμένῃ ἐξ ἁπάντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ βαρβάρων ; and Laws 681 D. Libby, Introduction to History of Science, p. 273, says “Arnold failed in his analysis of American civilization to confirm Plato's judgement concerning the variety of natures to be found in the democratic state.” De Tocqueville also, and many English observers, have commented on the monotony and standardization of American life.
194 For the idea that women and children like many colors cf. Sappho's admiration for Jason's mantle mingled with all manner of colors ( Lyr. Graec. i. 196). For the classing together of women and boys Cf. Laws 658 D, Shakes. As You Like It, III. ii. 435 “As boys and women are for the most part cattle of this color,” Faguet, Nineteenth Century “Lamartine a été infiniment aimé des adolescents sérieux et des femmes distinguées.”
195 Cf. Plutarch, Dion 53. Burke says “A republic, as an ancient philosopher has observed, is no one species of government, but a magazine of every species.” Cf. Laws 789 B for an illustration of the point. Filmer, Patriarcha, misquotes this saying “The Athenians sold justice . . . , which made Plato call a popular estate a fair where everything is to be sold.”
196 Cf. Aristot. Pol. 1271 a 12 δεῖ γὰρ καὶ βουλόμενον καὶ μὴ βουλόμενον ἄρχειν τὸν ἄξιον τῆς ἀρχῆς . cf. 347 B-C.
197 Cf. Laws 955 B-C, where a penalty is pronounced for making peace or war privately, and the parody in Aristoph. Acharn. passim.
198 διαγωγή : cf. 344 E, where it is used more seriously of the whole conduct of life. Cf. also Theaet. 177 A, Polit. 274 D, Tim. 71 D, Laws 806 E, Aristot. Met. 981 b 18 and 982 b 24 uses the word in virtual anaphora with pleasure. See too Zeller, Aristot. ii. pp. 307-309, 266, n. 5.
199 Cf. 562 D. For the mildness of the Athenian democracy cf. Aristot. Ath. Pol. 22. 19, Demosth. xxi. 184, xxii. 51, xxiv. 51 Lysias vi. 34, Isoc. Antid. 20, Areopagit. 67-68, Hel. 27; also Menex. 243 E and also Euthydem. 303 D δημοτικόν τι καὶ πρᾷον ἐν τοῖς λόγοις . Here the word πρᾳότης is ironically transferred to the criminal himself.
200 κομψή : cf. 376 A, Theaet. 171 A.
201 For περινοστεῖ cf. Lucian, Bis Acc. 6, Aristoph. Plut. 121, 494, Peace 762.
202 His being unnoticed accords better with the rendering “spirit,” “one returned from the dead” (a perfectly possible meaning for ἥρως . Wilamowitz, Platon, i. p. 435 translates “Geist”) than with that of a hero returning from the wars. Cf. Adam ad loc.
203 For οὐδ᾽ ὁπωστιοῦν σμικρολογία cf. on 532 B ἔτι ἀδυναμία .
204 σεμνύνοντες here has an ironical or colloquial tone—“high-brow,” “top-lofty.”
205 Cf. 401 B-C, 374 C and on 467 A, Laws 643 B, Delacroix, Psychologie de l'art, p. 46.
206 For ὑπερβεβλημένη Cf. Laws 719 D, Eurip. Alcest. 153.
207 μεγαλοπρεπῶς is often ironical in Plato. Cf. 362 C, Symp. 199 C, Charm. 175 C, Theaet. 161 C, Meno 94 B, Polit. 277 B, Hipp. Maj. 291 E.
208 In Aristoph. Knights 180 ff. Demosthenes tells the sausage-seller that his low birth and ignorance and his trade are the very things that fit him for political leadership.
209 Cf. Aristoph. Knights 732 f., 741 and passim. Andoc. iv. 16 εὔνους τῷ δήμῳ . Emile Faguet, Moralistes, iii. p. 84, says of Tocqueville, “Il est bien je crois le premier qui ait dit que la démocratie abaisse le niveau intellectuel des gouvernements.” For the other side of the democratic shield see Thucyd. ii. 39.
210 For the ironical use of γενναία cf. 544 C, Soph. 231 B, Theaet. 209 E.
211 ἡδεῖα : cf. Isoc. vii. 70 of good government, τοῖς χρωμένοις ἡδίους .
212 Cf. What Plato Said, p. 634, on Laws 744 B-C, and ibid. p. 508 on Gorg. 508 A, Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1131 a 23-24, Newman, i. p. 248, Xen. Cyr. ii. 2. 18.
213 Cf. 572 C, Theogn. 915 f., Anth. Pal. x. 41, Democr. fr. 227 and 228, DieIs ii.3 p. 106, and Epicharm. fr. 45, Diels i.3 126.
214 Cf. What Plato Said, p.485, on Laches 190 B, and p. 551, on Phaedr. 237 E.
215 Cf. 554 A, 571 B, Phaedo 64 D-E, Phileb. 62 E, Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1147 b 29. The Epicureans made much of this distinction. Cf. Cic. De fin. i. 13. 45, Tusc. v. 33, 93, Porphyry, De abst. i. 49. Ath. xii. 511 quotes this passage and says it anticipates the Epicureans.
216 Or “grasp them in outline.”
217 For ὄψον cf. on 372 C, Vol. I. p. 158, note a.
218 For κολαζομένη cf. 571 B, Gorg. 505 B, 491 E, 507 D. For the thought cf. also 519 A-B.
219 Lit. “money-making.” Cf. 558 D.
220 For γέμοντα cf. 577 D, 578 A, 603 D, 611 B, Gorg. 525 A, 522 E, etc.
221 αἴθων occurs only here in Plato. It is common in Pindar and tragedy. Ernst Maass, “Die Ironie des Sokrates,” Sokrates, 11, p. 94 “Platon hat an jener Stelle des Staats, von der wir ausgingen, die schlimmen Erzieher gefährliche Fuchsbestien genannt.” (Cf. Pindar, Ol. xi. 20.)
222 Cf. on 557 C, p. 286, note a.
223 Cf. 554 D.
224 For the metaphor cf. Xen. Mem. i. 2. 24 ἐδυνάσθην ἐκείνῳ χρωμένω συμμάχῳ τῶν μὴ καλῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν κρατεῖν , “they [Critias and Alcibiades] found in him [Socrates] an ally who gave them strength to conquer their evil passions.” (Loeb tr.)
225 Cf. on 554 D, p. 276, note c.
226 τινες . . . αἱ μὲν . . . αἱ δὲ . For the partitive apposition cf. 566 E, 584 D, Gorg. 499 C. Cf. also Protag. 330 A, Gorg. 450 C, Laws 626 E, Eurip. Hec. 1185-1186.
227 Cf. Tim. 90 A.
228 For the idea of guardians of the soul Cf. Laws 961 D, 549 B Cf. also on Phaedo 113 D, What Plato Said, p. 536.
229 Cf. Phaedo 92 D.
230 Plato, like Matthew Arnold, liked to use nicknames for classes of people: Cf. Rep. 415 D γηγενεῖς , Theaet. 181 A ῥέοντας , Soph. 248 A εἰδῶν φίλους , Phileb. 44 E τοῖς δυσχερέσιν . So Arnold in Culture and Anarchy uses Populace, Philistines, Barbarians, Friends of Culture, etc., Friends of Physical Science, Lit. and Dogma, p. 3.
231 βοήθεια : cf. Aristot. De an. 404 a 12.
232 Cf. 474 D, Thucyd. iii. 82 Wilamowitz, Platon, i. 435-436 says that Plato had not used Thucydides. But cf. Gomperz iii. 331, and What Plato Said, pp. 2-3, 6, 8. See Isoc. Antid. 284 σκώπτειν καὶ μιμεῖσθαι δυναμένους εὐφυεῖς καλοῦσι , etc., Areop. 20 and 49, Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1180 b 25, Quintil. iii. 7. 25 and viii. 6. 36, Sallust, Cat. C 52 “iam pridem equidem nos vera vocabula rerum amisimus,” etc.
233 ὑπερορίζουσι : cf. Laws 855 C ὑπερορίαν φυγάδα , 866 D.
234 Cf. 567 C and 573 B where the word is also used ironically, and Laws 735, Polit. 293 D, Soph. 226 D.
235 κατέχομαι is used of divine “possession” or inspiration in Phaedr. 244 E, Ion 533 E, 536 B, etc., Xen. Symp. 1. 10.
236 Plato frequently employs the language of the mysteries for literary effect. Cf. Gorg. 497 C, Symp. 210 A and 218 B, Theaet. 155 E-156 A, Laws 666 B, 870 D-E, Phaedr. 250 B-C, 249 C, Phaedo 81 A, 69 C, Rep. 378 A, etc., and Thompson on Meno 76 E.
237 Cf. Eurip. fr. 628. 5 (Nauck), Soph. El. 1130.
238 For the ironical δή cf. 562 D, 563 B, 563 D, 374 B, 420 E and on 562 E, p. 307, note h.
239 Cf. Phaedr. 241 A μεταβαλὼν ἄλλον ἄρχοντα ἐν αὑτῷ . For this type of youth Cf. Thackeray's Barnes Newcome. For the lot Cf. supra, p. 285, note d, on 557 A.
240 Notice the frequency of the phrase ἐξ ἴσου in this passage. Cf. 557 A.
241 An obvious reference to the Gorgias. Cf. Gorg. 494 E, Phileb. 13 B ff., Protag. 353 D ff., Laws 733.
242 The Greek Says “throws back his head”—the characteristic negative gesture among Greeks. In Aristoph. Acharn. 115 the supposed Persians give themselves away by nodding assent and dissent in Hellenic style, as Dicaeopolis says.
243 For the word καταυλούμενος cf. 411 A, Laws 790 E, Lucian, Bis acc. 17, and for the passive Eur. I. T. 367. Cf. also Philetaerus, Philaulus, fr. 18, Kock ii. p. 235, Eur. fr. 187. 3 μολπαῖσι δ᾽ ἡσθεὶς τοῦτ᾽ ἀεὶ θηρεύεται . For the type cf. Theophrastus, Char. 11, Aristoph. Wasps 1475 ff.
244 Cf. Protag. 319 D.
245 For ὅ τι ἂν τύχῃ cf. on 536 A, p. 213, note f, ὅταν τύχῃ Eurip. Hippol. 428, I. T. 722, Eurip. Fr. 825 (Didot), ὅπου ἂν τύχωσιν Xen. Oec. 20. 28, ὃν ἂν τύχῃς Eurip. Tor. 68.
246 παντοδαπόν : cf. on 557 C.
247 Cf. 557 D.
248 For the irony cf. 607 E τῶν καλῶν πολιτειῶν , 544 C γενναία , 558 C ἡδεῖα .
249 τίς τρόπος . . . γίγνεται is a mixture of two expressions that need not be pressed. Cf. Meno 96 D, Epist. vii. 324 B. A. G. Laird, in Class. Phil., 1918, pp. 89-90 thinks it means “What τρόπος (of the many τρόποι in a democracy) develops into a τρόπος of tyranny; for that tyranny is a transformation of democracy is fairly evident.” That would be a recognition of what Aristotle says previous thinkers overlook in their classification of polities.
250 Their idea of good. Cf. 555 b προκειμένου ἀγαθοῦ . Cf. Laws 962 E with Aristot. Pol. 1293 b 14 ff. Cf. also Aristot. Pol. 1304 b 20 αἱ μὲν οὖν δημοκρατίαι μάλιστα μεταβάλλουσι διὰ τὴν τῶν δημαγωγῶν ἀσέλγειαν . Cf. also p. 263, note e on 551 B ( ὅρος ) and p. 139, note c on 519 C ( σκοπός ).
251 Cf. 552 B, and for the disparagement of wealth p. 262, note b, on 550 E.
252 Zeller, Aristot. ii. p. 285, as usual credits Aristotle with the Platonic thought that every form of government brings ruin on itself by its own excess.
253 Cf. Arnold, Culture and Anarchy , p. 43 “The central idea of English life and politics is the assertion of personal liberty.”
254 Aristot. Pol. 1263 b 29 says life would be impossible in Plato's Republic.
255 ᾖα . . . ἐρῶν : cf. 449 A, Theaet. 180 C.
256 Or “protectors,” “tribunes,” προστατούντων . Cf. on 565 C, p. 318, note d.
257 Cf. Livy xxxix. 26 “velut ex diutina siti nimis avide meram haurientes libertatem,” Seneca, De benefic. i. 10 “male dispensata libertas,” Taine, Letter, Jan. 2, 1867 “nous avons proclamé et appliqué l’égalité . . . C’est un vin pur et généreux; mais nous avons bu trop du nôtre.”
258 μιαρούς is really stronger, “pestilential fellows.” Cf. Apol. 23 D, Soph. Antig. 746. It is frequent in Aristophanes.
259 For the charge of oligarchical tendencies cf. Isoc. Peace 51 and 133, Areop. 57, Antid. 318, Panath. 158.
260 Cf. Symp. 184 C, 183 A. Cf. the essay of Estienne de la Boétie, De la servitude volontaire. Also Gray, Ode for Music, 6 “Servitude that hugs her chain.”
261 For οὐδὲν ὄντας cf. 341 C, Apol. 41 E, Symp. 216 E, Gorg. 512 C, Erastae 134 C, Aristoph. Eccles. 144, Horace, Sat. ii. 7. 102 “nil ego,” Eurip. I. A. 371, Herod. ix. 58 οὐδένες ἐόντες .
262 Cf. Laws 699 E ἐπὶ πᾶσαν ἐλευθερίαν , Aristoph. Lysistr. 543 ἐπὶ πᾶν ἰέναι , Soph. El. 615 εἰς πᾶν ἔργον .
263 Cf. 563 C, Laws 942 D.
264 A common conservative complaint. Cf. Isoc. Areop. 49, Aristoph. Clouds, 998, 1321 ff., Xen. Rep. Ath. 1. 10, Mem. iii. 5. 15; Newman i. pp. 174 and 339-340. Cf. also Renan, Souvenirs, xviii.-xx., on American vulgarity and liberty; Harold Lasswell, quoting Bryce, “Modern Democracies,” in Methods of Social Science, ed. by Stuart A. Rice, p. 376: “The spirit of equality is alleged to have diminished the respect children owe to parents, and the young to the old. This was noted by Plato in Athens. But surely the family relations depend much more on the social, structural and religious ideas of a race than on forms of government”; Whitman, “Where the men and women think lightly of the laws . . . where children are taught to be laws to themselves . . . there the great city stands.
265 For the ironical ἵνα δή cf. on 561 B. Cf. Laws 962 E ἐλεύθερον δή , Meno 86 and Aristoph. Clouds 1414.
266 Cf. Protag. 336 A, Theaet. 174 A, 168 B.
267 For εὐτραπελίας cf. Isoc. xv. 296, vii. 49, Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 1108 a 23. In Rhet. 1389 b 11 he defines it as πεπαιδευμένη ὕβρις . Arnold once addressed the Eton boys on the word.
268 Cf. Xen. Rep. Ath. 1. 10. τῶν δούλων δ᾽ αὖ καὶ τῶν μετοίκων πλείστη ἐστὶν Ἀθήνησιν ἀκολασία , Aristoph. Clouds init., and on slavery Laws 777 E, p. 249, note g on 547 C and 549 A.
269 Nauck fr. 351. Cf. Plut. Amat. 763 C, Themist. Orat. iv. p. 52 B; also Otto, p. 39, and Adam ad loc.
270 Cf. 562 E, Julian, Misopogon, 355 B . . . μέχρι τῶν ὄνων ἐστὶν ἐλευθερία παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς καὶ τῶν καμήλων ; ἄγουσί τοι καὶ ταύτας οἱ μισθωτοὶ διὰ τῶν στοῶν ὥσπερ τὰς νύμφας ” . . . what great independence exists among the citizens, even down to the very asses and camels? The men who hire them out lead even these animals through the porticoes as though they were brides.” (Loeb tr.) Cf. Porphyry, Vit. Pythag. Teubner, p. 22, 23 μέχρι καὶ τῶν ἀλόγων ζῴων διικνεῖτο αὐτοῦ ἡ νουθέτησις
271 Otto, p. 119. Cf. “Like mistress, like maid.”
272 Eurip. Ion 635-637 mentions being jostled off the street by a worse person as one of the indignities of Athenian city life.
273 Cf. the reflections in Laws 698 f., 701 A-C, Epist. viii. 354 D, Gorg. 461 E; Isoc. Areop. 20, Panath. 131, Eurip. Cyclops 120 ἀκούει δ᾽ οὐδὲν οὐδεὶς οὐδενός , Aristot. Pol. 1295 b 15 f. Plato, by reaction against the excesses of the ultimate democracy, always satirizes the shibboleth “liberty” in the style of Arnold, Ruskin and Carlyle. He would agree with Goethe (Eckermann i. 219, Jan. 18, 1827) “Nicht das macht frei, das vir nichts über uns erkennen wollen, sondern eben, dass wir etwas verehren, das über uns ist.” Libby, Introd. to Hist. of Science, p. 273, not understanding the irony of the passage, thinks much of it the unwilling tribute of a hostile critic. In Gorg. 484 A Callicles sneers at equality from the point of view of the superman. Cf. also on 558 C, p. 291, note f; Hobbes, Leviathan xxi. and Theopompus's account of democracy in Byzantium, fr. 65. Similar phenomena may be observed in an American city street or Pullman club car.
274 Cf Callimachus, Anth. Pal. vi. 310, and xii. 148 μὴ λέγε . . . τοὐμὸν ὄνειρον ἐμοί , Cic. Att. vi. 9. 3, Lucian, Somnium seu Gallus 7 ὥσπερ γὰρ τοὐμὸν ἐνύπνιον ἰδών , Tennyson, “Lucretius”: “That was mine, my dream, I knew it.”
275 This sensitiveness, on which Grote remarks with approval, is characteristic of present-day American democracy. Cf. also Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, p. 51 “And so if he is stopped from making Hyde Park a bear garden or the streets impassable he says he is being butchered by the aristocracy.”
276 Cf. Gorg. 491 E δουλεύων ὁτῳοῦν , Laws 890 A.
277 Cf. Laws 701 B νόμων ζητεῖν μὴ ὑπηκόοις εἶναι
278 For unwritten law Cf. What Plato Said, p. 637, on Laws 793 A.
279 Cf. Lysias xxv. 27, Isoc. viii. 108, vii. 5, Cic. De rep. i. 44 “nam ut ex nimia potentia principum oritur interitus principum, sic hunc nimis liberum . . . “ etc.
280 For the generalization Cf. Symp. 188 A-B.
281 Cf. 565 D. The slight exaggeration of the expression is solemnly treated by ApeIt as a case of logical false conversion in Plato.
282 Plato keeps to the point. Cf. on 531 C, p. 193, note i.
283 ταὐτόν implies the concept. Cf. Parmen. 130 D, Phileb. 34 E, 13 B, Soph. 253 D. Cf. also Tim. 83 C, Meno 72 C, Rep. 339 A.
284 Cf. 555 D-E.
285 Cf. the parallel of soul and body in 444 C f., Soph. 227 Crito 47 D f., Gorg. 504 B-C, 505 B, 518 A, 524 D. For φλέγμα Cf. Tim. 83 C, 85 A-B.
286 μάλιστα μὲν . . . ἂν δέ : cf. 378 A, 414 C, 461 C, 473 B, Apol. 34 A, Soph. 246 D.
287 For εὐκρινέστερον Cf. Soph. 246 D.
288 Cf. Phileb. 23 C, which Stenzel says argues an advance over the Sophist, because Plato is no longer limited to a bipartite division.
289 Cf. 573 A.
290 ἀνέχεται cf. Isoc. viii. 14 ὅτι δημοκρατίας οὔσης οὐκ ἔστι παρρησία , etc. For the word cf. Aristoph. Acharn. 305 οὐκ ἀνασχήσομαι , Wasps 1337.
291 For βλίττεται cf. Blaydes on Aristoph. Knights 794.
292 That is the significance of πλούσιοι here, lit. “the rich.”
293 For the classification of the population cf. Vol. I. pp. 151-163, Eurip. Suppl. 238 ff., Aristot. Pol. 1328 b ff., 1289 b 33, 1290 b 40 ff., Newman i. p. 97
294 ἀπράγμονες : cf. 620 C, Aristoph. Knights 261, Aristot. Rhet. 1381 a 25, Isoc. Antid. 151, 227. But Pericles in Thuc. ii. 40 takes a different view. See my note in Class. Phil. xv. (1920) pp. 300-301.
295 αὐτουργοί : Cf. Soph. 223 D, Eurip. Or. 920, Shorey in Class. Phil. xxiii. (1928） pp. 346-347.
296 Cf. Aristot. Pol. 1318 b 12.
297 Cf. Isoc. viii. 13 τοὺς τὰ τῆς πόλεως διανεμομένους .
298 For τοὺς ἔχοντας cf. Blaydes on Aristoph. Knights 1295. For the exploitation of the rich at Athens cf. Xen. Symp. 4. 30-32, Lysias xxi. 14, xix. 62, xviii. 20-21, Isoc. Areop. 32 ff., Peace 131, Dem. De cor. 105 ff., on his triarchic law; and also Eurip. Herc. Fur. 588-592.
299 Cf. Aristoph. Knights 717-718, 1219-1223, and Achilles in Il. ix. 363.
300 i.e. reactionaries. Cf. on 562 D, p. 306, note b, Aeschines iii. 168, and 566 C μισόδημος . The whole passage perhaps illustrates the “disharmony” between Plato's upperclass sympathies and his liberal philosophy.
301 So the Attic orators frequently say that a popular jury was deceived. Cf. also Aristoph. Acharn. 515-516.
302 Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 1110 a 1, in his discussion of voluntary and involuntary acts, says things done under compulsion or through misapprehension ( δι᾽ ἄγνοιαν ) are involuntary.
303 For τότ᾽ ἢδη cf. 569 A, Phaedo 87 E, Gorg. 527 D, Laches 181 D, 184 A, and on 550 A, p. 259, note i.
304 So Aristot. Pol. 1304 b 30 ἠναγκάσθησαν σύσταντες καταλῦσαι τὸν δῆμον , Isoc. xv. 318 ὀλιγαρχίαν ὀνειδίζοντες . . . ἠνάγκασαν ὁμοίους γενέσθαι ταῖς αἰτίαις .
305 Cf. 562 D, Eurip. Or. 772 προστάτας , Aristoph. Knights 1128. The προστάτης τοῦ δήμου was the accepted leader of the democracy. Cf. Dittenberger, S. I. G. 2nd ed. 1900, no. 476. The implications of this passage contradict the theory that the oligarchy is nearer the ideal than the democracy. But Plato is thinking of Athens and not of his own scheme. Cf. Introd. pp. xlv-xlvi.
306 Cf. Aristot. Pol. 1310 b 14 οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν τυράννων γεγόνασιν ἐκ δημαγωγῶν , etc., ibid. 1304 b 20 ff.
307 Cf. Frazer on Pausanias viii. 2 (vol. iv. p. 189) and Cook's Zeus, vol. i. p. 70. The archaic religious rhetoric of what follows testifies to the intensity of Plato's feeling. Cf. the language of the Laws on homicide, 865 ff.
308 Note the difference of tone from 502 B. Cf. Phaedr. 260 C.
309 Cf. Pindar, Pyth. ii. 32; Lucan i. 331: “nullus semel ore receptus Pollutas patitur sanguis mansuescere fauces.
310 For ἀφανίζων Cf. Gorg. 471 B.
311 The apparent contradiction of the tone here with Laws 684 E could be regarded mistakenly as another “disharmony.” Grote iii. p. 107 says that there is no case of such radical measures in Greek history. Schmidt, Ethik der Griechen, ii. p. 374, says that the only case was that of Cleomenes at Sparta in the third century. See Georges Mathieu, Les Idées politiques d’Isocrate, p. 150, who refers to Andoc. De myst. 88, Plato, Laws 684, Demosth. Against Timocr. 149 (heliastic oath), Michel, Recueil d'inscriptions grecques, 1317, the oath at Itanos.
312 Cf. 619 C.
313 Cf. 565 A.
314 Cf Herod. i. 59, Aristot. Rhet. 1357 b 30 ff. Aristotle, Pol. 1305 a 7-15, says that this sort of thing used to happen but does not now, and explains why. For πολυθρύλητον Cf. Phaedo 100 B.
315 For the ethical dative αὐτοῖς cf. on 343 Vol. I. p. 65, note c.
316 For μισόδημος cf. Aristoph. Wasps 474, Xen. Hell. ii. 3. 47, Andoc. iv. 16, and by contrast φιλόδημον , Aristoph. Knights 787, Clouds 1187.
317 In Hom. Il. 16.776 Cebriones, Hector's charioteer, slain by Patroclus, κεῖτο μέγας μεγαλωστί , “mighty in his mightiness.” (A. T. Murray, Loeb tr.)
318 For the figure Cf. Polit. 266 E. More common in Plato is the figure of the ship in this connection. Cf. on 488.
319 Cf. Eurip. I. A. 333 ff., Shakes. Henry IV. Part I. I. iii. 246 “This king of smiles, this Bolingbroke.”
320 Not “foreign enemies” as almost all render it. Cf. my note on this passage in Class. Rev. xix. (1905) pp. 438-439, 573 B ἔξω ὠθεῖ , Theognis 56, Thuc. iv. 66 and viii. 64.
321 Cf. Polit. 308 A, and in modern times the case of Napoleon.
322 For ταράττειν in this sense cf. Dem. De cor. 151 ἐγκλήματα καὶ πόλεμος . . . ἐταράχθη , Soph. Antig. 795 νεῖκος . . . ταράξας .
323 ξυγκαταστησάντων is used in Aesch. Prom. 307 of those who helped Zeus to establish his supremacy among the gods. See also Xen Ages. 2.31, Isoc. 4.126 .
324 Cf. Thucyd. viii. 70, Herod. iii. 80. δή , as often in the Timaeus, marks the logical progression of the thought. Cf. Tim. 67 C, 69 A, 77 C, 82 B, and passim.
325 Cf. on 560 D, p. 299, note c. Aristotle says that in a democracy ostracism corresponds to this. Cf. Newman i. p. 262. For the idea that the tyrant fears good or able and outstanding men Cf. Laws 832 C, Gorg. 510 B-C, Xen. Hiero 5. I, Isoc. viii. 112, Eurip. Ion 626-628. But cf. Pindar, Pyth, iii, 71, of Hiero, οὐ φθονέων ἀγαθοῖς .
326 Cf. Laws 952 E, Rep. 467 D.
327 Cf. the Scottish guards of Louis XI. of France, the Swiss guards of the later French kings, the Hessians hired by George III. against the American colonies, and the Asiatics in the Soviet armies.
328 παντοδαπούς : cf. on 557 C.
329 For αὐτόθεν cf. Herod. i. 64 τῶν μὲν αὐτόθεν , τῶν δὲ ἀπὸ Στρύμονος , Thuc. i. 11, Xen. Ages. 1. 28.
330 For the idiomatic and colloquial χρῆμα cf. Herod. i. 36, Eurip. Androm. 181, Theaet. 209 E, Aristoph. Clouds 1, Birds 826, Wasps 933, Lysistr. 83, 1085, Acharn. 150, Peace 1192, Knights 1219, Frogs 1278.
331 For the wretched lot of the tyrant cf. p. 368, note a.
332 For οὐκ ἐτός cf. 414 E. The idiom is frequent in Aristoph. Cf. e.g. Acharn. 411, 413, Birds 915, Thesm. 921, Plut. 404, 1166, Eccl. 245.
333 This is plainly ironical and cannot be used by the admirers of Euripides.
334 Cf. πυκιναὶ φρένες Iliad xiv. 294, πυκινὸς νόος xv. 41 etc.
335 Cf. Theages 125 B f. The line is also attributed to Sopholces. Cf. Stemplinger, Das Plagiat in der griechischen Literatur, p. 9; Gellius xiii. 18, F. Dümmler, Akademika, p. 16. Wilamowitz, Platon, i. p. 119 thinks this an allusion to Euripides and Agathon at the court of Archelaus of Macedon. Isocrates ix. 40, like the poets, praises the tyrants, but ii. 3-5 contrasts their education unfavorably with that of the ordinary citizen. Throughout the passage he is plainly thinking of Plato.
336 Cf. Vol. I. p. 119, note c, Eurip. Tro. 1169, Isoc. ii. 5.
337 Cf. 394 D, What Plato Said, p. 561, 598 ff.
338 κομψοί is used playfully or ironically.
339 Cf. Gorg. 502 B ff., Laws 817 C, and for the expression Protag. 347 D.
340 Cf. Laches 183 A-B.
341 Cf. Shakes. Ant. and Cleop. III. X. 25 “Our fortune on the sea is out of breath.
342 Cf. on 572 B, p. 339, note e.
343 Cf. 574 D, Diels1 p. 578, Anon. Iambl. 3.
344 Cf. Soph. O. T. 873 ὕβρις φυτεύει τύραννον .
345 For καλῶν κἀγαθῶν cf. Aristoph. Knights 185, and Blaydes on 735. See also on 489 E, p. 27, note d.
346 Cf. Blaydes on Aristoph. Clouds 123.
347 For the threatening γνώσεται cf. 362 A, 466 C, Il. xviii. 270 and 125, Theocr. xxvi. 19 τάχα γνώσῃ , and Lucian, Timon 33 εἴσεται .
348 For the juxtaposition οἷος οἷον Cf. Symp. 195 A, Sophocles El. 751, Ajax 557, 923, Trach. 995, 1045.
349 Cf. on 574 C, pp. 346-347, note e.
350 As we say, “Out of the frying-pan into the fire.” Cf. Anth. Pal. ix. 17. 5 ἐκ πυρὸς ὡς αἶνος ' πεσες ἐς φλόγα , Theodoret, Therap. iii. p. 773 καὶ τὸν καπνὸν κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν , ὡς ἔοικε , φύγοντες , εἰς αὐτὸ δὴ τὸ πῦρ ἐμπεπτώκαμεν . See Otto, p. 137; also Solon 7 (17) ( Anth. Lyr., Bergk-Hiller, 9 in Edmonds, Greek Elegy and Iambus, i. p. 122, Loeb Classical Library) εἰς δὲ μονάρχου δῆμος ἀιδρείῃ δουλοσύνην ἔπεσεν , Herod. iii. 81 τυράννου ὕβριν φεύγοντας ἄνδρας ἐς δήμου ἀκολάστου ὕβριν πεσεῖν , and for the idea Epist. viii. 354 D.
351 Cf. Epist. viii. 354 D.
352 For the rhetorical style Cf. Tim. 41 θεοὶ θεῶν , Polit. 303 C σοφιστῶν σοφιστάς , and the biblical expressions, God of Gods and Lord of Lords, e.g. Deut. x. 17, Ps. cxxxvi. 2-3, Dan. xi. 36, Rev. xix. 16. Cf. Jebb on Soph. O. T. 1063 τρίδουλος .
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- The Republic Summary
The Republic itself is nothing at the start of Plato 's most famous and influential book. It does not exist. Not only does it not exist in actuality, but it does not exist in theory either. It must be built. It's architect will be Socrates , the fictional persona Plato creates for himself. In the first episode Socrates encounters some acquaintances during the festival of Bendis. His reputation for good conversation already well-established, Socrates is approached by some dilettante philosopher acquaintances and drawn into a dialogue. The discussion quickly moves to justice thanks to Socrates. The other philosophers, including Thrasymachus , Polermarchus , Glaucon , and Adeimantus enthusiastically consent to such a worthy topic. However, it is unlikely at this point that any of these philosopherssave Socrates, of courseanticipates the ambition and enormity of their undertaking.
In Book I, Socrates entertains two distinct definitions of justice. The first is provided by Polermarchus, who suggests that justice is "doing good to your friends and harm to your enemies." The definition, which is a version of conventionally morality, is considered. Very soon though, its faults are clearly apparent. It is far to relative to serve as a formulation of the justice. Moreover, its individual terms are vulnerable; that is to say, how does one know who is a friend and who an enemy? And are not friends as much as enemies capable of evil? And when a friend acts wickedly, should he not be punished? And next, what does it mean that an action is good or bad? The perils of giving credence to false appearances is introduced early on as a major theme. It will be dealt with at length in the succeeding books. Thus surely an idea as noble as justice will not stand on such precarious ground. Socrates is dissatisfied. A second definition, offered by Thrasymachus, endorses tyranny. "Obedience to the interest of the stronger," is likewise mined for its value, shown to be deficient, and discarded. Tyranny, Socrates demonstrates employing several analogies, inevitably results in the fragmentation of the soul. Benevolent rule, on the other hand, ensures a harmonious life for both man and State. Justice is its means and good is its end. That "justice is the excellence of the soul" is Socrates' main conclusion. But there are too many presumptions. Although his auditors have troubled refuting his claims, Socrates knows he has been too vague and that should they truly wish to investigate the question of justice, he will have to be more specific. Book I ends with yet another question. Is the just life more pleasurable, more rewarding than the unjust? Rather all at once the philosophers have inundated themselves. But the first book has succeeded in one major way. It has established the territory of the over-arching argument of the entire work;
The philosophers continue the debate in Book II by introducing a new definition that belongs more to political philosophy than pure philosophy: that justice is a legally enforced compromise devised for the mutual protection of citizens of a state. In other words, justice is a fabrication of the State that prevents citizens from harming one another. Socrates is certainly up to the challenge. He dislikes the idea that justice does not exists naturally, but that it must be externally and superficially imposed to discourage unjust behavior. Adeimantus' mentioning of the State seems fortuitous, but it is as if Socrates has been waiting for it all along. Uncertain whether they can arrive at an acceptable definition of justice any other way, Socrates proposes they construct a State of which they approve, and see if they might not find justice lurking in it somewhere. This State arises, Socrates says, "out of the needs of mankind." And the immense project of building a State from its very foundation has officially commenced. Basic necessities are addressed first, then the primitive division of labor, followed by the rudiments of education. Within the ideal State, Socrates maintains, there will be no need for "bad fictions," or manipulative poetics in general, since education must be perfectly moral.
The arts in education are primarily dealt with in Book III. Socrates concludes his attack on the "libelous poetry" that portrays his beloved virtues in so many negative lights. It is not of use to the State. Or if it is to be of use, it must be stringently didactic and partake of none of the indulgence and rhapsody common to their tradition and to contemporary poets as well. Even Homer is indicted. Instead the citizens of the state, at this early stage they are generically named guardians, are to be nourished only on literature - broadly termed 'music' by Socrates - clearly illustrating courage, wisdom, temperance, and virtue (just behavior). The second part of education, gymnasium, consists mostly of the physical training of the citizens. At this point Socrates' State needs rulers. Who better to rule than the best and most patriotic citizens produced by the rigorous education apparatus. These very select few are now more strictly called the guardians, while non-guardians remain citizens. The guardians will be the rulers. The book closes with the Phoenician myth, which Socrates feels would serve as effective mythical explanation for their State. Through the myth citizens are told they are made of a certain mix of metals, gold and silver, iron and brass, etc. They are born like this and are to take the requisite social station because of it. However, should a citizen of gold or silver be born to parents of an inferior metal, he will rise socially as is just; and the rule will also function in the reverse situation. The myth provides the State with an accessible, allegorical illustration of its stable, hierarchical social organization.
In Book IV the happiness of the guardians, so strenuously trained, is questioned. Socrates takes the objections of his auditors in due stride, reminding them of their original premise: that the State is to be for the good of the many and not the few. Their State has grown larger in the meantime, and is beginning to divide its labors. Defense and security against neighbors and foreign invasion enter the debate. But surely, Socrates says, the education, military and otherwise, that the citizens have garnered, coupled with their love for the State and their solidarity, will repel or outwit all challenges. Believing that what they have created thus far is a perfect State, the philosopher once again seek out justice. Socrates suggests they proceed by a process of elimination among the four virtues. He defines courage, temperance, and wisdom, but must digress before attaining justice. The digression yields the three principles of the soul: reason, passion, and appetite. When these exist in harmony, Socrates concludes, there is justice. It is a provisional definition.
The philosophers agreement at the end of Book IV to discuss the various corrupt forms of government is, however, interrupted by an accusation of laziness. Thrasymachus voices his dissatisfaction with Socrates who, he says, has purposely avoided speaking of the more practical concerns of the State. The objection blossoms into the section on matrimony. Encompassing matrimony, family, and community, Socrates elucidates his very scientific, very futuristic plan for population control and the right breeding of the human animal. The strong reproduce more often than the weak. Likewise weak offspring are disposed of or hidden away someplace unnamed. Socrates has bucked two of what he calls three "waves." The third and greatest is the question of whether their possibility is realizable in any way. Socrates' response is mostly negative. However, there is one method by which the States they see around them might become ideal States. That is, if philosophers become kings or, more likely, if kings take up the study of philosophy. Hence the famous term philosopher-kings. But this in turn begs the query: what is the philosopher? This leads Socrates into another complicated idea, an inchoate version of the Theory of Forms. Manifestations, appearances, likenesses, opinionsnone of them are Reality; they are merely shadows. Only the Forms, the ideals that lie behind are truth. And the philosopher seeks above all else knowledge of these Forms.
Yet another accusation from the gallery directs Socrates' inquiry in the beginning of Book VI. Adeimantus believes the guardians they have created are monsters. On the contrary, Socrates defends, their nobility and worth are beyond question, drawing on the parable of the pilot and his crew as an illustration. The parable opposes the wants of the majority with the authority of the truly fit leader. The multitudes, Socrates explains, do not know what is best for them. They are to be ruled by one especially suited and trained to this end, and for the good of all. Socrates is obliged then to develop the relationship between the guardians and philosophy. Guardians, he says, cease to be guardians when they abandon the truth, be minority or otherwise. The final section of Book VI includes a series of wonderfully vivid and intelligible figures or metaphors that help clarify somewhat the Theory of Forms and the good. Visibility, vision, and light are analogous to knowledge, the knower, and that which makes knowing possible, the good. The good is symbolized by sunlight, the vital means by which the sun not only sheds light on the world but nourishes that world. Philosophy is a love of the light, an attempt to perceive and understand it in all its metaphorical manifestations. Everything else belongs to the world of the manifold, of shadows. Finally the dialectic is the only way to ascend, as upon a staircase of ideas, to the luminous good.
Book VII is dominated by the Allegory of the Cave. One of the most enduring images perhaps in the history of western philosophy, the dim cave plays host to a group of prisoners, chained in such a way that they cannot move their heads, stare at a wall all day. Thanks to a small fire, the prisoners see the shadows of their captors projected on the wall. Having always been in the cave, they believe the shadows are true; likewise, the echoed voices they hear, they also believe to be true. Then one day a certain prisoner is released. The secrets of the cave are disclosed to him, and he is lead up into the sunlight, which blinds his unaccustomed eyes. The third part of the allegory has the enlightened' prisoner, who has looked upon, contemplated, and adjusted to the true light of the sun, must return to the cave. There he finds his new eyes ill-suited for cave life and is cruelly mocked by the other prisoners. A summary of the life course of the guardians, the allegory moralizes dutiful rule for the common good. The guardians must give up the beauty and peace of the light to help their fellow men, the majority of whom dwell in abject darkness. But who would make such a sacrifice? Given their educationwhich is now expanded even furtherSocrates is confidant the guardians would. After all they spend the first fifty years of their life training for the opportunity and, as they would considered it, their honor.
Socrates asks permission to backtrack a little at the opening of Book VIII in order to analyze the forms of corrupt governments. This way they can also look at the individuals inhabiting them, thus cutting away the grist so that only the meat, the just man, may remain. There are four principle defective forms: timocracy, oligarchy, democracy, and tyranny. Aristocracy's (the republic) degeneration into timocracy occurs as a kind of hypothetical fluke, an error in population control. The timocracy is a government based primarily on honor not justice, and the timocratic man is torn between his philosophical ancestors and new, ingratiating contemporaries who flatter his vanity. Oligarchy arises when wealth becomes the standard. The State separates into two distinct and distant classesrich and poor. And the timocrat embodies the old, honorable ways in competition with avarice. After a revolution in which the rulers are overthrown by the discontented poor, democracy, the most liberal and various State appears. The democratic representative is ruled by appetites that hold sway well above reason or honor. The final dissolution into the worst and most wicked form of government, tyranny, is the result of democracy's supposed virtue: freedom. But is in excess and, after another revolution, a new ruler, the tyrant ascends. He has no unlimited freedom and thus no morals. He feels off the State, taxes his people, protects himself with mercenaries, and destroys any threat to this power. The book's most miserable character, the tyrant is antithetical to the guardian; he is injustice incarnate.
Book IX sees Socrates deal with the figure of the tyrant in more depth. This is a necessary digression, since by evaluating the life of the tyrant, his pleasures and pains, they may have a better idea of what constitutes the unjust life. Eventually they will use what they learn from the tyrant to compare his life with the philosopher's. The tyrant begins as the champion of the people, promising to release them from debt. By the end of his reign, however, he has taxed them into poverty and enslaved them. Then, in an unexpected turn, the tyrant, for a while master of all men himself becomes a slave to all men. He is governed by insatiable appetites, is threatened on all sides and at every moment by betrayal and assassination, and can never leave his land for fear of being deposed. The portrait is rather dismal; what would seem to be absolute freedom is in reality absolute slavery. Book IX concludes with the re-introduction of the question: does the unjust man who is perceived as just in public live better or worse than the just man perceived as unjust? A discussion of the nature of pleasure ensues and the base pleasures are distinguished from the noble and, in fact, more enjoyable. Ultimately, Socrates answers, in the long run, injustice enjoys much less, if at all, and must inevitably reveal itself and be shunned or cast out. The finale, and really the end of the State as such, is Socrates assertion that whether or not the ideal State becomes a reality, the philosopher must always live as though it were real inside him.
The final book of The Republic, "The Recompense of Life," telescopes into two main points. First is the issue of imitative poetry. Here Socrates offers his conclusive assessment of the poetic arts. Homer, he apologizes, must, except for those parts portraying nobility and right behavior in famous men and gods, be left out of the State. He may even have to be translated from verse to prose, in order that the musicality of the language not seduce any citizens. Second comes the true recompense of life, which actually occurs in the afterlife. Although the just man reaps great rewards in mortal life, it is in his immortality, or the immortality of his soul, where he is truly paid his due. The gods receive the just man, who has aspired all along to emulate them, as a quasi-equal. And enfin, The Republic closes with Socrates' colorful narration of the tale of Er the hero. It is a long description of an afterlife, in which all those virtues that Socrates has worked so diligently to expose and defend are given their proper place. Souls are shown in eternal recurrence, moving up and down from the heavens to earth and back again (with the wicked spending thousand year stints in hell).
The Republic Questions and Answers
The Question and Answer section for The Republic is a great resource to ask questions, find answers, and discuss the novel.
Plato's The Republic Book 6
• Keenness of memory
Please give me a brief review about Book 10.
The final book of The Republic begins with Socrates return to an earlier theme, that of imitative poetry. He reiterates that while he is still content with having banished poetry from their State, he wishes to explain his reasons more thoroughly....
What does Socrates believe is man's obligation to his community?
Socrates believed that it is a man's obligation to act rationally not only for himself, but his community as well.
Study Guide for The Republic
The Republic study guide contains a biography of Plato, literature essays, a complete e-text, quiz questions, major themes, characters, and a full summary and analysis.
- About The Republic
- Character List
- Book I Summary and Analysis
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Essays for The Republic
The Republic literature essays are academic essays for citation. These papers were written primarily by students and provide critical analysis of The Republic.
- The Abolishment of Gender Roles in On Liberty and The Republic: Mill's Ethic of Choice Transcends Plato's Doctrine of Justice
- Plato and Gender Equality
- Property in the Ideal State
- The Metaphor of the Cave
- Equal Opportunity in the Republic
Lesson Plan for The Republic
- About the Author
- Study Objectives
- Common Core Standards
- Introduction to The Republic
- Relationship to Other Books
- Bringing in Technology
- Notes to the Teacher
- The Republic Bibliography
E-Text of The Republic
The Republic e-text contains the full text of The Republic by Plato.
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